

What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?



# What Difference has Peacebuilding Made?

A Study of the Effectiveness  
of Peacebuilding in  
Preventing Violence:  
Lessons Learned from the  
March 2004 Riots in Kosovo

CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects

July 2006

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### Kosovo Municipalities: Serbian & Albanian



The boundaries displayed on this map do not imply official recognition by the United Nations

UNHCR GIS Unit Skopje

30 April 1999

\\G:\Overview\Municipalities in Serb & Alb

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Serb Communities in Kosovo, from Matveeva, Anna and Wolf-Christian Paes, *The Kosovo Serbs: an ethnic minority between collaboration and defiance* (Friedrich Naumann Foundation and Saferworld, 2003).

# List of Abbreviations

CCK	Coordination Centre for Kosovo (Serbian Government agency)
CDA	CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects
CDA-CLP	Collaborative for Development Action – Collaborative Learning Projects
CivPol	United Nations Civilian Police
EU	European Union
HDI	Human Development Index
ICG	International Crisis Group
IEV	Inter-ethnic violence
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGO	Inter-governmental Organisation
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army (also known as UCK)
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
K-Albanian	Kosovo Albanian community
K-Serb	Kosovo Serb community
LDK	<i>Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves</i> (Democratic League of Kosovo), formerly headed by Ibrahim Rugova, currently headed by Kosovo President Fatmir Sedjiu
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSCE-KVM	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe – Kosovo Verification Mission (deployed prior to 1999)
PDK	<i>Partia Demokratikee Kosoves</i> (Democratic Party of Kosovo), headed by Hashim Thaqi
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self Government

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RAE	Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian
SNC	Serbian National Council
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo

# Foreward

The violence that shook Kosovo in March 2004 came as a blow to the people of Kosovo, and, especially to the international community. After nearly five years of significant investment in a variety of economic, social and cultural initiatives aimed at bridging the gap separating the different ethnic groups, the events of March 2004 were a sad reminder of the urgent need to assess critically whether such interventions were contributing towards the goal of building a peaceful, multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. This was particularly important for those specifically *peacebuilding* initiatives which focused on promoting conflict management and resolution through dialogue and mediation, as well as through the implementation of a diversity of development interventions in ethnically mixed areas.

CARE International viewed the March 2004 events as an opportunity to assess whether its peacebuilding work was in fact making a difference, as there was some evidence that a number of communities engaged in its programs had either resisted or experienced little violence. Given the relevance of such a study for future peacebuilding programming in Kosovo, it soon became evident that this exercise could not limit itself to reviewing CARE's programs but that it should include the peacebuilding work carried out by a number of local and international NGOs, as well as by municipal governments and some international organizations. Broadening the scope of the study was a means of obtaining more reliable, and therefore, more useful results for all those undertaking some form of peacebuilding work in Kosovo and hopefully elsewhere.

A successful combination of efforts by a number of organizations made this research possible. CARE International invited Collaborative Development Action (CDA) to undertake the study. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom generously offered to fund a substantial part of its cost. CARE International UK, CARE Austria, as well as CDA also contributed funds to the study.

Although the research findings cannot be considered conclusive, as they are necessarily based on a small sample of interventions in Kosovo, they do provide extremely valuable insights into the impact of peacebuilding initiatives that we cannot afford to ignore. Thus, the report indicates that important achievements obtained through dialogue and training in dispelling certain fears and breaking down stereotypes and 'enemy images' remain at the level of individuals and are not adding up by involving larger groups of individuals, communities and key organizations or by creating broader networks that could contribute more effectively to reducing tension and generating meaningful forms of inter-ethnic cooperation. The assumption that the implementation of ethnically mixed initiatives will bridge political divisions, diminish feelings of hatred and fear, and will facilitate acceptance of the "Other" is not materializing. This is due, among other reasons, because 'multi-ethnicity' is widely perceived as a 'conditionality' imposed by the international community, and because these initiatives are not addressing the issues

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that continue to divide and confront Kosovo along ethnic lines such as war crimes, missing persons, justice, impunity, security and property titles. With the partial exception of the latter, these admittedly sensitive issues are not being considered by most peacebuilding initiatives in a systematic way, perhaps because they demand a long-term and progressive approach that cannot be accommodated within the typically short life of projects which, moreover, are expected to demonstrate concrete, and at times immediate, results. The requirement of *quick-impact* peacebuilding interventions rather than gradual *time-healing* processes that allow for the sustainable resolution of ethnic antagonisms explains at least in part why ‘multi-ethnicity’ has not been internalized as a positive value by all ethnic groups and why they largely regard it as a component of an internationally-driven agenda. It is hard but valuable lessons such as these that make the CDA research report so relevant for rethinking and adjusting peacebuilding programming in Kosovo with a view to enhancing its impact. The report also enables us to envisage the immense challenges that will continue to haunt Kosovo after the resolution of its political status.

CARE International Kosovo is pleased to share with you this research report on ***What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?*** which will soon be published as a book. We are convinced that it will greatly help the work of all those committed to achieving a lasting peace in Kosovo.

Pristina, 20 September, 2006

**CARE International Kosovo**

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### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The violence of March 2004 prompted many agencies to reflect on their peacebuilding programming throughout Kosovo. What had gone wrong? Could they have done better? In some communities, however, there was little or no violence. This study was undertaken in response to a request by CARE International, with other NGOs, to understand what went right in those communities, and what lessons to be learned from those experiences to improve the effectiveness of peacebuilding programming in preventing violence in the future. The study was funded by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, CARE UK, CARE Austria, and CDA-CLP's *Reflecting on Peace Practice* project.

The purpose of the study was to understand whether and how peacebuilding programming contributed to communities' lack of participation in violence, especially that which occurred in March, 2004.<sup>1</sup> The questions we have focused on are:

- What have been factors that have enabled communities to avoid, resist or not to participate in inter-ethnic violence?
- To what extent has peacebuilding work contributed to these factors?

The study was conducted in three phases. First, between January and May, 2005, we conducted a broad survey and several consultative workshops with NGOs and other agencies in Kosovo to analyse patterns of violence from 2002 onward, to identify (preliminarily) factors to explore in understanding the presence or absence of violence in communities, and to select sites for in-depth case studies. Based on this, we conducted seven field-based, rich narrative case studies in the second stage of the research, from June – November 2005, focusing on the period 2002 – 2005. A mix of cases were chosen for comparative purposes: communities with and without high levels of inter-ethnic violence in March 2004 and previously, and with and without extensive peacebuilding interventions. The communities included: Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, Shtupel/Stupelj and Bica/Binxhe and Grabac/Grabc (Klinë/Klina municipality), Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec and surrounding villages (Pejë/Peć municipality), Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë and Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme (Štrpce/Shtërpçë municipality), Gjilan/Gnjilane town, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica town, and Zheger/Zegra (Gjilan/Gnjilane municipality). In the final phase, we analysed the cases, again collaboratively through several consultative workshops in Kosovo, Washington and Boston with NGOs, donors, international agencies and issue experts.

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<sup>1</sup> The term peacebuilding has been used alternatively to describe the entire endeavor of the international community in Kosovo and to describe specific programming designed to address the causes of ongoing and future conflict. Here the latter conception is used.

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The findings reflect what we have heard from a wide range of people in these communities and the international and governmental organizations and NGOs working there, about what has enabled them to avoid or resist violence, or, in cases where there was violence, what happened and why. We chose to focus first on community perceptions of violence and on peacebuilding work in their communities so that we would not bias the study in favor of peacebuilding work, and so that we would not miss important elements not related to that work.

### PERCEPTIONS VS. REALITY OF INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE

There was a widespread perception – especially among the international community – that in the 2002-2004 period security of minorities and relations among ethnicities had improved. Decreases in IEV in some municipalities with significant minority populations (e.g., Kamenicë/Kamenica, Dragash/Dragaš, Prizren, Sterpce/Strpce) were accompanied by signs of improvement in relations. People noted decreases in the numbers of intimidation, bombing and assault incidents; greater movement by minorities in private cars and without escorts, greater presence in cities and towns, interaction in multi-ethnic markets.

Yet the perceptions of improvements in inter-ethnic violence (IEV) masked a reality of a steady level of inter-ethnic violence during that time, unaffected by politically significant (and tense) periods such as elections, commemorations, returns of bodies of the missing, etc. Several municipalities with the highest levels of IEV overall, including several that experienced the worst violence in March 2004, saw IEV increase over the three years 2002 – 2004: Prishtinë/Priština, Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Vushtrri/Vučitrn and Lipjan/Lipljan. Others such as Gjilan/Gnjilane, Pejë/Peć and Istog/Istok, saw IEV rise to 2002 levels or higher in 2004, despite decreases in the 2002-2003 period.

Further, several factors suggest that IEV did not decrease, but rather shift in nature and visibility over time. Despite the decrease in inter-ethnic intimidation and assaults, property-related IEV increased during the same time period. This suggests that IEV has not decreased but shifted in nature over time to more indirect forms of intimidation and pressure. Many people discounted the significance of these kinds of property crimes (theft, usurpation, vandalism, etc.) because the motivations are not purely ethnic, but mixed. Also discounted or ignored was the likelihood that greater movement by minorities and inter-ethnic contact would also trigger greater mobilization of actors opposed to coexistence. The local nature of the indicators of progress—emphasizing movements and interactions *within* the community, also may have led international and local observers to miss the continuing threat of more extreme forces *outside* the community.

K-Serbs in this context did not feel more secure during the time period, and, clearly, feelings of insecurity increased after March 2004. K-Serb fears may in part be associated

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with the absence of rule of law that K-Albanians experience as well. They are also heightened warnings by politicians and the media that K-Serbs will be attacked if they travel. However, they are real, and many K-Serbs attribute decreases in IEV to precautions they take to minimize the risk of confrontation with K-Albanians.

Decreases in IEV and improvements in mobility of minorities may therefore not necessarily mean that the underlying situation has improved. It may also reflect a lesser need for high levels of violence to intimidate minorities (K-Serbs especially—an occasional dramatic incident of violence suffices to keep fears alive) and the effectiveness of K-Serb precautionary measures.

### FACTORS FOR AVOIDANCE OF VIOLENCE

On March 17-18, 2004 all over Kosovo, many individuals stepped forward to hide or evacuate their neighbours or protect their neighbour's property from the oncoming crowds. In some places, however, communities were able to mobilize *collective action* to stop or avoid violence – from stopping the crowds from entering a village, to preventing people from going to perpetrate violence to mobilizing not to behave in ways that might have invited violence. Why in some places was collective action to stop violence mobilized, while in others not, despite the actions of many individuals who objected to violence and helped their neighbours? The desk study and in-depth cases identified a number of factors that enabled avoidance of violence in communities. Some are *structural*, relating to the demographic profile of the communities and to socio-economic conditions. Many were *operational*, rooted in the decisions and actions of local and international actors in the context. While the structural factors need to be accounted for, local and international agencies can affect the operational factors in the future.

***High concentrations of K-Serbs appear to make IEV more difficult, in part because of fears of robust capacity of concentrated numbers of K-Serbs to fight back.*** The presence of minorities is perhaps the key structural factor associated with the level of IEV. In this context, the presence of Serbs appears to be correlated more with higher levels of IEV than the presence of other minorities (Roma, Ashkali, Bosniak, Turkish, Goran, etc.).<sup>2</sup> Yet areas with larger and denser K-Serb populations experienced less IEV. Municipalities with 4 – 15% K-Serb population experience amongst the highest relative levels of IEV, IEV levels drop significantly for municipalities with less than 4% K-Serb population and those with over 15% K-Serb population (Serb-majority municipalities, Kamenicë /Kamenica, e.g.). Within communities as well, highly concentrated K-Serb residential areas – e.g., large K-Serb apartment blocks or mono-ethnic villages – were often left alone.

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<sup>2</sup> Other minorities clearly suffer discrimination and violence, but IEV levels are higher in areas with a higher proportion of K-Serb minorities, while areas with primarily other minorities (e.g., Prizren or Dragash/Dragaš) have seen IEV levels decrease over time.

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***The poor socio-economic conditions prevailing in Kosovo, however, were not a decisive factor in violence.*** The poor state of the economy clearly generated frustration within both the K-Albanian and K-Serb communities, especially among youth. Yet the path from frustration to violence was not, as it is commonly believed, direct. The fact that poor municipalities with significant minority populations do not always exhibit high levels of IEV, and that in March 2004, it was school-age children (not those most directly impacted by lack of employment opportunities in Kosovo) who, with their teachers, were key participants in the violence, suggests a more complex relationship between the economy and violence. The evidence suggests that violence was driven by *resentment and feelings of injustice* stemming both from socio-economic inequalities between K-Albanians and K-Serbs (exacerbated by K-Serbs' taking of double salaries) and from K-Albanians' widely held perception that the poor state of the economy resulted from delays in addressing the political situation. The economy and the political situation are nearly inseparable.

***'Bridging social capital' in the form of inter-ethnic contacts, cooperation and dialogue was not strong enough to create networks ('bridging social capital') strong enough to mitigate violence.*** Places with greater inter-ethnic contact – whether in the form of business/economic ties or personal relationships – did not experience less violence. On the contrary, many communities considered 'good' in 2003-2004 in terms of inter-ethnic relations, from Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje to Gjilan/Gnjilane, experienced some of the worst violence in March 2004, despite efforts by individuals, often at great personal risk, to protect their neighbours. The evidence suggests that inter-ethnic contact in these communities remained at the individual level and did not produce 'bridging social capital,' or networks of communication and rumor or crisis control. Indeed, there is evidence that in both the K-Albanian and K-Serb communities there are unwritten 'rules of the game' concerning when, how, why and how much people can and should interact across conflict lines. These rules of the inter-ethnic game limited contact to trade and other economic transactions and created boundaries on the breadth and depth of relationships that could permissibly developed, ensuring that inter-ethnic contacts did not challenge the polarization of K-Serb—K-Albanian relations. These boundaries also limited the degree to which inter-ethnic economic cooperation could create interdependence that would operate as an incentive to resist violence; the kinds of interdependence cited by communities as effective brakes on violence related to the road network and access to particular places (e.g., main thoroughfares that went through K-Serb villages), and the risk of physical or political harm.

***Strong 'bonding social capital' has been a resource for preventing violence, but also for maintaining ethnic polarization.*** Of the communities in this study that avoided violence in March 2004, inter-ethnic relations in most were tense, if not polarized, and several had a prior history of IEV. In these cases, the case evidence suggests that *intra-ethnic social networks* (or 'bonding social capital') were more important than inter-ethnic

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engagement in preventing violence in March 2004. These communities experienced no influx of ‘newcomers’ and were generally able to bridge intra-community political divides to achieve consensus on issues important for the community. As a result, intra-ethnic social networks remained intact and strong, and communities were able to rely on these networks to mobilize collective decisions in the community to refrain from action that would provoke violent reactions. However, while this ‘bonding social capital’ was a significant resource for preventing violence in Kosovo, it was (and is) also used to prevent cooperation and preserve tension. In the absence of powerful strategic motivations for avoiding violence—such as the need to demonstrate fulfillment of the Standards for Kosovo in order to gain independence represented in some communities in March 2004—‘bonding social capital’ could in the future be used to mobilize violence.

***Leadership in standing up unequivocally to violence was a key factor in whether or not communities avoided violence.*** It was not only the unequivocal nature of the message or its timeliness that helped communities avoid violence. In some communities, including Gjilan/Gnjilane, leaders who took a clear, public stand against violence failed. Leadership that was effective against violence was credible and connected to their community, appealing to the community’s practical interest in avoiding harm. War experience provided credibility, but openness, inclusiveness and attention to problems of local citizens is also a source of credibility. Further, effective leaders foresaw the arrival of violence to their communities and prepared for how to handle it. K-Albanian leaders’ efforts to reach out to K-Serbs, however, did not influence communities’ vulnerability to violence, and in some cases, may have undermined their credibility within their own communities to take action at a time of crisis.

***The presence of security actors was a strong deterrent against violence in communities. The credibility of the deterrent was based to a large extent on their history of their engagement with communities, both in promoting interaction and in responding to incidents of violence.*** As many analyses have noted, KFOR was visible and in position and vigilant in places that avoided violence. More interestingly, there were common patterns of interaction between KFOR and communities prior to March 2004 in those communities. All had a history in the community of KFOR taking security action that caused hardship to communities, such as curfews and closing roads for extended periods of time. KFOR also had engaged with those communities. Although KFOR’s mission is not to promote inter-ethnic relations, in these places KFOR convened ongoing dialogue and discussion of security problems, and was a “first mover” in catalyzing and supporting cross-ethnic activities. Indeed, in several KFOR in particular was mentioned by a wide variety of people as an important peacebuilding actor.

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### Has Peacebuilding Programming Supported Violence Prevention?

The bulk of what agencies and community members characterized as peacebuilding was “dialogue”<sup>3</sup> and training – often in relation to the returns process and civil society and democracy building. There was also a great deal of joint projects related to infrastructure, culture and sports.

How well is peacebuilding programming supporting non-participation in violence? The peacebuilding programs have had some important, if modest, achievements in a difficult, polarized and uncertain environment. Still, while it would be unreasonable to expect dramatic changes in a five-to-six-year time frame, the evidence suggests that peacebuilding programming could have greater impact on peace than it currently has.

***Efforts to build “bridging social capital” are not adding up or creating networks that can or do reduce tension.*** Programming, especially dialogue and training, has had some powerful effects on individuals who are participating in them, but these changes have had little impact beyond this individual-personal realm, and little spill-over from participants to other members of their community. The cases point to several reasons why:

- *Programme assumptions that individual change will lead to socio-political change have not been borne out in Kosovo.* This spill-over has not happened, in part, participants report, because they feel powerless to change anything; “feelings of hatred are too strong,” and they “can hardly influence the positions of [their] community.”
- *Economic cooperation did not lead to interdependence sufficient to motivate action against violence.* While many individual business relationships did withstand the pressure of the March 2004 violence, interactions in economic and infrastructure-associated programming has mirrored the “rules of the inter-ethnic game.”
- *Programmes have not built on entry points.* Programmes bring K-Serbs and K-Albanians together for activities that are not overtly “peace” activities (e.g., community development, technical training, sports and cultural events) as an entry point because it makes it easier, socially and politically, for people to participate. Yet the programmes have not built on or expanded in ways that could deepen or expand the relationships that are begun in the initial contacts. The emphasis has been on short-term results, at the expense of addressing the core

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<sup>3</sup> The term “dialogue” itself has come to encompass a very wide range of activities – from negotiations on specific issues, to joint planning and problem-solving related to infrastructure, to youth camps and other forms of social contact, to the more pure forms of dialogue (structured conversations designed to increase mutual understanding of each other and issues).

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issues around an agreed upon vision for inter-ethnic relations. “Soft” programmes, such as dialogue, have often been short-lived and under-resourced. In some places funding was withdrawn and/or agencies left to move on to other areas or programs after initial successes were achieved. Lack of communication or coordination among programmes has often led to repetition, duplication and fragmentation, as participants have frequently been involved in the same kinds (and level) of interactions several times.

- *Programmes did not adequately address intra-community resistance to inter-ethnic dialogue and cooperation.* Agencies have undertaken within each ethnic community to prepare them for inter-ethnic dialogue. They have also provided substantial ongoing organizational support to make inter-ethnic interaction possible. While this has been important to create space for inter-ethnic engagement, it has not been sufficient to help these links and relationships withstand intra-community constraints and pressure not to engage with the other. There has been little support or follow-up and mono-ethnic work to support and help make post-programme interaction and cooperation sustainable.

***Policy and programme focus on peacebuilding through returns and multi-ethnicity has had negative impacts.*** The emphasis on returns and aid to returning IDPS or refugees has inadvertently worsened divisions between K-Serbs and K-Albanians, as resentment developed amongst K-Albanians especially that resources and attention have been dedicated to K-Serbs—their former oppressors—at the expense of the needs of the majority population. The practice of providing balancing grants has not significantly alleviated this feeling. Similarly, the relative lack of attention to relations between K-Serb remainees and K-Albanians has reinforced K-Serb perceptions that the commitment to multi-ethnicity both by K-Albanians and the international community is not sincere.

At the same time, the approach of providing rewards and incentives for cross-ethnic contact and activities in order to build willingness and capacity within all ethnicities to work together has not yielded the hoped-for results. While, many people have in fact come together and worked together on needed infrastructure and economic projects, the emphasis on multi-ethnicity has been perceived in communities not as a “carrot” or reward for cooperation, but as a “conditionality” that is widely resented. Communities have developed ways to circumvent the spirit of multi-ethnicity, either through *pro forma* multi-ethnicity in projects or by imposing conditions for agreeing to multi-ethnicity. Peacebuilding programming has exacerbated these unintended consequences by rewarding form, and not following up on or monitoring substance. This has created a great degree of cynicism about multi-ethnicity and opportunism, rather than increased trust, interdependence and information sharing.

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***Programs are not addressing key driving factors of conflict adequately. The focus on returns and democracy-building has overlooked critical issues affecting relations.*** People consistently mentioned missing persons and war crimes (K-Albanians) and security and justice related in particular to prosecution of perpetrators of IEV as key obstacles to peace. The uncertainty of the resolution of the status of Kosovo has weighed on all interactions, even when not mentioned explicitly. Few (if any) programs address the key issues even indirectly. And where they do, there are gaps limiting effectiveness. Progress on sensitive issues such as freedom of movement is plagued by and underlying lack of agreement on what the problem is, even whether there is a problem; this has not been addressed. Further, central level programming to address missing persons and justice issues is not reaching communities effectively and is not taking care of these issues at the community level. Communication between communities and justice and police institutions is limited, and communities do not understand either the procedures for dealing with claims or whether the police or justice system is being responsive. Conflict management mechanisms at the community level are weak or too returns-focused, and dialogues implemented by NGOs deliberately avoid sensitive political or emotional issues.

***Programs are not engaging many key people and areas.*** A significant proportion of programs identified in this study focus on women, youth and returnees and their receiving communities. This is partly because women and youth are considered natural bridge-builders or focused on the future. Yet there is little focus on the “hard to reach”<sup>4</sup> – less moderate people and people and groups that are “key” to success in the peace process. These constituencies, especially those who might undermine any potential agreement such as KLA and war veterans, the Serbian Orthodox Church, less moderate Serbian parties in Kosovo, etc., have only recently begun to receive some attention. Participant selection processes, with criteria that applicants exhibit tolerance and a willingness to live together, reinforce the tendency to engage the easiest to reach. For youth in particular, this was important, as it appears that the standard processes for selecting participants does not reach youth that are likely to or do participate in violence. At the same time, their teachers and principals, who played a role in the March 2004 riots, are often not targeted in peace programming, or when they are, it is not in relation to their role vis-à-vis the driving factors of conflict.

Finally, there is a question also about the geographical targets of programming may also be limited. The more extreme areas, in terms of the political situation and positions on status and in terms of their reported role (as travelers) in the March 2004 unrest, are those that were affected by the war and are largely mono-ethnic now. These areas did not receive the same levels of assistance, nor involved in inter-ethnic peacebuilding efforts. Similarly, “Belgrade” is mentioned as key to the evolution of the situation and of inter-

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<sup>4</sup> See Mary Anderson and Lara Olson, *Confronting War* (Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action, 2003), p. 59.

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ethnic relations in Kosovo. Yet aside from high level talks and working groups, there has been little cross-border or coordinated programming with Serbia. If a main driving force of conflict is in Serbia, however, failure to address it will keep relations in Kosovo vulnerable to escalation and violence.

### Recommendations

In order to strengthen the contribution of peacebuilding, to the development of these factors, we recommend taking action in several areas.

a. ***Build on security of concentrations of Serbs.*** Decentralization and returns policies should consider these the reality that concentrations of K-Serbs make them less vulnerable to violence in considering whether and how to delineate municipal structures or permit returns to places other than the original place of residence, while working simultaneously not only to connect these communities to the Kosovo government and economy, but also to build inter-ethnic social capital.

b. ***Develop a strategy for building bridging social capital.*** A strategy that relies on governance, minority rights, decentralization and economic development generally will not be sufficient to build real bridging social capital that can act as a restraint on violence. A strategy for transforming the *relationship* between K-Albanians and K-Serbs is also needed, both within Kosovo and in the broader region. Elements of a strategy should include the following:

- *Develop a vision of what the relationship between K-Serbs and K-Albanians will be in the future, one that is shared locally.*
- *Deal with political issues directly.* Agencies working at all levels and sectors should identify ways to incorporate ‘political’ issues, whether issues of the past to issues regarding status, into their work
- *Invest in follow-up and linkages.* Strategies are needed for moving beyond individual-personal impacts to affect the socio-political environment, and should be encouraged and funded among individual agencies implementing peacebuilding projects. Much more can be done to encourage greater synergy between different efforts so that they can build on rather than duplicate each other.
- *Expand programming to ensure communities have accurate information about the “other.”* The availability of accurate information about events and about the other’s intentions, as well as ways of checking rumors at times of crisis, was critical to communities’ capacity to avoid violence. Cross-ethnic information, crisis or “hotline” and other networks are one mechanism for promoting

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information exchange that did not play a role, but could be supported. As a key player in maintaining the conflict, the media should be a central focus for programming. Programming, however, needs to engage bigger players both in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.

- *Strengthen monitoring and evaluation.* At the same time, donors and policymakers need to institute more thorough monitoring of multi-ethnic programming to discourage *pro forma* multi-ethnicity and reward those in which meaningful inter-ethnic dialogue and cooperation is occurring.
- c. *Rethink targeting of areas and beneficiaries/participants.* The findings suggest that several of the cornerstones of peacebuilding programming – returns, rewards for “multi-ethnicity,” youth and women’s programming – need rethinking and refinement.
  - *Deemphasize refugee and IDP return.* Refugee and IDP returns are important, but to mitigate the negative conflict impacts of returns programming and to support local capacities for peace, *peacebuilding* programming should focus on inter-ethnic relations holistically, including working with remainees.
  - *Shift from emphasis on the “easy to reach” to promotion of leadership, local capacities for peace and connectors.* Reaching and mobilizing the moderate voices on both sides to have a voice in policy and public debate is important for building a peace constituency. Yet programs that target the “easy to reach” are not, collectively, mobilizing this voice. Identify and support “innovators” and “early adopters” who are will take or have taken public action for peace or in support of inter-ethnic cooperation. Greater rigor could be also exercised in identifying people who exercise informal leadership and authority in communities, in addition to community leaders. Teachers and educational officials emerged from the study as one such group.
  - *Address the “hard to reach.”* The general, if not always purposeful, exclusion of “key” people leaves programs vulnerable and undermines the overall impact of peacebuilding work. Steps could be taken to find ways to include or engage several key actors more systematically: KLA veterans and war victims, Kosovo Serb political and community leaders across the spectrum of opinion, less moderate Albanian organizations such as Albin Kurti’s “Vetevendosje,” and the Serbian Orthodox Church. Work with youth and women continues to be important, yet more rigorous analysis of youth and women is warranted to identify and support those that are “key” for violence or non-violence.
  - *De-“localize” programming.* Support programming that cross geographical boundaries – either between municipalities or communities, or between Kosovo and Serbia on issues beyond IDPs and returns. Mono-ethnic areas, that were most affected by the war and/or that are the cradle of the KLA, such as

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Gjakova/Đakovica or Decan/Decani, need greater attention. Interaction between people from these mono-ethnic areas with people (K-Serbs and K-Albanians) from more mixed areas should be supported.

- *Support “single identity” work.* Single identity work – work within one community on issues and dynamics in conflict – should be considered and supported not just as a preparatory step to cross-ethnic interaction, but also as a follow-up process to deal with intra-community resistance to inter-ethnic cooperation. Intra-ethnic political dialogue in communities with strong political divisions, as well as between ‘oldtimers’ and ‘newcomers’ in urban areas could strengthen capacity of communities to manage inter-ethnic conflict.

4. ***Address driving factors of conflict more directly.*** In the immediate term, this would include helping prepare the population for the eventual outcome and implementation of the status talks. Nonetheless, even after status is decided, many of the driving factors identified will remain. Some directions that might be pursued include:

- *Transitional justice:* Develop more transparent and fair procedures for dealing with claims of war crimes, and encourage NGO parallel processes. Issues related to lustration will also need to be considered carefully in this context, as concerns (of Albanians and Serbs) related to individuals’ involvement with the war continue to exacerbate tensions from the community level in places like Zheger/Zegra to the Kosovo-wide level.
- *Dialogue about improving people’s sense of security.:* Greater dialogue at all levels between Serbs and Albanians about the nature of the problem and what to do about it would be useful. Reframing of the issue from “freedom of movement” to address minorities’ “sense of security” could avoid the polarizing effect of terminology of “freedom of movement” that has become closely associated with the Standards.
- *Supplement central-level justice reform with community-based programming.* Efforts to strengthen the justice system, already underway should be supplemented in the short- to medium-term by efforts – both official (government and international agency) and civil society – to deal with the factors that motivate witnesses not to come forward and to deal with the link between impunity and K-Serb fears and insecurity specifically. In the shorter run, greater contact between police and communities, strengthening of complaints mechanisms, greater transparency about the status of investigations might be considered, as well as strengthening and expansion of community policing can be promoted.
- *Develop more community-based mechanisms for addressing driving issues of conflict* – from accusations of war crimes and experiences of the past to dealing with claims of property usurpation – especially those that do not rise to a level

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warranting institutional attention and the psychological, relational and emotional aspects of these issues. This should not necessarily entail new mechanisms, but could be incorporated into existing dialogue and other processes as a way of deepening and building on those efforts.

***d. Incorporate conflict sensitivity into all programming and policy making.***

Decisions about staffing and contracting, about location of programs and centers, and post-program sustainability planning especially should analyse and take into account potential impacts on K-Serb—K-Albanian tensions. In addition, future economic policy and development aid – from privatization to job creation policies to practical implementation of income-generation projects on the ground should identify concretely the ethnic dimension of potential “winners” and “losers.”

***e. Consider incentives and motivations for avoidance of violence after status is decided.*** “Bonding social capital” has been a great resource for mobilization of communities against violence. It has been under strain, especially in urban areas, as populations shift and social networks break down or change. In those areas, efforts to strengthen both “bridging” social capital across ethnic lines, as well as promote engagement and trust across intra-community lines of division, are important. In more rural areas, the “bonding social capital” that was mobilized to prevent violence in March 2004 is still in place, but can as easily be mobilized for violence in the absence of appropriate motivations. With the “Standards for Kosovo” operating as a weaker and weaker source of motivation, another set of incentives – associated perhaps with European integration – will need to replace them, with clear consequences for not meeting standards of behavior.

### I. INTRODUCTION

The violence of March 2004 prompted many agencies to reflect on their peacebuilding programming throughout Kosovo. While violence consumed Kosovo for two days, it was noted that the communities in which the international non-governmental organization, CARE, was implementing its peacebuilding programs experienced little or no violence.<sup>5</sup> Was CARE's and other agencies' peacebuilding programming responsible for this difference? In an attempt to answer this question, CARE approached CDA to undertake a study to ascertain whether communities in Kosovo that have participated in peacebuilding programming were as prone to violence as those who have not participated. . More specifically, the study seeks to understand whether and how peacebuilding programming in Kosovo contributed to communities' resistance to or lack of participation in violence, especially that which occurred in March 2004.

The study was not commissioned as an evaluation of CARE's program. Rather, CARE requested a broader scope, involving many NGOs and agencies that have been conducting peacebuilding programming. The goal was to develop findings that would be valid and useful to all those who are reviewing and planning peacebuilding activities in Kosovo. CARE International UK, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, CARE Austria, and CDA's *Reflecting on Peace Practice* project provided the funding for the study.

With the changing situation in Kosovo resulting from ongoing implementation of "standards" and the planned conclusion of negotiations that will determine the status of Kosovo, the March 2004 riots may seem far away. Nonetheless, with feelings of insecurity increasing in some communities, and greater polarization of Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb opinions on issues related to the status negotiations, especially in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, the possibility of escalation of violence still exists. The lessons from March 2004, especially from communities that succeeded in avoiding or resisting violence during that time, can still be useful to avoid violence in the future and to improve the impact of peacebuilding programming in Kosovo. This study aims to contribute to the reflection on the impacts and gaps of programming that is taking place in many agencies and suggest some directions for future policy and practice in Kosovo.

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<sup>5</sup> See International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, Europe Report No. 155 (April 2004), p. 16.

## II. METHODOLOGY

In designing the methodology it was important to ensure that the study was not biased toward finding an impact of peacebuilding programs, consequently missing important factors that might be unrelated to peacebuilding programming. Our research questions reflect this priority. The questions we have focused on are:

- What factors enabled communities to avoid, resist or not participate in violence?
- To what extent has peacebuilding work contributed to these factors?

By identifying the factors that have enabled communities not to participate in inter-ethnic violence such as the March 2004 riots, and only then examining if, how and why peacebuilding programming played a role, we could avoid this bias. This sequence of questions allowed us to trace the specific impacts of peacebuilding programming, in contrast to other factors in the communities, on why communities that avoided violence in March 2004 did so (or not), and to identify areas where future programming should focus.

The study was conducted using collaborative learning methodology which CDA has used in previous projects such as *Do No Harm* and *Reflecting on Peace Practice*: a highly collaborative process with opportunities in each stage for stakeholders in Kosovo to be consulted to provide feedback, reflect collaboratively on the evidence being gathered, and think together about its meaning and options for addressing the issues raised.

The study was conducted in three phases.

### *Phase I: Mapping of Violence and Collaborative Analysis*

The first phase mapped inter-ethnic violence over the period of March 2002-March 2005, in order to identify variables, patterns and trends that may be relevant to understanding the presence or absence of violence in March 2004, to assist in selection of case studies that will have the greatest generalizability, and to provide an overall context in which to understand the case studies. This time frame was chosen as offering an opportunity to observe the patterns and trends of inter-ethnic violence over three “spring and summer” seasons (2002, 2003, 2004), traditionally believed to be the worst in terms of interethnic violence. This time frame further contained significant landmarks in Kosovo’s recent history – the convening of the first Government of Kosovo in March 2002, the October 2002 Municipal Elections, political changes in Serbia, the beginning of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s trial in The Hague, the 2004 general elections, the indictment of former Kosovo PM Ramush Haradinaj, amongst others – and thus permitted a perspective on violence in a dynamic context of profound changes in Kosovo’s landscape. Finally, the data available for the year after the 2004 riots was

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examined in order to explore the ways in which communities recovered from the 2004 violence as well as to assess the degree to which the March events were an anomaly or, alternatively, reflective of deeper tensions in the communities.

The mapping was developed through desk research using information compiled from UNMIK CivPol data, UNHCR Security Unit Situation Reports (incomplete), UNMIK Office for Returns and Communities (ORC, now Office of Communities, Returns and Minorities -- OCMA), KFOR Situation Reports, and OMIK Situation Reports. Both physical and psychological violence (such as intimidation) were quantified and categorised geographically by municipality, and by time over the selected period March 2002 – March 2005.

The mapping of inter-ethnic violence presented a number of methodological challenges. Ordinary crime and inter-ethnic crime can be difficult to distinguish, as incidents perpetrated for economic or other criminal, and not specifically inter-ethnic, motives, can also have impact on inter-ethnic relations.<sup>6</sup> Even if there is clarity as to how to classify incidents, determining the level of IEV is difficult, because IEV is frequently not reported by victims and when it is, may be under- or over- identified as inter-ethnic due to the potential dangers of creating self-fulfilling prophecies as the information becomes public. Consequently, this research relied on inter-ethnic crime statistics only as a secondary (although initial) source of data to identify communities for further study, and to identify trends and factors to be investigated in greater depth. Further inquiry into the nature and levels of violence (both inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic) was conducted through extensive interviews with members of communities in Phase II of the study. This way the indicative value of inter-ethnic violence data available was utilised, while allowing the communities involved -- whether as victims, perpetrators, observers -- to speak for themselves about the extent, nature and impacts of inter-ethnic violence to ensure a truer picture emerges from our inquiry.

Finally, the research team also convened three consultative workshops in Pejë/Peć, Prishtinë/Priština and Mitrovicë/Mitrovica for a total of approximately eighty people drawn from local and international NGOs, UNMIK and OSCE. The workshops were part of the collaborative learning approach of the project: to engage stakeholders in Kosovo to include the vast experience, understanding, and insights of people working and living in the field to the research, as well as to ensure that the research remains relevant and useful to them. The workshops explored the ways in which practitioners themselves see:

- the contributions of NGO, IGO and other agencies' activities to peace;

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<sup>6</sup> In addition, there were significant discrepancies among the figures reported by CivPol and the UNMIK's Office of Communities. An intra-UNMIK effort to harmonise the processing and reporting to create a single body of information came to a conclusion just as the final workshops of this research were being convened, and thus have not been integrated into this report.


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- what forms of “violence” exist in different areas and their prevalence;
- instances of resistance to or non-participation in violence and what made those possible;
- advice on potential case studies that would have valuable learnings, and
- what criteria should be used to select, and later compare, case studies.

### *Phase II: In-Depth Case Studies*

Based on the Phase I mapping and input from participants in the consultative workshops, we conducted seven field-based, rich narrative case studies in the second stage of the research.

The case studies were selected using purposive sampling using three sets of criteria: a) the presence or absence of violence in March 2004; b) levels of IEV prior from March 2002-2004; c) degree of peacebuilding activity in the communities.



With the limited number of cases possible (seven), the selection focused on those cases that would provide insight into:

- Why communities had higher or lower levels of violence prior to 2004
- Why communities avoided or resisted violence in March 2004
- Why communities had high levels of violence despite high levels of peacebuilding support
- Why communities participated in the violence of March 2004 despite high levels of peacebuilding support.

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The cases were chosen also to include urban and rural sites, sites with higher levels of minority returnees and those with higher numbers of remainees, and to reflect differences in experience of the 1998-1999 conflict. These factors had been considered significant in the consultations conducted in Phase I, and we had not been able to develop any evidence-based hypotheses related to them because the inter-ethnic crime statistics were reported at the municipal level. Specific sites within municipalities were identified by participants in the consultative workshops, as well as through documentary research, based on the criteria and the participant's assessment that they could learn from the experiences in these communities in ways that could improve peacebuilding practice.

The cases chosen included:

- Shtupel/Stupelj (Klinë/Klina municipality): a K-Albanian populated village (Shtupel/Stupelj) in an area that suffered greatly during the 1998-1999 war, that strongly resisted K-Serb returns to the two nearby villages, Bica/Binxhe and Grabac/Grabac, and that continues to refuse to deal with Serb returnees, but which mobilized action to prevent crowds from attacking the Serb villages. Some, but not much, peacebuilding programming has been implemented here.
- Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec and surrounding villages (Pejë/Peć municipality): a K-Serb enclave in a difficult region surrounded by six K-Albanian populated villages (many of which were mixed before the war) in a difficult area that had itself experienced a high level of violence in the past, but which experienced no violence in March 2004. This area has received significant attention from two NGOs, KFOR, and some international organizations in terms of peacebuilding work.
- Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë and Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme (Štrpce/Shtërpçe municipality): two villages with K-Serb majority populations (in a K-Serb majority municipality) to which K-Albanians returned; an agreement for mutual protection against violence had been concluded after Serbs had resisted Albanian returns, and there was no violence in March 2004. Peacebuilding activities focused on mediation of the terms and conditions of return of Albanians to these villages. In Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë two NGOs began peacebuilding (dialogue) work in late 2004, while Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë, there has been relatively little peacebuilding assistance apart from United Nations and KFOR assistance for return and organization of a few sports events.
- Zheger/Zegra (Gjilan/Gnjilane municipality): a formerly mixed village that was one of the few in the municipality to have had a very harsh war experience during 1998-1999; tensions remain high with significant opposition to return of K-Serb residents, who are accused of war crimes, yet violence was avoided in the village. Zheger/Zegra had received much attention over the years, but only one agency has succeeded in implementing a longer-term peacebuilding program.
- Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje town (Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje Municipality): an urban area that was considered to be “stable” by many international actors but

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- which had higher levels of violence in the 2002-2004 timeframe and suffered much violence on March 17-18, 2004.
- Gjilan/Gnjilane town (Gjilan/Gnjilane municipality): an urban area in what is commonly thought to be one of the “best” areas in Kosovo in terms of inter-ethnic relations, and in which violence was severe in March 2004. Many international agencies working in the region are based there, and have conducted a significant amount of peacebuilding work in the town.
  - Mitrovicë/Mitrovica town (Mitrovicë/Mitrovica municipality): a divided city that has been and continues to be the “frontline” of conflict. It is an urban area that historically has had amongst the highest levels of IEV in Kosovo, along with a great deal of peacebuilding activity, and experienced clashes on March 17-18, 2004.

These cases focus upon Serb and Albanian relations and unfortunately were not able to take account of other minority communities.<sup>7</sup> A balance of cases involving different minorities (e.g., Roma, Bosniak, Gorani, Egyptian, Ashkali, etc.) would have been desirable, as these minorities do suffer discrimination and did suffer violence in the March 2004 events. However, limited resources prevented us from doing a comprehensive study, and we were forced to make choices regarding the focus of the research. We chose to focus on Kosovo Albanian—Kosovo Serb relations and violence for two reasons. First, the initial mapping of violence indicated that, in general, the presence of Serbs correlated more with higher levels of IEV than the presence of other minorities.<sup>8</sup> Second, this relationship coincides with the main lines of political conflict and thus is more directly related to the peace process, as opposed to the larger process of nation-building, democratic development and social stability.

Two researchers – one Kosovo Albanian and one Serb – conducted six of the case studies as a team, generally traveling together, sometimes with an international member of the research team, to the sites. They conducted interviews in parallel, comparing notes during the course of the case study to identify issues or perspectives to follow-up or pursue from the “other” side.<sup>9</sup> In general, 20-40 people were interviewed in each

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<sup>7</sup> Gjilan/Gnjilane, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje also have a significant Roma minority.

<sup>8</sup> See section VI below for a full explanation of this finding.

<sup>9</sup> The fact that the interviews were conducted fully a year after the March 2004 events raised challenges to collecting accurate information about conditions and events prior to March 2004, both because of the difficulty of accurate recall of the past, and the pressure at the time of the study felt by many to demonstrate fulfillment of the Standards for Kosovo in order that status talks could begin. Indeed, in many instances, peacebuilding programs in the communities explored either began or began to make progress only after March 2004. We addressed these challenges in several ways. First, by emphasizing in the deep narrative focus of the interviews the need to obtain detailed stories and to understand the evidence on which interviewees based their conclusions and perceptions, we could begin to understand how the stories were affected by

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community, including United Nations officials, NGOs implementing peacebuilding activities and their participants or beneficiaries, shopkeepers, medical workers, teachers, youth and other members of the community. We chose to focus first on interviews of community residents regarding perceptions of violence and on peacebuilding work in their communities rather than starting with participants of peacebuilding activities so that we would not bias the study in favor of peacebuilding work, and so that we would not miss important elements not related to programming. Only in the bigger urban areas (Gjilan/Gnjilane and Mitrovicë/Mitrovica) did the researchers talk early on to NGOs and international agencies. The size of these communities and the amount of work being undertaken made it necessary to select a representative sample of programs to explore.

### *Phase III: Comparative Analysis of Case Studies*

In the final phase, we analysed the cases, again using CDA's collaborative methodology. Three consultations were convened. The first, in Cambridge, MA (USA) brought together the local case writers, the international research team, and staff and advisors of CDA and CARE to read and analyse the cases individually and comparatively. This consultation identified common themes, issues and questions. These were then explored in two consultations in Kosovo and Washington, D.C., where practitioners, policy makers, donors and researchers also read and analyzed the cases and added their own experience and insights to the themes and issues. Preliminary conclusions were prepared after these consultations in executive summary form, and presented to three groups of policy makers, donors and NGOs in Kosovo in April, 2006. The conclusions and recommendations thus reflect extensive discussion and collective reflection on the evidence.

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the passage of time. Second, by triangulating information through many interviews with different people, we could identify with some confidence which information was likely accurate. Third, by examining reactions to and participation in the March 2004 violence in historical perspective, we could identify factors that helped communities avoid or resist violence and assess whether those factors were still present a year later, and whether the peacebuilding programs addressed them at any point before or after the March 2004 timeframe.

### III. DEFINITIONS

Three critical terms in the study need definition.

***Inter-ethnic violence (IEV)*** is defined in this study as acts of physical or psychological violence by members of one ethnic group against members of another, in recognition that psychological violence, such as intimidation, is both a frequent method of aggression and an important contributor to fears that perpetuate conflict. The definition was refined in collaboration with practitioners during the initial desk study, consultative workshops and community interviews. There, despite the difficulties of measuring IEV, a clear picture emerged of the types of incidents or behavior K-Albanians and K-Serbs *experience* as violence.

- *Direct physical and psychological violence* is the form best captured in the crime statistics. It includes intimidation, physical assault, property damage, theft, fighting, arson and murder. Some forms are ethnically-motivated, while others, such as theft or property usurpation, may not. Nonetheless, the latter are very relevant to considerations of conflict and IEV because often there is greater opportunity to perpetrate theft or property crimes with impunity across ethnic lines. In addition, they have significant effects on victims' sense of security, their ability to sustain a livelihood and their cost of living.
- *Indirect psychological violence*. People also experience many things that do not rise to the level of a reportable or prosecutable incident of violence, such as graffiti, verbal insults and swearing, offensive gestures, pressure to sell property and actual inter-ethnic property sales. Indeed, these more "minor" forms of violence, as many K-Albanians characterized them, are important forms of psychological violence and contribute significantly to people's (especially Serbs) sense of insecurity, in part because they are so frequent. While difficult to measure, this form of violence is explored in depth in the study.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> In this category, there is also a great deal of what many Serbs especially characterized as "institutional violence:" a failure of the institutions to provide basic services – police, justice, schools, electricity – or permit access to services that is experienced as a deliberate effort to push Serbs out of Kosovo. These structural pressures were not included in this study's *definition* of violence, as the study focused on more direct forms of physical and psychological injury. Here what is experienced as ethnically-motivated psychological pressure may in part be a manifestation of the general weakness of the institutions, with Kosovo Albanians experiencing similar failures, or the result of Kosovo Serb reluctance to recognize Kosovo institutions through, for example, payment of utilities. Nonetheless, it is important to note that institutional failures, intentional or not, are experienced by Serbs as part of a larger project to make them unwelcome in Kosovo.

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- *Intra-ethnic violence* related to inter-ethnic relations is considered by many – both in the communities and by agencies – as perhaps more important than inter-ethnic violence in sustaining polarized, hostile relations between groups. It is nearly impossible to measure levels of intra-ethnic violence.<sup>11</sup> Most practitioners and community residents we interviewed consistently report that violent forms of intra-ethnic intimidation of those who had relations with the “other” were common in the early years after the war, and despite observations that this has decreased,<sup>12</sup> non-criminal forms of intra-ethnic violence, from the threat of internal censorship and verbal intimidation to accusations of “treason” and social isolation, make people fear stepping out of line.

**Peacebuilding** has been used alternatively to describe the entire endeavor of the international community in Kosovo and to describe specific programming designed to address the causes of ongoing and future conflict. For this study the latter conception is used. **Peacebuilding** is defined as any activity or programming, undertaken by any agency – local or international NGO, UNMIK, OSCE, government, KFOR, etc. – that is *intended*, in part or fully, to prevent renewal of inter-ethnic violence or to address the political, economic and social causes driving conflict. Consistent with the inductive nature of this study, and the difficulty of defining *a priori* boundaries of peacebuilding activities, efforts were included in this study if the agencies and community members themselves characterized their own work as peacebuilding. The research team chose to rely on self-characterization by agencies and groups. In instances where the agencies did not self-identify as doing peacebuilding work (e.g., KFOR, which emphasized that its mandate is, in the words of one officer, to promote a safe and secure environment for democratic institutions to flourish, not to promote multi-ethnicity), they were included in the mapping of programming when community members perceived them as peacebuilding actors.

**Impact** refers to the change in the conflict at the societal level as a result of the peacebuilding programming. In this study specifically, impact refers to the significance of peacebuilding programming as a causal factor or contributor to the absence of or resistance to violence.

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<sup>11</sup> Crime statistics confirm that the greatest proportion of crime is intra-ethnic; typically, intra-ethnic violence constitutes more than 90% of total crime, and over 90% of that is intra-Kosovo Albanian. CivPol 2004. However, it is impossible to assess how much of that intra-ethnic violence is related to inter-ethnic relations.

<sup>12</sup> K-Serbs and K-Albanians alike claim that intimidation has decreased within their own community, but assert that it is prevalent and strong in the other community.

# IV. CONTEXTUALISING INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE AND THE MARCH 2004 RIOTS

## Pre-war and war violence

During the decade preceding the 1998-1999 civil war in Kosovo, systematic human rights abuses perpetrated by Yugoslav police and security forces mainly against Kosovo Albanians were widely reported and condemned (Amnesty International: Annual Report, 1997; Kosovo: The Evidence, 1998). The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, which deployed in 1998 to observe compliance by the Yugoslav State of its international human rights obligations, reported:

- Arbitrary arrest and detention, and the violation of the right to a fair trial, became increasingly the tools of the law enforcement agencies in the suppression of Kosovo Albanian civil and political rights, and - accompanied by torture and ill-treatment - were applied as a means to intimidate the entire Kosovo Albanian society.
- Rape and other forms of sexual violence were applied sometimes as a weapon of war.
- Forced expulsion carried out by Yugoslav and Serbian forces took place on a massive scale, with evident strategic planning and in clear violation of the laws and customs of war. It was often accompanied by deliberate destruction of property, and looting. Opportunities for extortion of money were a prime motivator for Yugoslav and Serbian perpetrators of human rights and humanitarian law violations.<sup>13</sup>

These events brutally exacerbated and institutionalized the already existing segregation of the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, two communities that for most of the 90's inhabited "parallel worlds."<sup>14</sup> After mass dismissals from state structures and enterprises in 1990-1991, the Kosovo Albanians turned to parallel structures and entrepreneurship both legal and illegal to survive. This non-violent resistance movement kept the conflict latent but unresolved for over five years.<sup>15</sup> While war raged in the collapsing Yugoslav Federation, Kosovo remained under a state of emergency that gave the police and forces deployed unprecedented powers to carry on with their abuses.

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<sup>13</sup> OSCE. *Kosovo/Kosova As Seen As Told*. OSCE - KVM, October 1998-June 1999.

<sup>14</sup> D. Kostovicova, *Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to loss of Autonomy in Serbia 1989-1996* (Published M.Phil Thesis, University Cambridge, 1996).

<sup>15</sup> C. Clark, *Civil Resistance in Kosovo* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

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As the Dayton Accords for Bosnia Herzegovina were signed in 1995 without resolving the issue of Kosovo, the conflict escalated. Kosovo Albanians had now re-armed through an influx of weapons from the collapsing Albanian state. By 1997 the Kosova Liberation Army (UCK) was actively engaged in operations against both civilian and security targets. Kidnappings and assassinations of both Serbs and “collaborators” amongst Albanians were frequent.<sup>16</sup> Both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs were displaced from areas where hostilities flared, and both communities suffered enormously

By early 1998, Kosovo had erupted into full-scale civil war, carried out mostly in rural areas while many urban centres retained some normality. Violence by armed groups, which included special units with experience of ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina and irregular units of armed civilians, actively engaged in the campaign. This blurred lines between combatants and non-combatants, “aggressors” and “victims” (both K-Albanians and K-Serbs believing themselves to be victimized), and collective and individual responsibility, have made the post-war setting a justice quagmire and have contributed to the pervasive inter-ethnic violence in peacetime. The diplomatic drive by the international community in late 1998 proved insufficient to reverse the process, and led to a controversial military campaign in June 1999 that saw the most brutal 3 months of the civil war. An estimated 10,000 people killed, 863,000 Kosovo Albanian and other non-Serb minorities became refugees, while 590,000 became IDPs.<sup>17</sup>

There was a pattern to the Yugoslav’s army’s process of displacement. It often began with the shelling of villages to drive people out, followed by entry of forces to loot and expel/kill those who remained, and to set property on fire preventing return of the displaced. The areas worst hit by the campaign were those considered KLA strongholds in western Kosovo. Areas of the Peja/Pec and Prizren Regions, such Glllogovc/Glogovac, Skenderaj/Srbica, Gjakova/Đakovica, Rrahovec/Orahovac and Suharekë/Suva Reka municipalities, experienced mass executions, and Pejë/Peć, Lipjan/Lipljan, Decan/Decani and Klinë/Klina municipalities were also hard hit by fighting. No part of Kosovo was unaffected by the violence. For example, in Prizren Region where traditionally multi-ethnic relations had been good and its capital an emblem of cosmopolitanism, the war also had a significant impact. As the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission reported: “Summary and arbitrary killing of civilian non-combatants occurred at the hands of both parties to the conflict in the period up to March 24 [1999]. On the part of the Yugoslav and Serbian forces, their intent to apply mass killing as an instrument of terror, coercion or punishment against Kosovo Albanians was already in evidence in 1998, and was shockingly demonstrated by incidents in January 1999 (including the Racak mass killing) and beyond.” Villages considered by the Yugoslav forces to be sympathetic to the KLA were systematically ‘cleansed’, with crimes of violence committed in Bela

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<sup>16</sup> OSCE, *Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told, October 1998-June 1999*.

<sup>17</sup> Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 90.

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Crkva/Bellacerke, Celina/Celine, Velika Krusa/Krushe e Madh, Mala Krusa/Krushe e Vogel and Suva Reka/Suharekë.<sup>18</sup> Human Rights Watch reported that “abuses in the Drenica region were so widespread that a comprehensive description is beyond the scope of [its] report.”<sup>19</sup> An entire generation, who are now the disaffected and often unemployed youth who make up about half of Kosovo’s population, was, regardless of ethnicity, brutalised by a war that seemed to show violence pays.

### Post-war violence<sup>20</sup>

In the immediate aftermath of NATO’s military campaign, and against the advice of international agencies hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians began to return home from Macedonia, Albania, and South Serbia. By the end of July 1999, 740,000 had spontaneously returned. Over the course of that summer over 150,000 Kosovo Serb and their alleged Roma collaborators fled to Northern Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, or to mono-ethnic enclaves such as Gracanica and Gorazhdec/Gorazdevac.<sup>21</sup>

The successor to the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission described the climate of revenge that reigned in Kosovo for months after the deployment of international forces, from mid-June through October 1999 as follows:

“Violence has taken many forms: killings, rape, beatings, torture, house-burning and abductions. Not all violence has been physical, however, fear and terror tactics have been used as weapons of revenge. Sustained aggression, even without physical injury, exerts extreme pressure, leaving people not only unable to move outside their home, but unable to live peacefully within their home. In many instances, fear has generated silence, in turn allowing the climate of impunity to go unchecked.”<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> OSCE, *As Seen, As Told – Part II, June to October 1999*

<sup>19</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo*.

<sup>20</sup> The following section of this paper looks at the aftermath of the war by offering a regional overview that portrays the atmosphere of impunity and tolerance to violence that prevailed despite the international community’s efforts. The Section does not offer a comprehensive account of all violence, but highlights diverse aspects of the majority-minority relationship in Kosovo immediately post-1999 that remain relevant to understanding the nature of inter-ethnic violence today.

<sup>21</sup> UNHCR, *Tenth Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo; Prishtina/Priština* (Kosovo: UNHCR, March 2003), <http://www.unmikonline.org/press/reports/MinorityAssessmentReport10ENG.pdf> (accessed 15<sup>th</sup> April 2005).

<sup>22</sup> OSCE, *Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told – Part II, June to October 1999*.

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Between June and December 1999, 454 murders, 190 kidnappings, and 1,327 incidents of arson took place in Kosovo. Between January 2000 and June 2000 these figures had gone down to 146 murders, 94 kidnappings and 362 arson attacks.<sup>23</sup>

This trend continued into 2001 and beyond, with UNHCR's 10<sup>th</sup> Assessment on the Situation of Minorities noting "the positive trends of increased security and mobility of minorities in Kosovo". It went on to say "[t]he gradual decrease in ethnically motivated crime, the removal of KFOR checkpoints and the adoption of more flexible and less intrusive security arrangements [...] represent signals that the situation of minority communities gives some grounds for encouragement. The Assessment finds, however, that minority communities continue to face varying degrees of harassment, intimidation and provocation, as well as limited freedom of movement."<sup>24</sup> This improvement was partly due to the increasing departures and segregation of Serbs in mainly rural areas.<sup>25</sup> Direct violence may have subsided, but structural and cultural violence has perpetuated an atmosphere of pervasiveness and tolerance of violence against others (whether of different or same ethnicity) as well as a culture of impunity for such crimes.

The trend of inter-ethnic violence steadily declined from the initial high levels of June-December 1999

### **Decline in violence due to focus on institution building?**

In Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, many people attributed the better climate in inter-ethnic relations between 2002 and 2004 to the feeling of momentum among the K-Albanian community resulting from the holding of municipal and parliamentary elections and the focus on "institution building aiming toward independence."

through February 2004, with the largest drop occurring in the 2001-2002 timeframe. Initially, some believe, the decline in violence was due to the

attention devoted to establishing the institutions of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), as well as municipal government structures, and the expectations generated with respect to eventual full transfer of practical and legal authority. The "Standards Before Status" policy announced in April 2002 and the subsequent plan for its "operationalization" seemingly created a path to independence. Occasional high profile murders still shocked minorities and the international community, but overall many thought that reduction in overt violence represented significant change.

<sup>23</sup> UNMIK, *Civpol in Kosovo Report* (Prishtina: UNMIK, August 2000).

<sup>24</sup> UNHCR, *Tenth Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo* (Prishtina/Priština; UNHCR, 2003).

<sup>25</sup> A. Yannis, *Kosovo Under International Administration: An Unfinished Conflict* (Athens: ELIAMEP/PSIS, 2001), p.37.

### March 2004

The failure to define status, coupled with Serbian resistance to recognition of the PISG structures and increasing clashes between the PISG and UNMIK, which resisted PISG declarations on status and demands for more powers, heightened tensions. In addition, by 2003, unemployment was at about 50%. Tensions exploded in March, 2004. The ICG Report, *Collapse in Kosovo* (22 April 2004) -- one of the authoritative analyses of the riots of 17-18 March 2004 in Kosovo<sup>26</sup> -- describes the start of the riots in the following way:

March 2004, the week ahead was set for demonstrations: on KLA grievances on 16 March and on trade union demands for resumption of privatisation and the dismissal of Fucci on 18 March. On the evening of 15 March, however, a Kosovo Serb teenager was shot and severely wounded in the Serb village of Caglavica, which straddles the highway south to Macedonia just outside Pristina. Allegedly, it was a drive-by shooting. For the Serbs it was yet another in a series of unsettling "terrorist" incidents, and they felt that KFOR and UNMIK were not paying sufficient attention. They reacted predictably, by blocking the highway. In a show of solidarity, on 16 March Serbs in the enclave of Gracanica, straddling the Pristina to Gjilan/Gnjilane highway, also blocked their road, thus severing Pristina from the south of Kosovo.

[. . .]

Around midday demonstrations of the "associations emerged from war" went ahead in Pristina, Prizren, Peja/Pec and many other municipalities (still reproducing anger over the 16 February arrest for war crimes of senior KPC figures from Prizren). Anger against the internationals was palpable. The pro-KLA *Epoka e Re* reproduced on its front page the next morning a slogan that attracted cheers from the crowd in Peja: "UNMIK

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<sup>26</sup> There have been a number of good accounts and analyses of the events of March, 2004. In addition to the ICG report, the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Centre and Human Rights Watch published a detailed authoritative account of the events of March 17-18, based on interviews with victims and witnesses. Humanitarian Law Centre. *Ethnic Violence in Kosovo* (Belgrade, Humanitarian Law Centre, July 2004). United Nations Special Envoy Kai Eide also prepared a political assessment of the causes, consequences and implications of the March 2004 events for the international community. Kai Eide, Letter dated 17 November 2004 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/2004/932. Other authoritative accounts include Human Rights Watch, *Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004* (Human Rights Watch Vol. 16, No. 6(D), 2004); Riinvest, *Early Warning Report Kosovo January – April 2004* (Prishtinë/Priština: UNDP, 2004); Harald Schenker, *Violence in Kosovo and the Way Ahead*, ECMI Brief # 10 (Flenisburg, Germany: ECMI, 2004).

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watch your step, the KLA has gunpowder for you too!" During the evening of 16 March, RTK -- Kosovo's public television channel -- broadcast an interview with a twelve-year old boy from the Albanian village of Caber, on the north bank of the Ibar near Mitrovica. Journalists reported - although the boy did not explicitly say so in his interview - that Serb youths with a dog had chased him and three companions, aged nine, eleven and twelve, into the river. The companions were missing, presumed drowned (two bodies have since been recovered).<sup>27</sup>

The fuse was lit; riots broke out all over Kosovo, targeting mainly Serbs and UNMIK, killing 19, wounding 900, and resulting in extensive destruction of property, from churches to homes and personal property.

The events of March 2004 have been analyzed extensively,<sup>28</sup> and the purpose of this research is not to re-analyze these events, but rather to begin to develop an understanding of the causes and factors leading to violence and prevention of or resistance to violence. Nonetheless, a number of factors identified in these analyses (as well as in this study's feedback workshops, community studies<sup>29</sup> and case studies) are worth underlining from these analyses as significant factors for violence:

- *The role of children.* Secondary school children being one of the main perpetrators of March'04 violence was a shock to many, but children are regularly engaged in acts of intimidation against minorities (stoning, verbal abuse) that reflects both permissiveness in society towards IEV, but also the result of years of brutalisation and a widespread nationalistic K-Albanian primary education system where the K-Serb & Serbs are defined as 'the enemy'.
- *The role of media.* Media played a key role in the riots, first by misinforming the population about the circumstances surrounding the drowning of the three Albanian children (trigger event) then by portraying the escalating unrest as legitimate protests.

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<sup>27</sup> International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*, Europe Report No. 155, 22 April 2004, 13-14.

<sup>28</sup> See note 22 above.

<sup>29</sup> During the first phase of the study, in addition to document-based research, the researchers conducted two very brief community studies in Gjilan/Gnjilane and Peje/Pec (Gorazdec/Gorazdevac) to assist in interpreting some of the problematic documentary data they collected, and to begin to develop hypotheses about factors important for the presence or absence of violence. In addition, CDA-CLP conducted three feedback workshops with local and international organizations and NGOs in Peje/Pec, in Pristina and in Mitrovica North to gather experience-based evidence concerning violence, absence of violence and peacebuilding activities.

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- *Resistance to returns.* Houses that had been returned to their rightful owners were illegally re-occupied after the displacement caused by the riots had left them vacant.<sup>30</sup> This suggests that resistance to returns, especially in urban areas, may have been a factor in the March 2004 violence itself.
- *Quiet acceptance of IEV.* A culture of silence and quiet acceptance of violence may have played a role in fueling the March 2004 events. The lack of response by civil society actors during the riots reveals at best a lack of initiative or a fear to step out of line, and at worst a quiet acceptance of yet another display of behaviour that has become equated with ‘patriotism’. Many influential NGOs created within the peaceful resistance movement of liberation in the 90’s have struggled to re-define their role during peacetime, and some, particularly the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms, played a controversial role during the March riots.
- *Role of international community.* KPS, KFOR, UNMIK were criticised for their response and they certainly played a part in the escalation by not sending an unequivocal message from the very beginning about the zero-tolerance to IEV. Although, in retrospect, certain actions by UNMIK, KFOR and KPS (such as clearing the highway to Skopje) might have helped reduce the intensity of violence, their pre-riots performance did not have a determining role in whether violence occurred.
- *Role of “outsiders.”* In explaining March 2004, a common discourse has developed to explain the events in the following terms: ‘they came from outside, the rioters were not from this town/village.’ This allows the community to jointly explain what happened without having to accept responsibility, and both majority and minority communities are finding that explanation convenient. Yet at the early stages particularly, the rioters had extremely widespread public support in the K-Albanian community, and there was practically no public protestation of the violence being perpetuated against K Serbs.
- *The primacy of political vs. social or economic causes.* Some have commented that the message of March 2004 was primarily political, rather than social, and in this way different from the overall IEV, as areas worst affected by March violence were also the relatively more economically developed.

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<sup>30</sup> OSCE, *Human Rights Challenges Following the March Riots* (Prishtinë/Priština : OSCE Mission in Kosovo, May 2004).

### V. PERCEPTIONS VS. REALITY OF INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO, 2002 - 2005


Because of the difficulty of defining what is or is not inter-ethnic violence (IEV), and the under-reporting of IEV, any conclusions about the nature and extent of IEV in Kosovo can only be tentative. Much IEV is not reported at all. In Gjilan/Gnjilane, for example, the “Committee of the Serbian Community,” which collects data on violence against K-Serbs and their property, reports that in 60% of the cases the Serbs do not report attacks on people or property, because attackers are often not recognized (due to the dark, stress, etc.) and because they fear reporting will make the situation worse and induce more attacks. In addition, even if fully reliable, the statistics on IEV cannot paint a full picture of ethnically-related violence and insecurity. Lower IEV may not reflect improvements in security, but rather that people are taking effective actions to manage the risk of falling victim to IEV. And a focus on IEV may miss the potentially important role of *intra-ethnic* intimidation and violence related to inter-ethnic relations. For instance, violence committed within one community as punishment for stepping across ethnic lines. Nonetheless, trends, typologies, and variables can be identified in a comparative fashion. The observations below draw on the desk research and statistics gathered in Phase I with corroboration from the evidence gathered in the case studies conducted in Phase II.

Perceptions within the international community, and locally, of a decrease in inter-ethnic violence prior to March 2004 are not supported by the data, although there is a marked drop in levels of inter-ethnic violence after November 2004 that has been noted by K-Albanians and K-Serbs alike.

Figure 1 – Overview of Inter-Ethnic Crime - summarizes UNMIK CivPol statistics on IEV. On first examination the level of inter-ethnic violence has remained stable with only a slight increase over the spring-summer periods, if we disregard the pronounced increase experienced in March 2004 during the two-day riots. However the difference between the autumn-winter and spring-summer periods is not as pronounced as might be expected by the often claimed peaks of the hotter months of the year. As the first time period (March-Sept’02) is seven months as opposed to the six months covered by the last time period, the evidence suggests that there has been a modest but steady increase in inter-ethnic violence that reversed improvements during the 2001-2002 period reported by UNHCR in its 2002 Assessment of Minorities Report. This may be partly due to greater freedom of movement of minorities and the number of returns, which increased contact and therefore opportunity for IEV. Many of the incidents featured above include targeting through theft or damage of property. This makes sense since during the period 2002-2004 housing reconstruction assistance mostly benefited returning communities that have become a frequent target.

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**Figure 1**



The same slight increase during the three year period is mirrored in the commemoration seasons (see Table 1). The immediate post-riot (April – September) lull that many claimed had taken place is not supported by the figures which equate it to the average spring incidence of inter-ethnic violence. In the aftermath of the riots, despite the displacement of about half of the Kosovo Serb and Roma populations, the figures remain high, reflecting the increased looting, theft and damage of private property of those who left which remained without police or other protection until reconstruction began. Levels of IEV began to fall only after November 2004, though it should be noted that the January – March 2005 levels, while lower than those of the similar time period in 2004, still did not decrease to below 2002 levels overall.


**Table 1**

Spring 2002			Spring 2003			Spring 2004		
March	April	May	March	April	May	March* (incl. riots)	April	May
80	77	82	91	89	109	235	86	99


In sum, the steady and slightly rising level of violence over the period 2002-2004 challenges the perception of significant reductions in levels of violence (and consequent improvement of security for minorities) that made the March 2004 events seem so unexpected. What drove these inaccurate perceptions of improvement? There are several good reasons the violence of March 2004 came as a surprise to many in the

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international community especially. Four of the primary ones are covered in depth below.



**1. Mixed municipalities experienced decreases in IEV.** Several municipalities, including several significant municipalities with minority populations, did experience significant decreases in levels of IEV prior to March 2004. Kamenicë/Kamenica, Viti/Vitina, Prizren, Rahovec/Orahovac and Dragash/Dragaš, for example, experienced significant decreases in levels of IEV from 2002-2004 (See Figure 2).



Others, including municipalities with high levels of IEV such as Gjilan/Gnjilane, Pejë/Peć, and Istog/Istok, saw significant decreases in 2003, only to see IEV rise again to 2002 levels or higher in 2004. Still, it is thus not surprising that by 2004, the perception of a significantly improved situation with regard to IEV prevailed.

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At the same time, however, several municipalities with the highest levels of IEV overall and that eventually suffered heavily in March 2004 also had steadily increasing levels of IEV over the three-year (2002-2004) period examined (see Figure 3). This includes Prishtinë/Priština, Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Vushtrri/Vučitrn and Lipjan/Lipljan. Many of these municipalities already had high levels of IEV: Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, Obiliq/Obilic, Lipjan/Lipljan, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica. The decreases in IEV in some municipalities, combined with improvements in inter-ethnic interactions in those municipalities with the highest levels of IEV, could have obscured trends suggesting deterioration of the overall situation of IEV.

**2. A Steady Relationship to Ordinary Crime?** Table 2 – Relationship of IEV to Overall Crime - depicts IEV in relation to overall crime rates in Kosovo. While overall levels of inter-ethnic violence did not decrease significantly since 2002, IEV did remain steadily at around 8-10% of overall crime rates throughout the reporting period. Both overall crime figures and IEV remained at similar levels between 2002 and 2004, with a slight, but steady, increase in overall crime from 2002 onwards. In those occasions when IEV has peaked slightly, as in July and September 2004, overall crime has also peaked, thus keeping the percentage stable. This is true also of Albanian-Albanian and Serb-Serb crime (where the victim and suspect are of the same ethnicity), which remained at approximately 85% and 2-3% respectively during the period March 2002-September 2004. The slight rise in IEV during 2003-2004 period coincided with a significant fall in visible presence of KFOR and UNMIK Police as more security tasks are handed over to KPS. Equally it has coincided with efforts to normalise the economy by cracking down on corruption, organised crime, tax evasion, trafficking, etc., which has led to resistance by organised groups benefiting from an unstable environment.

After the peak in IEV in the aftermath of the war and then drop during the 2000-2001, the figures in Table 2 may remain as representative of the stable crime rates in Kosovo unless changes in the security configuration alter this again. These relatively stable figures suggest that crime and inter-ethnic violence may be related to more permanent features of Kosovo's landscape such as socio-economic deprivation, weapon availability, organized crime, weak law enforcement and judiciary, and demographics, as opposed to the state of inter-ethnic relations, or political events, March 2004 notwithstanding.

They also indicate that, contrary to widespread belief, the higher tensions prevalent during politically significant periods (e.g., elections in Kosovo or Serbia, arrests of prominent former KLA figures, commemorations of key events, returns of bodies of the missing, etc.) do not appear to lead to increased attacks (except in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica). This cannot be concluded with certainty, as the *intra-ethnic* crime statistics are not disaggregated by type or motive of violence, and increases in overall crime rates may reflect also increases in politically-motivated intra-ethnic violence related to inter-ethnic relations.

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**Table 2: Relationship of IEV to Overall Crime as reported by UNMIK CivPol Crime Statistics**

2002

	March	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
%	10.0%	9.8%	8.8%	8.8%	10.2%	8.8%	9.7%	10.2%	10.7%	9.1%
IEV	80	77	82	84	109	102	108	108	118	88
Overall Crime	795	783	930	945	1072	1151	1106	1054	1102	966

2003

	Jan	Feb	March	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
%	10.0%	9.6%	9.4%	8.5%	9.4%	8.9%	9.0%	8.1%	9.6%	9.8%	8.9%	9.1%
IEV	104	89	91	89	109	102	112	113	112	117	96	97
Overall Crime	1031	923	963	1045	1155	1150	1239	1391	1161	1191	1077	1056

2004


	Jan	Feb	March	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sept
%	7.8%	9.8%	22.4%	8.4%	9.0%	8.8%	9.1%	7.9%	9.2%
IEV	93	103	235	86	99	105	134	117	137
Overall Crime	1179	1044	1048	1014	1089	1184	1471	1477	1478

**3. Changes in the nature of IEV over time.** Figure 4 summarizes trends in various types of IEV from 2002-2004, reflecting a shift in the nature of IEV over time, from pure intimidation and assault to more property-related forms of IEV which resemble ordinary crime and vandalism.<sup>31</sup> A sharp increase in theft and property crimes is observable, along

<sup>31</sup> Three sources of data have been used for this exercise: UNMIK CivPol Inter-ethnic crime data, UNHCR Daily Situation Reports, and OSCE Daily Situation Reports. All recorded incidents (based on UNHCR and OSCE Daily Situation Reports, supplemented by UNMIK CivPol Situation Reports) were inputted on tables following the categorisation of type of incident. The categorisation of crime was developed to reflect the most common types of incidents recorded (I-intimidation, A-assault, M-murder, P-damage to property, T-theft, F-fight/group fight, R-riot related incidents). Theft (T) was included as a significant category in the overall typology of inter-ethnic violence as it is comparable to that of intimidation. Many incidents displayed a combination of the categories. For example, burglary and intimidation were classified TI, throwing of explosives at inhabited property was classified PI, with what appeared to be the most prominent aspect of the incident coming first. For simplicity in this figure, these mixed-type incidents have been classified under the predominant type, e.g., TI as theft, property damage and intimidation as property. IEV figures from the period March 17-18, 2004 have been excluded from these trends.

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with significant decrease in assault. Intimidation increased slightly in 2003 from 2002 levels, but has been declining since. The increasing frequency of property-related IEV, such as damage to homes and building or theft,<sup>32</sup> relative to pure intimidation and assault, reinforces the impression that ethnically-motivated violence has subsided, and that there are multiple motives for IEV. Indeed, in several places, UNMIK and Kosovo Police suggested that “real” inter-ethnic incidents are rare; they are more often stealing or criminal damages, as one KPS officer commented.



While these incidents are not primarily ethnically-motivated and often not seen as “real” inter-ethnic, the climate of impunity towards inter-ethnic crime makes the likelihood of theft against minorities more likely. Minorities are also likely to feel victimised due to their ethnicity irrespective of the motives of the perpetrator even though the circumstances and motivations surrounding the incidents are likely more complex.

**4. Indicators of progress did not reflect reduced vulnerability to violence.** There were indicators of “progress” with regard to security and inter-ethnic relations. These indicators, however, were misleading and did not reflect reduced vulnerability to violence. Boxes 1 and 2 summarize typical indicators used (often implicitly) by UNMIK staff, security actors, NGOs and community members to gauge progress in the security situation for minorities. These include: traveling in private cars, lack of escorts, moving on foot in the centre of town, Serbs shopping in Albanian shops, selling in multi-ethnic markets, speaking language in local cafes, more relaxed inter-personal interactions, more cooperation, and no major violence. In some, K-Albanians especially perceived a

<sup>32</sup> A common theft suffered by minorities is of farming equipment and cattle, which threatens livelihoods. In one community, UNMIK police even suspected Serbs and Albanians working together to perpetrate the thefts.

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significant decrease in levels of violence since 2001, concluding that there is no problem with violence now.

The attention to these perceived positive indicators may have led local and international agencies to ignore other important indicators of continuing insecurity and consequently to overestimate progress. Several municipalities were characterized as “good” in terms of IEV by international agencies and local residents alike prior to March 2004 based on these indicators: Obiliq/Obilic, Viti/Vitina, Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, Gjilan/Gnjilane, Lipjan/Lipljan, among others. These same municipalities not only experienced high levels of violence in March 2004 – to the surprise of many, especially in Gjilan/Gnjilane – but, contrary to popular belief and perception, also consistently had amongst the highest levels of inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo over the entire 2002-2004 period. This suggests that the indicators were incomplete, missing several important factors relevant to security.

### **Box 1: Indicators Signaling Increased Interaction**

In Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, “inter-ethnic relations had improved, and there was more communication between north and south.”

People meet in cafes, talk and take a drink together. (Gjilan/Gnjilane, Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, Gornja Bitina/Biti e Epërmë, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica municipality)

“Albanians went to Shilovo (Silovo) for a drink, and were treated well by Serbs in the café.” (Gjilan/Gnjilane)

There is an inter-ethnic market in which people of both ethnicities buy and sell products. “Albanians use market in Štrpce/Shtërpçë, and there are many Albanians who sell goods there.” (Gjilan/Gnjilane and Štrpce/Shtërpçë)

People have started to visit each other’s homes, reviving old friendships from before the war. (Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, Gjilan/Gnjilane)

First, as mentioned previously, increased contact also creates increased opportunities for violence, whether ethnically motivated or not. Moreover, as tensions ease and inter-ethnic contact improves, more extreme actors are also likely to be motivated to resist these developments through violent action designed to re-polarize communities. Opposition to inter-ethnic contact still remained very strong and powerful in 2003 – 2004 and up to the present time, even in the “good” communities, and there were signs that it could be mobilized. For example, Serbs in Gjilan/Gnjilane say that although their Albanian friends disagree with the “policy of non-communication” between the communities, they are “intimidated” and “punished” by “radical structures” in their own

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community. Albanians deny this is the case, but many people still reported that they were “threatened” by their community “almost constantly” before March 2004 for engaging with K-Serbs, suggesting that there is some truth to the allegation, even if intimidation had decreased since the period immediately following the NATO bombings .

### Box 2: Indicators of Improved Security from Case Studies

Before March, 2004, there were few intimidations, according to K-Albanians and some KFOR interviewees, and no crime against Serbs, no physical violence. Only “minor” incidents such as “dirty looks” or “swearing from drunken people,” “swearing at people when they are passing by, shouts from cars,” which make Serbian women and girls uncomfortable, and some defacing of ethnic symbols. (Gjilan/Gnjilane, Donja & Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme & Biti e Epërmë)

A 2001 incident in Gjilan/Gnjilane in which an old Serb with a traditional Serb hat (sajkaca) was walking through the center of town, and young Albanian boys had topped it off his head and onto the ground “cannot happen anymore,” as people are now used to seeing Serbs in town, and there is no reason to fear.”

Outside Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec, if a Serb had walked into the subunit in the years immediately following the war, this would have been treated as a provocation and people would have reacted aggressively. This would no longer occur, Albanian young men explained, because Kosovo was becoming more European.

Serbs move freely through the town, come to the centre of town to shop, collect their pensions and take necessary documents from the municipality. They not only shop in Serbian stores, but also in Albanian shops. (Gjilan/Gnjilane, Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje)

“Serbs went without an escort, went to work on foot, sent their children to school in Bresje, went shopping and spoke their language freely in town.” (Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje)

Serbs began to cultivate their land, at first going to the fields with KFOR escort, but gradually beginning to go alone (Zheger/Zegra). “Serbs and Albanians help each other in the fields and borrow equipment from each other, as they did before the war.” (Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme)

“The situation had been good lately so that we used the main bridge” not only the footbridge built by KFOR, to cross to the south of the city. (Mitrovice/Mitrovica prior to March 2004)

Serb minority representatives coming to town were at first escorted by KFOR in armored cars “and now the same leaders come in their own vehicles without a problem.” (OSCE 29)

The multi-ethnic police station is an “indication that Serbs are now safe working in the village.” (Zheger/Zegra)

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Albanians too note the same thing about their Serb friends and colleagues: “When you speak to one Serb and when you speak to two it is completely different. They are afraid of one another.” Even in Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë, in an atmosphere that community members themselves describe as “tolerant” even if tense, no Serb from the village has accepted to work for UN institutions or KFOR and Serbs are proud of the fact. Easing of tensions could thus be expected to provoke some backlash.

Second, the very local nature of the indicators, emphasizing movements and interactions within the local community, also may have led international and local observers to miss the continuing threat of more external sources and triggers of violence. Nearly all community residents attributed at least some of the violence in March 2004 and previously to “outsiders” coming from regions of Kosovo known for more extreme political views who then worked with local residents, mostly young people, to identify houses and property to attack.

*“I recognized a lot of children from [town] but also a lot of people from outside” in March 2004.  
-- Resident, Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje*

Third, the same progress on these indicators may have led international agencies and local leaders to take actions that actually increased communities’ vulnerability to violence. In the sites considered to be “better” than others in terms of freedom of

*In Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje KFOR had removed its checkpoint in 2002 in “conformity with the situation” which was generally considered “stable” and “with no particular concern about security and ethnic tensions.”*

movement, integration of minorities and inter-ethnic cooperation, checkpoints had been removed, programs were closed or funding reduced. In Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, KFOR had removed its checkpoint

in 2002 “in conformity with the situation” which was considered to be “stable” and, as one KFOR officer put it, “with no particular concerns about security and ethnic tensions.” In Gjilan/Gnjilane, one K-Albanian interviewee noted, “because the atmosphere in the town was completely relaxed, KFOR and KPS had gone out of the town to prevent any possible disorder in their region.” These communities also experienced violence in March 2004. In communities where violence was stopped or avoided (e.g., Bica/Binxhe and Grabac/Grabc or Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec), KFOR was in place, violence was anticipated (or at least feared), and there was a credible (if implicit) threat that KFOR would react if violence occurred.

Finally, the indicators led to inaccurate conclusions and assumptions about actual security and minorities’ (Serbs’) sense of security.. Increased movement and progress on other indicators did not reflect significant improvements in actual conditions of security, in people’s sense of security, or in real engagement between K-Albanians and K-Serbs.

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

Despite greater movement and interaction, K-Serb feelings of insecurity were high before March 2004, and remained so a year later.

This low sense of security may not be due entirely to inter-ethnic violence but rather with the absence of rule of law more generally. There is also good evidence that these fears are heightened by the occasional dramatic incidents of violence. As several interviewees in Gjilan/Gnjilane suggested, the security situation reflects what is going on in other parts of Kosovo, so that the August 2005 attack on a group of Serbs on the road from Štrpce/Shtërpçë to Ferizaj/Urosevac (in which two of the four were killed) caused people in Gjilan/Gnjilane to reduce their movement. In some cases, leaders have kept the fear alive by reminding people that they will be attacked if they travel out of their village.

*While K-Serbs move freely, one international official noted with respect to Gjilan/Gnjilane, it is “in limited areas and with fear.”*

While K-Serbs again move more freely now, one international official noted with respect to Gjilan/Gnjilane, it is “in limited areas and with fear.”

The increased freedom of movement observed by locals and internationals alike has been accompanied by precautions to minimize the risk of falling victim to violence. While Serbs moved freely and interacted with Albanians, they followed (and still follow) a set of implicit protocols for reducing risk of confrontation when they do: moving in limited areas, especially those with strong presence of security forces, developing information and communication networks to warn each other about potential dangers, adopting a “low profile” in the streets, etc. In Gjilan/Gnjilane, for example, where Serb presence in the center of town is seen as a sign of relaxed relations, Serb report they feel secure there mainly because it is in the KFOR “red zone” – where KFOR is authorized to fire immediately in case of unrest. In Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje K-Serbs remarked that they are careful when moving in town. When they see groups on the street, they cross over, so as to avoid any possible conflict. They dress inconspicuously, and either speak Serbian quietly on the street or do not speak at all. One interviewee would walk to town with a dog on a leash for protection. K-Serbs in all the communities that were part of this study say they have shunned inter-ethnic situations, as they felt and feel vulnerable, and they move as little as possible other than for their most indispensable affairs.

Are these precautions the result of exaggerated fears stoked by politicians and the media in Belgrade and in Kosovo? Perhaps. It is also likely that these precautions reduced points of friction, thereby contributing to reductions in violence and perceptions of improved security. K-Serbs interviewed in this study predominantly attributed improvements in freedom of movement and decrease in violence to these precautionary measures and to their efforts to minimize contact with K-Albanians.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Amb. Kai Eide also points this out in his 2005 report on Kosovo: “The low number of reported inter-ethnic incidents partly also stems from the fact that the minorities tend to avoid or reduce to

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

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It is worth noting that K-Albanian claims of “normal” relations and great freedom of movement may partly reflect their own improved sense of security, though not necessarily a greater willingness to engage with K-Serbs. Albanians’ improved overall sense of security is well documented in the UNDP study, which found that nearly 50% of Kosovans felt the security situation Kosovo-wide had “gotten better” and 82% claiming they had not changed behavior out of concern about crime.<sup>34</sup> In the communities visited in this study, when speaking about improvements in the security situation, K-Albanians underlined how their own fears have eased. K-Albanians in Gjilan/Gnjilane commented that cooperation with Serbs is not seen as bad, as they neither fear nor see Serbs as a threat. Several people in the villages surrounding Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec noted that the situation is “not bad” and without much intimidation, then added “there is no fear [of Serbs] now.” Yet they still felt that if they were seen talking to a Serb walking through the village, they believed they would be called traitors by their own community.

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a minimum their contacts with the majority population.” K. Eide, *Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo*, in Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/635/2005, p. 9.


<sup>34</sup> See Rees, *Light Blue*, pp. 19, 31.

# VI. STRUCTURAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO AVOIDANCE OF VIOLENCE

Geography has been a consistent theme both in the desk research and the case study interviews as an important variable influencing whether or not violence occurred. The study explored the relationship of the geographical dimension of IEV with socio-economic conditions and demography, in particular the size and nature of minority populations.

## Geographical Dimension of IEV

Figure 5 – Three-Year Total IEV Incidents by Municipality - depicts the average yearly IEV by municipality for the three years 2002-2004.



The municipalities with the highest gross IEV are:

1. Mitrovicë/Mitrovica
2. Gjilan/Gnjilane
3. Pejë / Peć
4. Viti/Vitina
5. Vushtrri/Vučitrn
6. Prishtinë/Priština
7. Lipjan/Lipljan
8. Obiliq/Obilic
9. Prizren


## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

### 10. Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje

In general, per capita analysis did not significantly change conclusions regarding levels of IEV, except for the largest and the smallest municipalities (see Figure 6).

Municipalities with large populations and high number of IEV incidents – Prishtinë/Priština and Prizren, two of the largest urban areas in Kosovo, fare better when IEV incidence is considered relative to the size of the population, while municipalities with the smallest populations (Novobërdë/Novo Brdo and Shtërpçë/Štrpce) see the reverse (moving from amongst the lowest in numbers of incidents to amongst the highest per capita rates of IEV), perhaps reflecting the ongoing underlying tension in these municipalities.<sup>35</sup>

Figure 6: Average Per Capita Yearly IEV, 2002-2004



Excluding the per capita figures for those with very low populations (Novo Brdo/Novo Brdo, Štrpce/Shtërpçë, and the three northern Serb-majority municipalities), then a fairly consistent picture of the high IEV areas emerges (taking those municipalities on both lists):

<sup>35</sup> Calculations for IEV per capita were not possible for Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, because the population is unknown. It was thus not included in the Per Capita list, but it is safe to assume that it would be at or near the top of the list. In addition, the per capita figures may be skewed for municipalities with populations under 20,000: (Novobërdë/Novo Brdo (3,900), Shtërpçë/Štrpce (13,600), Zubin Potok (14,900), Zvečan/Zvečan (16,600) and Leposaviq/Leposavić (18,500)), and consequently it may not be accurate to categorize them as having high levels of IEV based on the per capita figures.

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?


1. Mitrovicë/Mitrovica
2. Gjilan/Gnjilane
3. Viti/Vitina
4. Vushtrri/Vučitrn
5. Lipjan/Lipljan
6. Obiliq/Obilic
7. Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje

### Minority Presence and IEV

Cross-referencing of the geography of IEV (IEV by municipality) and the demographics of each municipality points to two conclusions concerning the correlation of minority presence with IEV:

**1. Higher levels of IEV are associated with larger Serb, rather than other minority, population.** Figure 7 - Proportion of Minorities - depicts the demographic breakdown of municipalities in order of lowest to highest average IEV levels in the 2002-2004 timeframe.

**Figure 7: Proportion of Minorities**



## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

Overall, presence of minorities is a key factor for IEV; municipalities with the fewest or no minorities (e.g., Kacanik/Kacanik, Malisheve/Malisevo, Decan/Decani, Suharekë/Suva Reka, Podujevë/Podujevo) have little or no IEV, while municipalities with higher levels of violence have significant Serb and other minorities (e.g., Gjilan/Gnjilane, Lipjan/Lipljan, Obiliq/Obilic, Viti/Vitina, Vushtrri/Vučitrn, Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje).

A closer examination of the demographics of municipalities with highest and lowest IEV suggests that the presence of Serbs correlates more with higher levels of IEV than the presence of other minorities, whether Roma, Egyptian, Ashkali, Bosniak, Turkish, or Goran. The municipalities with the highest levels of IEV have a primarily Serb minority. By contrast, a number of municipalities with a significant proportion of other minorities and very few or no Kosovo Serbs had low or lower levels of violence, including Ferizaj/Urosevac, Dragash/Dragaš, Suharekë/Suva Reka, and Prizren (on a per capita basis).<sup>36</sup> This is not to suggest that non-Serb minorities do not suffer IEV, nor that they do not suffer discrimination and other forms of violations of minority rights. Several municipalities with significant non-Serb minority populations tend to experience greater levels of IEV than those with no minorities (e.g., Prizren, Gjakovë/Đakovica, Istog/Istok). However, it is those with Serb or predominantly Serb minority populations that experience the greatest levels of IEV.<sup>37</sup>

**2. Concentrated presence of minorities appears to be associated with reduced vulnerability to violence.** While greater numbers of K-Serb residents appear to correlate with higher levels of IEV, higher *concentrations* of Serbs appear to reduce vulnerability to violence. Municipalities with greater than 15% Serb population, including the four Serb-majority municipalities (Štrpce/Shtërpçë, Leposavic/Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, Zvecan/Zveqan), have amongst the lowest levels of inter-ethnic violence, along with nearly mono-ethnic K-Albanian municipalities (less than 2-3% minority). Municipalities with 4-15% Serbs experience the most violence.

This effect of concentration of minorities on IEV is reflected at the more “micro” level in the geography of violence during the March 2004 riots. Within communities, places with large concentrations of Serbs – from apartment complexes to mono-ethnic villages, were often not attacked. People (from both sides) reported that this was because they were

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<sup>36</sup> The level of IEV in relation to other municipalities of these more urban areas, like Prishtinë/Priština, drops significantly when IEV is measured on a per capita basis.

<sup>37</sup> Peje/Pec is the big exception to this observation. The high levels of violence experienced there may be associated with its urban character, as several of the areas with higher levels of IEV targeting non-Serb minorities are among the more populated in Kosovo (e.g., Prizren, Gjakovë/Đakovica). They may also be connected to what many people interviewed in the case studies reported as politico-strategic efforts to keep urban areas nearly fully Kosovar-Albanian, which is further explored later in the report.

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

considered difficult to target and overwhelm. In some instances, people thought (or were told) that the Serbs in these areas had arms or were otherwise capable of fighting back.<sup>38</sup>

### **Fear of arms and concentrations of Serbs deterred attacks**

In Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, neither the complex of apartment buildings with majority K-Serb population nor the nearby K-Serb populated villages, such as Kuzmin, were attacked during March 17-18, 2004. K-Serbs believe the demonstrators feared that people living in the apartment complexes might be capable of resistance and might be armed, as the apartment complex in question had previously been occupied by army officers. During these same events, a K-Albanian who tried to prevent demonstrators from going to the edge of the Serb village adjacent to Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje believed that Serbs there were armed and that “hell would break loose” if demonstrators went there. He did not argue this publicly to the crowd in Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, but in Zheger/Zegra, local people who dispersed a group of protesters who had prepared to go to a Serb village nearby did make the argument publicly. They told the demonstrators that Serbs were “most probably armed and if anything happened they would start a conflict between the communities.”

In Gjilan/Gnjilane, there was no violence in the surrounding predominately Serb-populated villages, including the largest village, Silovo/Shilovo, where many K-Serbs from town now reside. According to one person, the crowds “couldn’t” attack “because they didn’t dare to attack such a high concentration of Serbs.”

## **Socio-Economic Deprivation and IEV**

The desk study and cases show that *socio-economic deprivation increased general frustration and anger, but was not, and is not, a direct cause of inter-ethnic violence*. The outbreak of violence in 2004 has widely been attributed to the poor economic situation in Kosovo – high levels of unemployment, lack of investment (in part stemming from the difficulties of privatization), youth desperation and lack of economic prospects, etc. Indeed, Kosovo has the poorest economy in the Balkans and the worst

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<sup>38</sup> Clearly, Mitrovice/Mitrovica is an exception, but can be explained by the fact that it is the “front line” of the conflict. Still, neither the apartment complex in the Miner’s Hill/Microsettlement area in Mitrovice/Mitrovica north, which houses a mixed population including a significant number of Albanians, nor the Bosnia Mahalla, were attacked in March 2004.

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

unemployment in the region, with the burden falling particularly on youth and women.<sup>39</sup> The dire economy, as the ICG reports, is now rivaling status as the most important question for both communities.<sup>40</sup> People broadly believe that improvements in the economy – in livelihoods, employment and quality of life in particular – will bring about peace, either because they “cannot think about cooperation with others if they are hungry”<sup>41</sup> or because people will “stay busy and have no time to make war.”<sup>42</sup>

The ICG reports that in some cases, people from Mitrovicë/Mitrovica north are being drawn by high salaries to jobs in the south, and some Albanians have begun coming to Serbs on the border for work.<sup>43</sup> Socio-economic deprivation is also believed to be a significant cause of crime in Kosovo, and may therefore indirectly exacerbate IEV.<sup>44</sup> Youth are particularly affected, and unemployed youth in particular are seen by many as a big problem. As one Albanian teacher in Gjilan/Gnjilane commented, youth are angry and frustrated with the institutions because they want jobs and see the institutions as doing little. One school director noted that “because of the lack of activities for youth it has come to their degeneration.”

A number of factors together suggest, however that poverty is not a decisive factor in violence, at least not directly, and that the relationship between socio-economic deprivation is more complicated. An initial cross-referencing of levels of inter-ethnic violence with the Kosovo Human Development Index (HDI) (2004) and the World Bank’s Kosovo Poverty Assessment (2005) reveals no neat patterns relating poverty and unemployment to levels of inter-ethnic violence. Several extremely poor municipalities with minority populations, such as Novobërdë/Novo Brdo, Dragash/Dragaš, Klinë/Klina and Rahovec/Orahovac, have maintained low (or lower) levels of IEV. At the same time, higher HDI municipalities with minorities (such as Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Gjilan/Gnjilane, Lipjan/Lipljan, Viti/Vitina) do not necessarily have lower levels of IEV, and indeed are amongst those with the highest IEV in Kosovo over the 2002-2005 period. A cross-referencing of income levels and levels of extreme and less extreme poverty with IEV levels by municipality yields no clearer patterns, as municipalities with the highest or medium Human Poverty Index (HPI) are amongst both those with high and low levels of IEV.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> European Commission, *Kosovo (Under UNSCR 1244) Progress Report 2005* (Brussels: European Commission, 9 November 2005), p. 19; World Bank, *Kosovo Monthly Economic Briefing* (Prishtinë/Priština : World Bank, September 2005), p. 16.

<sup>40</sup> International Crisis Group, *Bridging Mitrovica’s Divide*, Europe Report No. 165 (Prishtina and Brussels: ICG, 13 September 2005), pp. 11-12.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with K-Albanian from Peje/Pec municipality, July 2005.

<sup>42</sup> Interview with K-Serb from Peje/Pec municipality, July 2005.

<sup>43</sup> International Crisis Group, *Bridging Mitrovica’s Divide*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>44</sup> See Rees, *Light Blue*, p. 22

<sup>45</sup> See UNDP, *Human Development Report*, pp. 38-39.

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Moreover, specifically in the case of the March 2004 violence, it should be noted that the main perpetrators of violence (though not the organizers, to the extent the violence of March 2004 was organized) were primary and secondary school students, working at times with the help or encouragement of their teachers. Witnesses in Gjilan/Gnjilane, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje identified “kids,” “teenagers” or “primary and secondary school students” from their communities amongst the violent demonstrators in the front lines.<sup>46</sup> While these students were no doubt affected by the growth in Kosovans’ pessimism about the economy, the future welfare of their own families and their own employment prospects,<sup>47</sup> they were not the most directly affected by the economic situation, as were the unemployed or university students about to enter the workforce. Moreover, the role of their teachers in encouraging and sometimes leading the youth in these violent protests has been underemphasized and suggests an intervening cause of violence. In all three communities explored for this study in which violence occurred (Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, Gjilan/Gnjilane), the significant role of teachers in organizing, promoting or encouraging the violence – mentioned in interviews by a range of people, K-Albanians, K-Serbs and internationals alike – hints at a more instrumental, rather than driving, role by the school youth. At first, the demonstrations were mostly peaceful; in Gjilan/Gnjilane a demonstration had been organized outside the Ministry of Education, said one UNMIK official, to protest current conditions, while in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, K-Albanian teachers had organized a march of their primary school students toward the bridge to protest the drowning of the three children the day before.<sup>48</sup>

*“March was done by kids,  
and [kids were] told by  
teachers to go out and do it.”*

As one international official told researchers, “March was done by kids and [kids were] told by teachers to go out and do it.” The demonstrations did turn violent, and in some communities, witnesses recognized some

teachers among the demonstrators burning houses.

The research uncovered a few instances, including the oldest primary school in Gjilan/Gnjilane, where teachers told students preparing to demonstrate to go home. These instances of resistance to violence reinforces impressions of teachers’ moral and

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<sup>46</sup> In Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, some claimed that the protest went violent after the students had gone back to school in the afternoon, and the non-school (rural) youth took over.

<sup>47</sup> See RIINVEST. 2004. *Early Warning Report Kosovo, Report #6, January – April 2004* (Prishtinë/Priština: UNDP, 2004). See also Human Rights Watch, *Failure to Protect*, p. 27. (“The main component of most of the crowds were young ethnic Albanians, many of whom came of age after the 1999 conflict, and who feel deeply marginalized and frustrated by the lack of opportunities provided by Kosovo’s stagnating economy.”)

<sup>48</sup> See ICG, *Collapse in Kosovo*, p. 44.

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actual authority vis-à-vis students, and suggests that youth may have been organized by them to some degree.

This does not mean that economic issues, and socio-economic deprivation in particular, are not connected to the incidence and level of inter-ethnic violence or tension in Kosovo. The connection may, however, be through politics: the disappointment or frustration of the political aspirations of K-Albanians, and the overlap of factors contributing to poverty with the ethno-political cleavages that continue to drive tension. Clearly economic issues – privatization, pensions, and property, for example – have been issues over which Prishtina and Belgrade have negotiated and over which there is continuing tension. Inter-ethnic violence itself has increasingly been carried out in the realm of property and livelihoods at the local level. Pressure to sell property is experienced as a form of violence by K-Serbs. K-Albanians in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica experience similar pressure to sell their property in Mitrovica North. Sales of property around the footbridge leading to the three towers neighborhood in the north to K-Serbs have made K-Albanians nervous, as the “greatest fear” of K-Albanians is that K-Serbs will control all entrances to the North and will more easily force K-Albanians to sell their property and permanently divide the city. It is difficult to separate economics from politics in this situation.

The perception widely held among K-Albanians is that the poor state of the economy is the result of delays in addressing the political situation,<sup>49</sup> and that the resolution of issues that affect economic development and livelihoods, such as privatization and pensions, has been stymied by the lack of resolution of the status question. In this sense, the economy

### **Economic links to IEV: property and livelihoods**

Since 1999, most people in Fushe Kosove/Kosovo Polje confirm that there have been extensive inter-ethnic sales of property by Serbs, both in town and in the neighboring predominantly Serb village of Bresje. There was a pattern to the sales, people explained. Someone would be beaten up, and two to three days later a buyer would visit the house, telling the owner that they should consider selling because of security reasons. Key points in the neighborhood were targeted, so that once one sold, the others in the neighborhood would as well.

and frustration with the lack of development go hand in hand with political frustration, and attribution of inter-ethnic violence to economic factors is difficult.

Horizontal inequalities may also play a role in perpetuating tensions, even if they are not a proximate or immediate cause of violence. Socio-economic deprivation is differentiated along ethnic lines in Kosovo.

According to the UNDP Human Development Report 2004, K-Serbs enjoy the highest HDI, followed by K-Albanians and then “Others.” The RAE have a distinctly lower HDI

<sup>49</sup> In a 2005 poll, 46% of Kosovo Albanians surveyed believed that the economy will not develop until final status is agreed. Colin Irwin, *Coming to Terms with the Problem of Kosovo: The People's Views from Kosovo and Serbia* (Thessaloniki: CDRSEE, 2005), p. 18.

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

and a “strong disadvantage” in terms of extreme poverty,<sup>50</sup> but a clear differentiation still exists between K-Serbs and K-Albanians. Municipalities with the highest HDI are nearly all Serb-majority municipalities (with the exception of Prishtinë/Priština), while those with the lowest HDI are predominantly nearly mono-ethnic K-Albanian and were heavily affected by the war (Novo Brdo/Novoberde with nearly 38% Serbs and Shtime/Stimlje with nearly 3% other minorities are exceptions). The three northern Serb-majority municipalities also have amongst the lowest human poverty indices. The factors associated with extreme poverty also appear to be experienced more by K-Albanians than K-Serbs: joblessness, income sources from borrowed money, remittances, help from relatives, sold property, greater numbers of children, households with disabled members or female heads. K-Serbs have tended to obtain income from salaries, pensions, and social aid, with some sold property, presumably benefiting from the ongoing connection with Belgrade. Municipalities with more extreme human poverty households tend to derive more of their income from borrowed money, remittances and help from relatives, while households with income composed of salaries, pensions and social aid are nearly inseparable from the political situation.<sup>51</sup>

This general differentiation along ethnic lines may feed resentment at the municipality level as well, in the form of K-Albanian resentment of K-Serbs’ taking “double salaries” and generally receiving support from Belgrade as well as the international community, while economic development is stymied in Kosovo because of the uncertainty of the status. In some local communities, K-Albanian authorities claim that some K-Serbs also manipulate the international process by registering as refugees “for personal benefits, as they receive aid from the government here.”

### **Perceptions of international community favoritism feeds tension**

Among three dividers mentioned repeatedly by K-Albanians in the six villages surrounding Gorazdevac/Gorazdec was the perceived favoritism of the international community towards Serbs. The attention that the Serb minority is receiving in terms of resources and projects makes the Albanian community very angry. There is a perception that the Albanian community is receiving nothing while the Serbs get everything.

In other areas, local officials – principals and teachers especially – are resentful of the pressure on public services. Space is a big problem for K-Albanians in schools, where, as some teachers commented, many students do not continue to secondary education because of lack of space. In Gjilan/Gnjilane, the director of one school noted that “instead of working with 600 pupils we are working with 3000.” In Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, 20,000 K-Albanian children are crammed into the same number of schools as 4000

<sup>50</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Report 2004*; World Bank, *Kosovo Poverty Assessment 2005*.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

Serbs.<sup>52</sup> Securing space for K-Albanian schoolchildren in under-utilized K-Serb schools caused conflict in Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje and Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë. In Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, the Special Representative of the Secretary General issued a decision in 2005 over the objection of K-Serbs, making the K-Serb “Sveti Sava” school multi-ethnic<sup>53</sup> because Albanian schools lacked space for their students. In Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë and Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, conflict erupted when Albanian returnee parents and children protested the lack of space and blockaded the school in an attempt to gain access to the school building., This conflict was only diffused when the Štrpce/Shtërpçë municipality, with international support, decided to build two small schools to accommodate both communities.

At the same time that horizontal inequalities may feed K-Albanian resentment, socio-economic conditions also appear to have contributed to a radicalization of K-Serb opinion, in particular in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and the northern municipalities. The economic situation has reinforced the growth of radicals in North Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, as most people depend on the social institutions (health, education, university, etc.) financed mainly by Belgrade for employment. The drift in loyalties to the hardline Serbian National Council has, as ICG reports, resulted from their growing control of limited budget resources and jobs.<sup>54</sup> Vested economic interests have also developed; it is an open secret, several interviewees remarked, that some people control economic cooperation with Albanians over the bridge, and the prohibition of cooperation with Albanians preserves this monopoly on economic ties.

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<sup>52</sup> International Crisis Group, *Bridging Mitrovica's Divide*, p. 11.

<sup>53</sup> In this case multi-ethnicity refers to allowing Albanian students to attend the school in a separate shift from the K-Serb students.

<sup>54</sup> International Crisis Group, *Bridging Mitrovica's Divide*, p. 12.

# VII. OPERATIONAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO AVOIDANCE OF INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE

On March 17-18, 2004 all over Kosovo, many individuals disregarded personal danger and stepped forward to hide or evacuate their neighbours or protect their neighbours' property from the oncoming threat of angry and negatively motivated crowds. In some places, communities were able to mobilize *collective action* to stop or avoid violence. They prevented mobs from entering a village, prevented potential demonstrators from going to perpetrate violence, and prevented community members from acting in ways that might have provoked a violent response from the other ethnicity. The inquiry into factors seeks to understand why some places were able to mobilize collective action, while in others, the actions of many individuals who objected to violence and helped their neighbours did not evolve or catalyze collective action.

### “Bridging Social Capital” Not A Significant Factor for Avoidance

Social capital refers to the “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”<sup>55</sup> It includes the institutions, relationships, attitudes, norms, and values that govern interactions among people, and, it is argued, contribute to social and economic development.<sup>56</sup> The notion of “bridging” social capital has captured the imagination of policy makers and NGOs engaged in peacebuilding around the world. The expectation is that if cross-ethnic bonds of trust, cooperation and solidarity are formed either in associations (business associations, trade unions, professional associations, NGOs, sports clubs, etc.), or in everyday contact (social visits, cultural festivals, business dealings, marketplace contact, etc.) these will counterbalance the divisive force of “bonding” social capital, or the social networks, values, norms and connections that keep homogenous groups cohesive. The

*“Bridging social capital” in the form of cross-ethnic contact, cooperation and associations was not a significant factor in helping communities to avoid or resist IEV.*

theory postulates that “because they build bridges and manage tensions, interethnic networks are agents of peace, but if communities are organized only along intraethnic lines and the interconnections with other communities are very weak or even nonexistent, then ethnic violence is quite likely.”<sup>57</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Putnam, R. 1995. “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital.” *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 6, No. 1: 66.

<sup>56</sup> Grootaert, C. & Bastelaer, T. 2001. *A Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations from the Social Capital Initiative*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. p. 4.

<sup>57</sup> Varshney, A. 2001. “Ethnic Conflict & Civil Society.” *World Politics* 53:363.

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Based on social capital theory and experience in other places, we expected to find greater “bridging social capital” in communities that had avoided or resisted violence in March 2004. The cases suggested, however, that “bridging social capital” in the form of cross-ethnic contact, cooperation and associations was not a significant factor in helping communities to avoid or resist IEV.

Communities with greater interethnic engagement before March 2004, such as Gjilan/Gnjilane or Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, erupted in violence in March 2004. At the same time, the absence of significant cross-ethnic engagement in most of the communities studied that avoided violence in March 2004 – Shtupel/Stupelj and Bica/Binxhe and Grabac/Grabc in Klinë/Klina municipality, Zheger/Zegra in Gjilan/Gnjilane municipality and Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec in Pejë/Peç municipality – stood out.<sup>58</sup>

### **Communities with “good” inter-ethnic relations experienced violence in March 2004**

Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje was considered by many international and local practitioners to be “an example of good co-habitation.” People from both communities worked together in the municipality which had a Serb in a leadership role serving as Deputy President. Several institutions were mixed: staff in the Kosovo Police Service, the community center (an OSCE-supported project), and a multi-ethnic radio station. There was also a multi-ethnic market used by people of all ethnicities in town. Yet, the town suffered greatly from violence on March 17-18, 2004. 106 houses were burned down, along with the Serbian hospital, administrative building/post office, school and church. Many people, including elderly Serbs, men and women, were beaten, with one man beaten to death by the mob while KPS allegedly watched.

In Gjilan/Gnjilane, there are a number of connectors that bind the communities. There are, as one young person noted, many opportunities to do inter-ethnic activities. The majority of her friends are involved in multi-ethnic activities. Many Serbs and Albanians work together in the municipality, in NGOs, and in the Kosovo Police Service which gained a K-Serb regional commander in 2005. People trade and do business with each other. A multi-ethnic sports festival was held in 2003. A multi-ethnic market exists. Friendships survived the war. Like Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, Gjilan/Gnjilane erupted in violence in March 2004.

As reported by most interviewees, both within and outside these “good” communities,

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<sup>58</sup> The one exception is Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Eperme and Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, where inter-ethnic interaction on a daily basis, as well as local efforts to develop cross-ethnic associations, were greater than in other areas. These villages did, however, experience significant tension and confrontation before March 2004, even if they did not become violent.

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everyday interethnic engagement, from the contacts in markets and stores to cooperation in the municipality, festivals and athletics, was greater than in other parts of Kosovo. There were also a number of associational linkages – cross-ethnic economic cooperation, ongoing business relationships, and cooperation in NGOs. As a result, people reported, tensions were lower.

Yet neither the everyday type nor the associational engagement in these communities was sufficient to withstand violence or provocations to violence on a collective level. Indeed, over the entire 2002-2005 time period higher levels of violence (or non-violent confrontation, in the case of Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë and Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme) relative to other places in Kosovo co-existed in these “good” places with higher levels of inter-ethnic engagement. Why? The cases suggest several reasons.

**1. Geo-strategic dimensions of IEV.** A wide range of people interviewed for this study believe that the March 2004 violence, and IEV against Serbs more generally, has a strong geo-strategic dimension to it. Analyses of the March 2004 violence identified “a more calculated side,”<sup>59</sup> even if not a fully organized dimension of the violence. Urban areas and areas and populations along main roads were particularly hard hit, because, many people suggested, the goal was to clear them of Serbs by targeting minority properties there.

### **IEV designed to clear urban areas of Serbs**

In Gjilan/Gnjilane, some people explained violence in town as part of an effort to keep urban areas “pure,” while multi-ethnicity is more tolerated in rural areas. In Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, nearly all the Serb properties that were along or near the main road from Prishtinë/Priština to Pejë/Peć were attacked in March 2004, while buildings located further back from the road, as well as villages farther away (e.g., Kuzmin) were not attacked. People noted a similar pattern to the violence there from 1999-2002. Thirty percent of the Serb population in town, they noted, lived along that main road in 1999, and most attacks were concentrated on them. By 2003, 160 Serbian houses were left in town, most far from the road.

In this context, in March 2004 communities such as Gjilan/Gnjilane and Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, or Prizren experienced greater vulnerability to IEV than other areas far from strategic main roads or rurally located and might have required a greater density and depth of inter-ethnic engagement to have withstood the violence.

**2. Inter-ethnic engagement did not lead to cross-ethnic communication or rumor control mechanisms.** The literature indicates that when routine (everyday types) inter-

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<sup>59</sup> ICG, *Collapse in Kosovo*, p. 15.

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ethnic engagement is effective as a peacebuilding mechanism, it has helped mitigate or prevent violence not only by promoting communication across conflict lines, but also by allowing people to come together, even temporarily, in formal or informal organizations in times of tension. In other words, they are able to organize collective action to police neighborhoods, dispel rumors, and talk with each other during times of crisis.<sup>60</sup>

This kind of collective action did not occur in the communities that experienced violence in March 2004. In Gjilan/Gnjilane and Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, many individuals took action, often at significant personal risk, to protect or help their Serb neighbours.

In Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, the majority of people remained hidden in their houses, intimidated by extremists whom they all know but “do not have the courage” to resist, as both an international who resides in town and a human rights activist commented. However, many people tried to protect their neighbors. Many Albanians took their neighbors into their homes and hid them. In two instances, Albanians stepped forward and successfully persuaded the crowd not to attack a neighboring Serb house. In one case, an Albanian successfully persuaded the crowd by arguing that his own house would burn along with the Serb house.

In Gjilan/Gnjilane, neighbors commonly told the crowd that the Serb in a house they were attacking was “a good man.” One witness told the story of an Albanian who stopped the crowd from stealing his Serb neighbor’s possessions by calling KPS. He remarked: the crowd “didn’t know the Serb was a good man, so they listened to the Albanian neighbor and took his word.” Serb leaders also recount how they were helped by Albanian friends who took them to a safer location.

Yet these individual ties and actions, even if numerous, did not catalyse collective action. The individual-level engagement prevalent in these areas did not produce networks of communication and/or rumor control. Nor was there even significant communication across ethnic lines to warn of impending events. In a few instances, again on an individual basis, Albanians called their Serb friends to warn that something bad might happen, but mostly Serbs reported being “surprised,” “unready” or having “no idea what was going on” except insofar as they observed the behaviour of their Albanian colleagues and neighbours on March 17. In Štrpce/Shtërpçë municipality, Serb employees “knew something was afoot” because Albanian co-workers “seemed nervous” and left before the end of the working day. But there was no direct communication about impending trouble.

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<sup>60</sup> Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society,” p. 375.

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It is worth noting that these cross-ethnic networks of communication and rumor control also did not exist in the communities that *did* avoid violence. However, as we describe below, these communities that succeeded in avoiding violence did develop mechanisms *within their communities* for checking rumors about imminent threats that might have justified escalatory reactions and for obtaining accurate information about the other side.

**3. Leadership to reach out to the ‘other’ did not mitigate violence.** Reaching out to the other community (to Serbs, mainly, by Albanian leaders) was *not* an important factor in effective resistance to violence. In Gjilan/Gnjilane and in Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, people described their municipal leaders at the time as having made great efforts to reach out to minorities, and Serbs in particular. The municipal president in Gjilan/Gnjilane in March 2004 was seen as inclusive and open. He was known to have invited Serbs to join in municipal structures early on. One person noted that he went to places where minorities lived without the prodding of the international community – something unique to Kosovo, he added. Yet when he, and the PDK leader in Gjilan/Gnjilane went out to stop people before the violence broke out, “people would not listen to them at all.” Similarly, the President of Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje municipality was said to have taken a stand against violence toward minorities, with veiled threats, for example, of surveillance and punishment of anyone who threatened children walking to school. The President spoke Serbian, openly, in public forums. Yet although some Serbs working with the municipality believe the President has changed his views of Serbs as a result of working with them and is responsive to solving the problems of the Serbian community, most do not. The municipality’s reaction to the violence was seen by everyone as weak; the President was out of town, and no one, people reported, came out to confront the crowds.

**4. “Rules of the inter-ethnic game” regarding interaction limit development of bridging social capital.** The cases suggest that in both K-Serb and K-Albanian communities, there are clear unwritten “rules of the game” concerning when, how, why and to what extent people can/should interact across conflict lines. These “rules of the inter-ethnic game” create boundaries on the depth and breadth of relationships that can permissibly be developed and ensure that any inter-ethnic engagement that does occur does not challenge the current polarization of K-Serb - K-Albanian relations. Interaction unmediated by international agencies takes place primarily for the purpose of trade or other economic transactions and property sales. As people across the range of communities in this study noted, these kinds of contacts for personal, economic gain are “ok,” but socializing generally is not “ok.” Inter-ethnic contact – even “permissible”

### Boundaries of Permissible Contact

It is “ok” to conduct trade with Albanians, but “not ok” to socialize. It is “ok” to go to the municipality, but not to cafes or the cinema. Cafes once popular and used by everyone are no longer used by Serbs.

-- K-Serbs from Fushë Kosovë/  
Kosovo Polje

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economic dealings – usually happen “at night,” or discreetly, in places and at times when it is not visible (even if everyone knows it is happening).

The limiting effect of these “rules” on the scope and depth of inter-ethnic interaction and the possibilities for real, substantive engagement across ethnic lines that could transform relationships or give birth to conflict mitigation mechanisms is clear. While inter-ethnic sports activities are quite common, the Zheger/Zegra youth dialogue group was the only location in this study that mounted a mixed football team. Further, youth participants in multi-ethnic activities and interactions say they generally do not keep contact outside the organized activities. Some phone their friends of the other ethnicity, but do not meet unless an NGO or international agency organizes an activity.

### **Limited Contact Outside Agency-Sponsored Inter-Ethnic Activities**

A participant in a multi-ethnic youth group in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica noted that it is enough for him to see the other participants once a month on [NGO] premises. There is a guy from the [other] group with a worldview similar to his own: they listen to similar music, share many interests. However, even with him there are no contacts. In the couple of years that they have been involved in the youth group they have but exchanged a few SMS messages. He is sure they would be good friends if they did not live in this environment.

In Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, the researchers observed more public interaction between Serbs and Albanians than in other parts of Kosovo: people drink and talk together, help each other in the fields, hire each other for work, visit each other’s homes, and walk the “corso” together. Serbs greeted Albanian villagers in Albanian on the street and Albanians responded in Serbian. Albanian returnees use all available village infrastructure (health services, stores, etc.) except the school. Yet they say they are still “cautious” about visiting each other, preferring secret places or nighttime for such visits, and when they walk the “corso,” Serbs remain on one side of the road and Albanians on the other.

These narrow boundaries of interaction are actively (albeit informally) policed within each community, preventing the development of real bridging social capital. Intimidation remains a powerful and widespread force, even if it is no longer overt or physical. Overt intra-group intimidation of people who do engage in inter-ethnic activities has, to be sure, declined since 2002, especially among K-Albanians who cite the need to demonstrate that Standards are being met as a powerful reason. Nonetheless, there is evidence that it was quite strong before 2004, is still present, and there are indications that the “rules of the inter-ethnic game” have become internalized and self-enforcing. Youth from Zheger/Zegra go to Gjilan/Gnjilane town or Kamenicë /Kamenica to meet with their Serb counterparts who live in neighbouring Donja Budriga in Gjilan/Gnjilane or Kamenicë/Kamenica because local NGO organizers “were facing big problems from the Albanian community.” K-Serbs, especially in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, are under pressure

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### **Intra-ethnic intimidation remains a powerful force**

In Pejë/Peć, fear of being seen in the company of Serbs is said to drive Albanian behavior. Albanians speak with Serbs only when in an office (for example, while attending meetings initiated by UNMIK or KFOR about the return of Serbs in Kosovo), but never in the street, and would never go out with Serb friends to a café or restaurant.

not to deal with Albanians generally; NGO staff to NGO staff contact seems to be “okay,” says one international official, but “average people would never do it as the [political] leadership would say no.” Both K-Albanians and K-Serbs, while claiming that

intimidation has decreased or does not exist in their own community with regard to inter-ethnic contact, believe that intimidation by extremists prevents good-willed people from the other community from interacting and cooperating with them. Both sides cited examples of friends from the other community stating that they were not “able” to be seen with them due to fear of censure from their own community.

Many people in both the K-Albanian and K-Serbian communities also still expressed feelings of discomfort at potential reactions by their own community, even if, as some youth participating in inter-ethnic activities in the Pejë/Peć region noted, they “had not heard of anything happening to anyone.” Consequently they have still not initiated much visible contact with the other except when invited by international agencies. This suggests that many people may have internalized the prohibition against inter-ethnic engagement that goes beyond the accepted boundaries such that overt forms of intimidation are no longer needed.

**5. Interdependence sufficient to constrain violence was not economic.** In the communities that did not experience violence, the kind of interdependence cited by residents as creating a brake on violence related to the road network and the need for access to particular places (e.g. as main thoroughfares went through K-Serb villages), and mutual vulnerability to harm. In Pejë/Peć, for example, some people believe that K-Albanian villagers’ interest in ensuring the main road to Pejë/Peć was a significant factor against violence. This vital transport artery for the K-Albanians runs through the centre of the enclave Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec. Similarly, in Zheger/Zegra, people believe the road connecting the village to Gjilan/Gnjilane town through Donja Budriga remained calm “because Albanians need to use the road that drives through Budriga, and it is in everyone’s interest to keep things calm.”<sup>61</sup> In the village of Shtupel/Stupelj, Albanian war veterans, who stood in front of the crowd to stop it from going to the Serb villages of Bica/Binxhe and Grabac/Grabc, said they were afraid that the situation would have escalated. If a single rioter had been shot, they feared, fighting would have broken out between KFOR and the people.

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<sup>61</sup> Interview with K-Serbs, Donja Budriga, October 2005.

### Bonding Social Capital: A Resource for Collective Action?

It is not clear whether the failure to prevent or avoid violence in places like Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje or Gjilan/Gnjilane was due to the absence of real bridging social capital in those communities, or whether bridging social capital simply has no role to play in mitigating violence in this divided society. The communities that avoided violence had no more bridging social capital than those that suffered in the riots of March 2004. Consequently, no definitive conclusions can be drawn about the *potential* of inter-ethnic engagement to be a mitigating force in Kosovo, at least in the medium term. All we know is that there is in fact very little “bridging social capital” and that the little that does exist is highly circumscribed.

We also know that the communities that did avoid violence drew mainly on *intra-ethnic* “bonding social capital” at the local level – the intra-ethnic social networks and norms of reciprocity, trust, shared values that arise from them<sup>62</sup> – to resist violence or provocations to violence. This is counterintuitive, as the literature and experience predominantly stress the role of inter-ethnic engagement and trust in prevention of violence, while intra-ethnic engagement and bonding is said to heighten divisions and tension.<sup>63</sup> A comparison of communities that avoided violence with those that did not in March 2004 suggests some aspects of “bonding social capital” facilitated mobilization of action against violence.

**1. All had effective crisis management mechanisms.** The communities that were able to avoid or resist violence in March 2004 had effective mechanisms for gathering and interpreting information about threats and for taking, disseminating and implementing collective decisions. In Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, for example, the Štrpce/Shtërpçë-based media, TV “Herc,” a local station widely viewed by Serbs and by some Albanians, was reported to be moderate in its coverage of the March events (although the Belgrade-based RTS had been sounding the alarm that an attack on the villages was imminent). In Pocheste, the first village after Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec to the southeast, the Albanian community had established a gathering place at a petrol station at the edge of the village. When first-hand information arrived from a resident arrived that Serbs were not blocking the road,<sup>64</sup> it was disseminated through the community. A collective decision to refrain from action that might provoke a reaction was taken because there was no trouble and

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<sup>62</sup> Robert Putnam, *The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (2000).

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Putnam, *Bowling Alone*; Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society;” Putnam, Arne Strand, Hege Toje, Alf Morten Jerve, Ingrid Samset, “Community Driven Development in Contexts of Conflict,” Concept Paper commissioned by ESSD, World Bank (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Inst. 2003); Jodi Halpern & Harvey Weinstein, “Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 26: 561-583 (2004).

<sup>64</sup> At the same time, however, the (mostly rural) communities in which violence was stopped or avoided were generally isolated, without access to newspapers, television and other news and information about the world outside their community. In this case, this may have insulated them from the more inflammatory media reporting that was going on in March 2004.

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there was no need to do anything, as one villager commented, and disseminated quickly within the entire community. In Shtupel/Stupelj, the municipal leadership and village leadership were on the phone early tracking the direction of the crowds and planning the human barricade – a line of local leaders from KPS members to TMK, war veterans and political activists – that stopped the crowd from passing to the village to Bica/Binxhe and Grabac/Grabc.

**2. *Stable populations and intact networks facilitated crisis management.*** The role and influence of “newcomers” and “outsiders” was a consistent theme in all of the cases. Communities that succeeded in avoiding or resisting violence have largely experienced no influx of new populations since 1999. To be sure, many people had left the communities like Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë and Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, and Zheger/Zegra, either for economic reasons or as a result of the events of 1998-99 or 2000, and consequently the communities themselves had changed. Yet there had been no equivalent influx of “newcomers” to these communities. By contrast, in the three communities in this study that did suffer violence in March 2004, people underlined the importance of changes in population and the influence of “newcomers” on polarization and the incidence of violence in their communities.

The stability of the population in Zheger/Zegra, Shtupel/Stuplej and Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme and Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë left social networks and trust intact. This allowed these communities to develop effective crisis management processes in which they obtained reliable information about the situation and possible threats, checked and contained rumors, and took and implemented collective decisions.

By contrast, in places where violence erupted, outsiders from southern Serbia (Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje), rural areas (Gjilan/Gnjilane), or IDPs from other parts of Kosovo (Mitrovicë/Mitrovica) had moved into the cities. “Newcomers” disrupted networks *within* ethnic communities that had facilitated communication and organization of collective action in times of crisis.

### **“Newcomers” to the community disrupted communication networks**

Within the Albanian community in Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje, there is a strong separation between older residents and newcomers who came from other parts of Kosovo or southern Serbia. Networks and relations between older settlers and newcomers are minimal. They do not visit each other’s homes, drink coffee or stop and talk together on the street. The older residents say they used to know everything and everyone in town; now they do not know who is living in town and who is visiting.

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As a result, when a roadblock took place in Fushe Kosove/ Kosovo Polje, for example, K-Albanian elders reported that they were not able to bring people together to decide and take action collectively in response to event roadblock. Others commented that advent of “newcomers” permitted anonymity, making participation in the violence more permissible by making impossible any social sanction from the community for such acts.

Not only did “newcomers” disrupt community social networks, but many people believe they were responsible for escalation of conflict. The arrival of newcomers undermined whatever ties across ethnic lines had existed prior to the war by bringing in “different attitudes,” and in some cases radical opinions. In Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, for example, with the movement of Albanians from the northern to the southern part of the city after the war, and the influx of people from surrounding villages that had been burnt down, a rural-urban divide has emerged; the urban members of the community are more open-minded, some people noted, while the rural ones “do not care what happens to the town.” A similar influx of Serb IDPs from other parts of Kosovo to the north of the city has changed the Serb population, and Albanians believe these people are the main obstacle to reconciliation of the communities and unification of the city. Similarly, in Gjilan/Gnjilane, the influx of people from rural areas has doubled the population. Some K-Albanians interviewed attributed the high level of violence in Gjilan/Gnjilane – especially in March 2004 – to the large numbers of current residents who were not native to the town before 1999.

**3. Ability to bridge political divides.** Communities that were homogeneous politically, or able to work across intra-communal political divides to resolve problems, appear to have been better able to stop or resist violence. While the evidence is not conclusive on this point, of the seven communities studied in this research, those that avoided violence in March 2004 were either homogeneous politically within the K-Albanian community (Shtupel/Stupelj and villages surrounding Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec), or reported some degree of political division or “mild intolerance for political affiliation,” as one resident put it (Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme and Zheger/Zegra). the political factions were able to accept each other and work together on issues of importance to the community. This was also true of the divided Serbs in Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec. Even in Shtupel/Stupelj, which, although closely knit and homogeneous itself in support of the PDK, village leaders cooperated with Klinë/Klina municipal leaders led by the LDK during the March riots.

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### **Communities that overcame political divisions able to avoid violence**

In Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, when the LDK representative ousted the PDK-affiliated leader of the community in an election he called without previous publicity, the result was accepted by all, including the PDK leader.

In Zheger/Zegra, while significant divisions in the community existed between young people and the established leadership, the political parties were not divided on the critical issues of return and inter-ethnic relations.

The Serbs in Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec were divided politically between those who work within UNMIK structures and those who support village leaders appointed or supported by Belgrade. Yet on March 17, 2004, these normally competing leaders agreed, for different reasons, to stay in the enclave against KFOR's suggestion to move Serbs to the base. They also worked together to appeal to people to keep calm and not react or provoke.

By contrast, the history of Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje is one of bitter political rivalry between the LDK and PDK that had made decision making difficult in the town; the Serb community is also divided between those working for the CCK and Serbian government-financed institutions and those working within UNMIK, whom the former call "traitors" and "so-called Serbs." In Gjilan/Gnjilane, which may appear to be the exception because of the dominance of the LDK there, it was suggested by some interviewees that the municipal president's public efforts to stop the violence failed in part because political rivals were trying to undermine him.

While the evidence suggests a relationship between intra-community political division and inter-ethnic violence, the precise impact of intra-community political division on violence is not entirely clear. It may reflect a dynamic in which competition amongst the parties to be "more patriotic" than the other and gain constituents (as some people we interviewed suggested) reinforces extremism, or a divided community in which it is difficult to mobilize collective action because the leaders do not have credibility in the whole community. Nonetheless, the ability to work across political lines appears to be an important element of communities' capacity to resist or avoid violence.

**3. Motivation matters: bonding social capital is both a resource for preventing violence and for maintaining polarization.** It should be noted that while "bonding" social capital has been a significant resource for preventing violence in Kosovo, it is also used to prevent cooperation and preserve tension. Communities' willingness and ability to mobilize action against violence did not mean they were willing to cooperate with the other. Shtupel/Stupelj in Klinë/Klina municipality is the most dramatic example, as even the intervention of KLA leaders and the Prime Minister himself in 2004 could not persuade the villagers to engage with the Serb returnees of neighbouring Bica/Binxhe and Grabac/Grabac.

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The highly strategic motivations for avoiding violence – namely, the need to demonstrate fulfillment of the Standards for Kosovo to gain independence, fear of being hurt by Serb or international counter-attacks or fear that needed roads would be blocked – suggests that a sustainable capacity for avoidance of violence does not exist. “Bonding social capital” was and continues to be an important resource to be drawn upon to mobilize collective action against violence, but cannot be relied upon as a violence prevention mechanism and certainly not as an indicator of improved inter-ethnic relations. While some motivations for violence are likely to disappear once status is decided, equally motivations for resisting violence will diminish.

### **Motivations for avoidance of violence were pragmatic**

In Zheger/Zegra, local youth leaders prevented local demonstrators from going to a nearby Serb village by telling them that Serbs were most probably armed, and if anything happened they would start a conflict between the communities.

The Presidency of Kline/Kline municipality, who stood with the war veterans in Shtupel/Stupelj to prevent rioters from reaching Serb enclaves, explains their actions by the need to fulfill Standards, which they see as the only path to independence for Kosovo. Villagers agree. They claim they stood up to the crowds because they wanted to give a good impression of Kosovo to internationals.

## Leadership

The political leadership in Kosovo was criticized widely after March 2004 for not taking a stand against the violence early enough or unequivocally enough. In all the cases of successful avoidance of or resistance to violence in the case studies, one or more individual leaders took a clear stand and mobilized community action, or in the case of communities that did not react prematurely to reports of violence, sent a clear message to stay calm and not to provoke. Yet timeliness and clarity of message were not the only elements of leadership effective in avoiding violence. In some communities, such as Gjilan/Gnjilane, leaders also took clear, public stands against the violence, but failed. Several additional dimensions leadership facilitated success in resisting violence.

**1. Credibility and Connectedness to their own community.** Leadership that was listened to was credible and connected to the community, and therefore could command the attention as well as disseminate information quickly within their communities. For K-Albanians, having participated or been a victim of the 1998-99 war lent credibility to the leaders' calls for non-participation in violence. The credibility of war veterans in Shtupel/Stupelj was clearly a significant factor in the effectiveness of the line of local leaders that stood at the entry to the village to prevent the crowd from moving on to the Serb enclaves. In Gjilan/Gnjilane, the TMK played a significant role in dispersing the

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crowds and restoring order, deploying troops to protect the Serbian Orthodox church, among other things. They were effective, as a KFOR officer noted, “because they are war heroes [and] people listened to them.”<sup>65</sup> Yet war experience was not the only source of credibility – in Gjilan/Gnjilane the leaders’ connectedness to their community and their accessibility and service were also sources of great respect and support, even if they were not sufficient to persuade the crowds, while in Zheger/Zegra and in Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, youth and elders have been able to prevent violent action.

The political divisions in both communities likely played a role in their ability to mobilize their constituents at a time of crisis. Given that no Serbs interviewed in these communities commented on the outreach of these mayors, it is possible that the significance or magnitude of the gestures of these leaders was not fully comprehended or appreciated in the Serb community. Without being effective at building connections *across* ethnic lines, these gestures might have undermined these leaders’ connection and credibility within their own communities to take action at a time of crisis.

**2. Preparation for violence.** Effective leadership also uniformly appears to have foreseen the arrival of violence in their community during the course of the two days of riots and prepared for it. In each of the communities where violence was avoided, leaders anticipated the violence, and the entire community prepared for how to handle it. In Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë and Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, the K-Serb community organized a “guard” and early warning mechanism by which they monitored certain indicators they had identified (e.g., whether K-Albanians were leaving) to determine the level of threat they faced. In Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec, as well as Zheger/Zegra, leaders implicitly identified a threat or trigger they would respond to – the closing of the road – and when the threat did not materialize, cautioned their co-villagers not to react. They effectively appealed to community members’ practical self-interest, whether in avoiding harm or achieving their goals, to mobilize community restraint.

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<sup>65</sup> It is not clear how they came to play this role. Some people said that KFOR, which had been patrolling outside of town, came back in time to prevent the burning of the church, deploying eventually 10 troops to guard the church. The ICG report (*Collapse in Kosovo*, Report. No. 155, 22 April 2004, p. 23) also notes that KPC was “detailed to guard the Serb Orthodox church.” KFOR representatives say it was the TMK general’s initiative; TMK was not invited by KFOR to protect the church. Serbs said they “heard of this [TMK protecting church with help of KFOR] but do not think it is true.” In their opinion, Serbs who happened to be there and some Serbs from KPS (who had run away from their stations after “probably” being told that no one could guarantee their security) put together a barricade from the market stalls and blocked access to the church.

### Security Actors

Consistently, in the areas where violence occurred, KFOR had withdrawn (Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje), were outside the area (Gjilan/Gnjilane) or were slow to respond (Mitrovicë/Mitrovica).<sup>66</sup> More interesting is the role of the security actors in the areas in which violence did not occur, both before March 2004 and during the crisis. Presence and action or threat of action by security forces in these communities varied from airlifting minorities out of the village (Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme and Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë) to positioning of troops at the entrance to the Serb village (Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec, Bica/Binxhe and Grabac/Grabc) to no presence at all

After the August 2003 incident in which three Serb children were shot in Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec while swimming, KFOR closed the road that runs through the enclave and kept it closed for forty days. This caused tremendous hardship for people in the subunit who use the road to travel to Pejë/Peć.

(Zheger/Zegra). The history and nature of involvement by KFOR in particular, however, are quite similar in all these cases. In these communities, previous KFOR decisiveness in responding to violence with action that had caused hardship to communities (e.g., curfews and closing roads for extended periods of time) was a factor in communities' decisions not to participate in violence. At least in one place, Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec, the memory of this action made the K-Albanian communities, whose main route to Pejë/Peć was through the Serb village of Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec, more cautious about participating in violence.<sup>67</sup>

At the same time, KFOR was mentioned by a wide variety of people as an important peacebuilding actor. In the places that avoided violence, KFOR engaged with the communities. Although their mission is not to promote inter-ethnic relations, in these places KFOR convened ongoing dialogue and discussion of security problems, or was a "first mover" in catalyzing and supporting cross-ethnic activities. In Gjilan/Gnjilane and Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec, for example, KFOR brought Albanian and Serb community leaders together for security dialogue shortly after the end of the war. Although perceptions of KFOR in both Albanian and Serb communities around Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec are ambivalent now, some Albanians believe that "KFOR helped the softening of inter-ethnic relations and nobody else."

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<sup>66</sup> The performance of KFOR, UNMIK and the Kosovo Police Service has been the subject of much analysis and commentary that will not be repeated here. The case studies conducted in this research broadly support the analyses.

<sup>67</sup> Some people also noted that in Gjilan/Gnjilane KFOR always reacted strongly to security violations, instituting a curfew in town after killings of minorities occurred.

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### **KFOR seen as peacebuilding actor**

KFOR's mission does not include promotion of positive inter-ethnic relations. Yet many people count KFOR among the significant peacebuilding actors in Gjilan/Gnjilane, Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec and Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme.

There were numerous other examples offered of KFOR's contribution to peacebuilding. KFOR was the first to organize football games between youth from Štrpce/Shtërpçë and the neighboring municipality of Kacanik at the field in Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme. Now children and youth from Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme regularly organize sports games together without any assistance. In Zheger/Zegra, KFOR has tried to encourage multi-ethnicity in the activities they take within their mandate. In 2003, when they organized medical clinics for residents of Cernice/Cernica and Klokot (two mixed villages in Gjilan/Gnjilane municipality), they worked with local doctors from Donja Budriga and Zheger/Zegra to provide the services. KFOR also hosted a joint sports event organized by a local NGO; as a KFOR representative noted, "access to the base is an honor," and is granted as a kind of reward for multi-ethnic cooperation.

### **Non-Violent Alternatives for "Fighting" the Other?**

It is interesting that in three of the four cases in which no violence occurred, the communities had been pursuing alternative means of "fighting" the other. In these communities, tensions were already high because of opposition to return of Serb IDPs (and in one case Albanian IDPs). In all three, the communities opposed to return had taken action to block it from happening. In two communities (Shtupel/Stupelj and Zheger/Zegra), the Albanian communities tried to pursue legal action (for war crimes) against the Serbs – mostly potential returnees. In Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë as well as its sister village, Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme, the Serb (majority) community protested against Albanian returns by blocking the entrance to the village, but did negotiate a resolution, and it was said Serbs subsequently used their own tractors to help Albanians move back to their houses.

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### **Alternatives to Violence: Peaceful resistance and negotiation**

In Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë, there was a stand-off at the entrance of the village when Serbs blocked the entrance to the village for the returnees. According to some Albanian interviewees, the returnees' show of commitment moved the situation to resolution. That night, the Albanian returnees drew back a few kilometres and lit a bonfire with wood from a Serb house. Albanians we talked with believe that the bonfire indicated to the Serbs that they were committed to return, and would not turn back. Serbs came forward spontaneously with a proposal for an agreement of mutual protection: Serbs would not oppose Albanian return, and Albanians would protect Serbs from attacks from other Albanians (from nearby villages that had had strong KLA involvement during the war).

Was the absence of violence due in part to the communities' use (or creation) of alternative, non-violent avenues for expressing their grievances? The evidence in the cases is not unequivocal and is far from adequate to draw any conclusions. In both communities that had submitted lists of people accused of war crimes, leaders complained that they had not received satisfactory responses from KFOR and the KPS.<sup>68</sup> Nonetheless, the relationship of the availability of non-violent strategies for confrontation and conflict to violence prevention merits further exploration.

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<sup>68</sup> KFOR and KPS reported that they had investigated the allegations of the communities and had not found sufficient evidence of war crimes by the people on the lists.

# VIII. HAS PEACEBUILDING SUPPORTED VIOLENCE PREVENTION?

The peacebuilding programs have had some important, if modest, achievements in a difficult, polarized and uncertain environment. The observations below summarize the range of programming areas agencies themselves characterized as having peacebuilding intent in Kosovo, and strengths and weaknesses of these activities and approaches, taken in the aggregate, in relation to the factors identified as either exacerbating or inhibiting factors for violence.

### What is “Peacebuilding” in Kosovo?

Peacemakers select methods, approaches and tactics for building peace that are rooted in a range of assumptions about how to bring about peace. In many, perhaps most, cases these theories are not necessarily conscious. Rather, they are embedded in the skills and approaches that they have learned, the capacities and “technologies” of their organizations, and the perspectives we bring to the peacebuilding process. Rather than supply a definition of peacebuilding, this research sought to identify and reflect on what people themselves – from UNMIK to NGOs to local community members – characterized as peacebuilding in the Kosovo context, and to explore the assumptions driving these activities regarding how peace comes about (theories of peacebuilding). The analysis then explored whether and how these theories of peacebuilding related to prevention of violence, and where there may be gaps.

The table below summarizes the dominant types of activities and beneficiaries characterized by practitioners and/or community members in the case sites. Because the case studies themselves were chosen to include rural and urban sites, communities with returnees or potential returnees and remainee populations, different experiences of the war and different degrees of ethnic mixing, we believe the range of peacebuilding programming identified there presents a fair picture, even if not comprehensive, of the activities that are being pursued Kosovo-wide.

#### *1. Inter-ethnic and Inter-religious Dialogue*

The bulk of what agencies and community members characterized as peacebuilding was “dialogue.” “Dialogue” means many things to many people, and, as the word has been used in Kosovo, encompasses a wide range of different activities: from social contact to structured conversations about identity to problem-solving and negotiations in the Municipal Working Groups on Return. “Dialogue” in Kosovo can be defined along three dimensions: main constituencies targeted, issues addressed, and process or methodology used.

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*Constituencies targeted.* The majority of “dialogue” (and indeed, other peacebuilding) programs in Kosovo worked with youth, women and returnees and their host communities. There were also a number of programs that worked with civil society organizations and municipal authorities. Dialogue amongst religious leaders, media and politicians was found less frequently, but has been undertaken by a few organizations.

*Issues Addressed.* “Dialogue” most frequently was focused around three areas: a) conditions for sustainable returns of refugees or IDPs; b) priorities and implementation of community development activities; and c) non-political issues of common interest and potential future cooperation for participants, such as HIV/AIDS, drug use, business and entrepreneurship, women’s rights, infrastructure, etc. A few programmes of dialogue were being implemented in the communities visited in this research on cultural heritage of Kosovo, on religious tolerance and inter-ethnic relations, and on politically-relevant issues such as the causes of conflict and distrust, freedom of movement, implementation of the Standards for Kosovo, and decentralization. However, they were few and fairly isolated.

*Process/Methodologies used.* The format or methodology of the dialogues identified in the cases varied as much as the issues addressed, including: a) pure, unmediated contact and discussion; b) structured dialogue without commitments exploring relationship building and mutual understanding; c) facilitation of cooperative projects; d) problem-solving related to specific issues; and d) mediation and negotiation of agreements at the local level. The range of processes and methodologies – and consequent outcomes or results—of “dialogue” in this context makes it difficult to assess “dialogue” as a single type of peacebuilding activity, or to compare it with other approaches used in Kosovo.

### **2. Training and Peace Education**

Training in conflict resolution, human rights, non-violent communication and related topics was done in all the communities visited in this study, and, with dialogue, one of the most popular approaches to peacebuilding programming. We also encountered many youth camps, such as the School for Peace, Brezovica Peace Camp, archeological camp, art camp and many others. In addition, training in computers, project management, marketing, and other technical or professional topics has been used as a vehicle to bring people from different ethnicities together and build relationships.

To a lesser extent, school-based peace education programming has developed human and children’s rights education, democracy education, psycho-social training for teachers, life skills education and education to deal with anger about the past in school settings. Multi-ethnic schools have also been developed in Kosovo, though there are very few.

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### 3. *Multi-Ethnic Projects and Institutions*

Along with dialogue and training, joint (inter-ethnic) projects and institutions comprise a significant proportion of the peacebuilding programming we found in the communities that were part of this study. Some of the projects were the outcome of or follow-up to dialogue, aiming to take the communication and relationship-building beyond mere talk.

The kinds of joint projects or activities varied widely, but can be grouped into three broad categories. First were programs that sought economic cooperation and interdependence. There were a number of economic or income-generation projects designed to bring K-Serbs and K-Albanians together to cooperate or to yield benefit for both ethnic groups in the community. For example, a project to provide greenhouses to both K-Serbs and K-Albanians in a community. An agricultural cooperative in another was designed to bring Serbs and Albanians in neighboring communities together to share equipment provided by the agency and cooperate in their agricultural production. Yet another provided grants to promote cross-ethnic business linkages, in which, for example, an Albanian-owned milk station would obtain its milk from Serbs. The idea of these programs was to provide economic benefits for both communities, and, as one agency's staff described, make it "bad business to harm your neighbor."<sup>69</sup>

A second, related, category of joint projects programming sought to create inter-ethnic cooperation. Some were more *ad hoc* projects, for example: a women's program bringing together women to develop income-generation possibilities in cross-ethnic bakery supply or handicrafts projects, youth internet cafes servicing multi-ethnic youth; a joint environmental clean-up project, multi-ethnic youth magazines, or a joint advocacy project for access to youth services. Others sought to institutionalize multi-ethnic cooperation by supporting the creation of multi-ethnic NGOs, multi-ethnic community centres, multi-ethnic youth organizations (e.g., the Kosovo Youth Assembly), multi-ethnic media organizations, and more broadly integrate minorities into local government. In both cases, programming aimed to bridge mistrust and tension between ethnicities by providing opportunities for people to work together in areas of common interest.

Finally, multi-ethnic cultural and sports activities were also very popular approaches to programming, from a pop music school for youth, multi-ethnic festivals, or a painting school to multi-ethnic documentary films and joint sports events. These sought to create opportunities for positive contact among ethnicities that would help break down negative stereotypes of and attitudes towards the "other."

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<sup>69</sup> Douglas Schlemmer, "Building Peace in Kosovo: An evaluation of Mercy Corps' PRM refugee assistance programs" (Cambridge, MA: JF Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, July 2005), p. 8.

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### 4. *Democratic Governance and Capacity-Building*

Many international donors, agencies and NGOs have implemented peacebuilding activities designed to strengthen municipal government institutions to support integration of minorities, better communication and dialogue, and sustainable returns. For example, the OSCE's Local Governance Support Section has provided oversight, monitoring and training for local government officials on standards implementation, and more generally on "how to improve and standardize their administrative practices and how to provide services to all communities without discrimination."<sup>70</sup> The Municipal Infrastructure Support Initiative (MISI), implemented by Mercy Corps, assists municipal officials in identifying and addressing barriers to return and reintegration of minorities. The OSCE-sponsored Kosovo Youth Assembly seeks to "facilitate communication, exchange of information and experience and promote dialogue among young people across ethnic lines" through simulation of the Municipal Assembly in Kosovo and associated training in democratic decision making and joint projects on issues of concern.<sup>71</sup> Programs for civil society development, including advocacy training and initiatives, such as the Kosovo Centre for International Cooperation's "Advo-net," on social issues are also characterized by agencies as peacebuilding.

### 5. *Media*

Finally, media was a frequent focus of programming. Two approaches dominated the media programming. The first aimed to build independent, objective media that would contribute to peace by providing objective (non-inflammatory) information and providing open debate on important peace issues in the media. The media organizations that took this approach were often not multi-ethnic, but did establish links – formal or informal – with media outlets on the other side.

The second approach aimed to build multi-ethnic media – with multi-ethnic staff and multi-ethnic programming, such as Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje's Radio K and a number of multi-ethnic magazines and bulletins implemented from Pejë/Peć to Gjilan/Gnjilane. The idea in this approach is both to integrate the media institutions and to promote mutual respect and the values of a multi-cultural society, through providing multi-ethnic programming or articles.

### 6. *Psychosocial programming*

We did not encounter a tremendous amount of psychosocial assistance programming in the communities visited during this study, but it has been a significant area of programming in Kosovo. Some programs, such as peace education, include elements of

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<sup>70</sup> OSCE Mission in Kosovo, <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/13420.html>.

<sup>71</sup> <http://www.youthassemblies.com/youth/index.html>.

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psychosocial assistance, either directly addressing issues of trauma or anger in children caused by displacement, or building capacity in the schools to deal with trauma. A kindergarten project in one of the villages neighboring Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec, for example, was designed to help “the children deal with their anger with Serbs for throwing them out of their homes.” Some of the women’s programs too included elements of psychosocial assistance.

### **Programming impacts: Efforts to build “bridging social capital” are not adding up**

The theory underlying much of the programming in Kosovo is that contact, dialogue and cooperation on issues of common concern (coupled with concrete benefits) will lead to changes in attitudes, reduced hostility, and in the case of joint projects or infrastructure support, to interdependence between ethnic groups that would restrain them from violence. This is not happening, at least on a scale and at a depth that could begin to build sustainable “bridging social capital.”

#### ***1. Some positive impacts of peacebuilding programming...but programmes could achieve much more***

Peacebuilding programming has had some powerful effects on individuals who are participating in them and has played an important role in providing opportunities for inter-ethnic contact that otherwise would not have occurred after 1999.

Indeed, international agencies – NGOs and inter-governmental agencies – essentially

provide the only safe space for inter-ethnic interaction and communication. Without NGOs, even the level of communication that exists now would not occur. Participants report that they have good communication in dialogue and training programmes, some fears are dispelled, and that they are more relaxed with people from the other ethnicity. Stereotypes and “enemy images” are also broken down. One participant in youth trainings said he “used to be very prejudicial” toward the other, but now is not. Another said the training showed him he can work with Serbs. Still another learned that it is necessary “to know different sides of stories to know the truth.”

#### **NGOs have opened space for inter-ethnic interaction**

“If there were no NGOs,” one participant in multi-ethnic trainings explained, “things would be very different in Gjilan town. There would be no communication and people would not be as close as they are now.”

#### **Powerful personal impacts of peacebuilding**

“The training showed me I can work with Serbs. Before there wasn’t hatred, just no relationship. If there had been no projects, then we wouldn’t work with Serbs and there would be no meetings.”

-- Participant in youth trainings, Gjilan/Gnjilane

The joint projects in the economic and social realm also have helped build some lasting ties across conflict lines. “The relationships are better. There is much more

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business, a higher frequency,” one beneficiary of a greenhouse project that created linkages with other ethnicities commented.<sup>72</sup> In some cases, the programmes have also helped minorities feel safer traveling into town from rural areas.

Some important small steps in creating space for inter-ethnic relations as well as action against inter-ethnic polarization have also been taken by some of these programs. The Women’s Center in the Miner’s Hill/Microsettlement area of Mitrovicë/Mitrovica north has survived despite opposition and threats, and is expanding space for interaction. In Zheger/Zegra, an NGO-facilitated dialogue led to an agreement that has allowed Serbs to begin working their fields again; Serb IDPs now increasingly go to their fields unescorted by KFOR. In Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë, NGO mediation diffused a conflict between Serb and Albanian residents about water supply, while in Gjilan/Gnjilane NGO efforts contributed significantly to the establishment of the multi-ethnic market in town. Some programmes have been sustained in spite of very adverse circumstances; several programmes – such as a women’s business program in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and the Municipal Infrastructure Support Initiative (MISI) in Gjilan/Gnjilane – were amongst the first to resume activities after the March 2004 violence. The scale of multi-ethnic participation in public events, such as festivals, in Gjilan/Gnjilane suggests an interest in cross-community contact beyond just participants of inter-ethnic projects.

The significance of these achievements in the post-1999/2000 environment should not be underestimated. Even seemingly modest achievements – K-Serbs and K-Albanians agreeing to a joint agricultural cooperative board in Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec (even if they do not interact on a daily basis in implementation of the cooperative) or the formation of a City-Wide Youth Council in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica – are significant steps in the polarized atmosphere that prevails in these communities.

However, the evidence shows that the programs are achieving less than they could. In particular, the majority of programs have had little impact beyond this individual-personal realm. Participants in dialogue, training or joint activities are generally not taking initiatives outside activities organized by NGOs and international agencies. “There are no informal, not-NGO-organized multi-ethnic activities,” one participant in youth activities commented. While this may be an exaggeration, it reflects a reality painted by most interviewed for this study. Participants rarely take initiative to contact their friends from other ethnicities outside opportunities offered by NGOs. As a result, the effects of these programs rarely expand beyond the immediate target participants or beneficiaries. This is, of course, not surprising, as the political environment and the “rules of the inter-ethnic game” described above discourage, and

*“There are no informal, not-NGO-organized multi-ethnic activities,” one participant in youth activities commented.*

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<sup>72</sup> Schlemmer, *Building Peace in Kosovo*, p. 12.

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even sanction, such initiatives. Nonetheless, it is an indication that, in the aggregate, peacebuilding programming has not had much success in creating space for inter-ethnic interaction unmediated by international agencies, and as currently designed and implemented, is not likely to contribute to building of real “bridging social capital” that can mitigate inter-ethnic violence.

Why has peacebuilding programming failed to create space and momentum for productive inter-ethnic interaction? Could programming do better? The cases in this research suggest that although it would be unreasonable to expect robust bridging social capital to develop quickly in the hostile, political environment that prevailed after 1999 for peacebuilding, the programs themselves are falling short of their potential to facilitate real bridging social capital.

**2. Program assumptions that individual change will lead to socio-political change are not borne out in Kosovo.** Most programming assumes that the transfer from individual-level change to more socio-political change will happen automatically. Agencies typically assumed that the results of their activities would automatically “spill over” into other domains of participant’s lives—for example, that the profound personal and relationship changes catalyzed by NGO activities will lead to changes in political attitudes and actions—or trickle out to influence others in the community or trickle up to influence key decision makers. Many assume that participants who have had a transformative experience in the program will spread their experience and changed attitudes to others – from family to colleagues to the community at large.

### **“Spillover” cannot be assumed**

When Albanians in one community were asked ‘why are you participating in these events, forums, meetings?’ typical responses included:

- § ‘for European integration’
- § ‘for the sake of Kosovo and the EU. The EU says we need to be a democratic state and all nationalities will live together.’
- § ‘it is the best for the village and it will help us get infrastructure.’
- § ‘it is a condition, if you have a project you need the other community to get money’

-- Evaluation of NGO program

The evidence gathered in this research suggests that this is not happening—at least not automatically and that such “spillover” cannot be assumed to happen. First, motivations reported by participants for their participation in inter-ethnic programming – whether dialogue and training or economic activity – were consistently unrelated to peace. Youth participants in training, for example, reported that it was “fun.” People participating in joint infrastructure, economic or other projects agreed to cooperation in order to access the resources (money) that were being made available or, alternatively, to demonstrate

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that the “Standards for Kosovo” are being met. In this context, without significant follow-up to build on initial contacts or identify and support those who are (or become) truly interested and committed to working for peace, the impact of programming did not systematically go beyond the establishment of opportunistic or, where real, good, inter-personal, relationships.

### Why do participants take part in dialogue and training?

“Friends got interested because it sounded fun and the topic was interesting.”

“Because I was interested in learning something and wanted to meet new people.”

“I would happily attend next year – it was fun.”

In these seminars, participants are “awarded diplomas,” and “believe some of them can help get new employment with international organizations.”

“Interesting to meet new people and to have mastered communication skills which I find useful in everyday activities.”

Second, participants in dialogue, training, education and joint activities programming report feeling powerless to change anything. “Feelings of hatred are too strong,” some noted, while others believed they “can hardly influence the positions of [their] community, since people are closed from within,” and “whatever we do or decide to do, much remains in the hands of the older generations.”

Whether or not this is true, these feelings of powerlessness prevent people from taking their own initiatives, and indeed, lead most to keep to themselves.

A participant in a youth program feels he has little influence in his community when he talks to his friends on the cooperation of the Serbian and Albanian youth. He holds the hatred is too strong for him to change.

**3. Economic cooperation did not lead to interdependence sufficient to motivate action against violence.** Joint projects-type programming in the economic and infrastructure realm has been no more successful in moving beyond individual-level interactions. Many business relationships did withstand the pressure of the violence of March 2004, and many participants in these enterprises helped their counterparts and continued to conduct their business throughout the periods of high tension and violence. An evaluation of the international NGO Mercy Corps’ stabilization programme in eastern Kosovo, for example, observed that all of the multi-ethnic business linkages created from 2000-2004 survived the March riots. In several cases, Albanians and Serbs continued even through

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the riots to deliver goods to their customers from the other ethnicity. Others called each other during the riots to make sure they were alright.<sup>73</sup>

Yet these forms of engagement did not create a sense of interdependence strong enough to motivate action against violence. The kind of interaction supported by the programs themselves has often mirrored the “rules of the inter-ethnic game” of interaction and been limited by them. While the programming may have expanded the numbers of inter-ethnic contacts, the nature of the interactions they have facilitated has been squarely within the boundaries of “permissible” interaction, and may have even contributed to reinforcing those boundaries. Attempts to “scale up” the cooperation and interdependence – such as a factory project that attempted to hire a joint work force and an effort to institutionalize cooperation among Serb and Albanian beekeepers in a beekeepers’ association, amongst others have generally failed. In these (and other) cases, the attempts to institutionalize cooperation in this form have met with resistance or disinterest from participants themselves and have subsequently been abandoned.

The expectation of spillover from working together into increased interdependence, better relationships and increased trust therefore has not materialized. As a result, the economic cooperation that is taking place in Kosovo appears either to involve enough key businesspeople, be big enough in scale and importance for the interests of both ethnicities, or be sufficiently institutionalized to create the kind of interdependence that could constrain politicians. Particularly in urban areas, where the violence has been most pronounced, more robust associational forms of inter-ethnic engagement are essential, because with everyday, social engagement, it is harder to connect everyone individually in larger communities than it is in villages.<sup>74</sup>

**4. Programmes do not build on entry points.** Many programmes bring K-Serbs and K-Albanians together under a non-peacebuilding umbrella – such as community development, technical training, professional development, sports and cultural events, etc. – as an entry point. The initial forum or activity makes it easier (socially and politically) for people to participate, and may attract people who would not want to join a “peacebuilding” program. However, these valuable initial engagements – from sports competitions and youth camps to returns dialogue, economic linkages, and joint activities – have generally not been built on or expanded. Consequently, their impact is limited.

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<sup>73</sup> D. Schlemmer, *Building Peace in Kosovo: An Assessment of Mercy Corps’ PRM Refugee Assistance Programs* (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government Policy Analysis Exercise, 2005).

<sup>74</sup> *Id.* This is not to suggest that economic cooperation and interdependence could not become a source of bridging social capital and a mitigating force on violence. There is no evidence in the cases to suggest such a conclusion. The evidence suggests that the level of cooperation and independence currently is insufficient to constitute a brake on violence, primarily because it has remained primarily at the individual level and has not risen to the level of an associational or socio-political form of engagement.

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A significant underlying problem is the underinvestment in this kind of “soft” programming, projects or components of programs that do not have direct, concrete, or visible results. Those agencies engaged in returns-related programming especially noted that while donors have emphasized the importance of dialogue in the returns process, the resources actually allocated to dialogue and other relationship-building activities are inadequate. The emphasis on achieving concrete results in the shorter term – whether return, building of houses or infrastructure, business linkages, or concrete projects – has undermined the ability of the programs to deepen the relationships of the participants.

### Limited resources for “soft” aspects of programming

Most organizations involved with return and reintegration said resources available for dialogue are very limited. This is “indicative of the importance attached to the ‘soft’ components by UNMIK and the donor community,” one development NGO worker commented. Another put it more bluntly: “Donors do not give money for dialogue.”

Withdrawal or reduction of resources for programs upon achievement of the initial entry point interactions has also hindered impact. In several communities, when initial “success” is achieved, agencies left (often because of funding requirements) to move on to other areas or programs, or were unable to obtain funding for follow-up. Thus, in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica, a school-based youth program said it could not obtain funding to bring

school principals together after principals from schools in the north and south expressed interest in meeting. Funding for programming in the Gjilan/Gnjilane region designed to prepare the ground for returns by building inter-ethnic linkages was directed to new areas for replication of the program after a year, then later stopped completely once returns began to happen. In Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec, Serbs and Albanians alike mentioned that international NGO activities have been short-lived because they tend to leave shortly after they begin work. As a result, initial cooperative relationships remained vulnerable in some cases and did not survive. Where they did survive, participants continued to interact or do business together, and in some cases, took initiatives to involve some others in the activity, but they did not take an active stand against violence or impact their communities significantly in other ways toward peace.

Even with sufficient allocation of resources over a long-enough time period, issues of fragmentation and lack of follow-up and continuity of programming would likely still plague efforts to build bridging social capital. The events-based nature of many

*There are not always the same participants in the seminars, but they always call me.*

(although not all) dialogue and training projects, as well as commonly used processes for participant selection, often leads to repetition and duplication rather than deepening or expansion of inter-ethnic interaction. For

example, participants in training programmes are often selected by referral from other agencies doing similar work, and as a result are frequently involved in the same kinds of

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training and other programs several times. As one Mitrovicë/Mitrovica participant put it, there are not always the same participants in seminars, “but they [international agencies] always call me.” Agencies that have identified participants for dialogues and trainings through referrals from other agencies engaged in similar programming or school officials, have not then built on what the other agencies have done; often they present the same content. A participant in a youth camp may have an opportunity to engage with people from other ethnicities in a social event, a festival or another youth camp, but often not to deepen his or her experience with the same participants on more difficult issues. Indeed, one NGO in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica attributed the drop-off in interest in programs to the fact that the programs have nothing new to add. Another in Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec suggested dialogue participants may get bored because they have been through trainings already. A participant in an inter-ethnic sports match organized as part of a returns program may never interact with someone from the other community again, and the sports match may never be repeated without the NGO or international agency’s initiative. Even where programmes have consistently worked with communities or participants over a longer period of time, as have many returns projects, many have not succeeded in deepening the work they have done with existing participants or beneficiaries – whether through advanced workshops, or engagement on more difficult issues. Dialogues facilitated as part of returns or economic development programmes frequently ended once concrete objectives became realizable, and opportunities to deepen relationships were missed.

***5. Programmes do not adequately address intra-community resistance to inter-ethnic dialogue and cooperation.*** Particularly problematic for building real bridging social capital is the social pressure and “rules of the inter-ethnic game” that inhibit people from developing relationships outside the bounds of the permissible. Issues of intra-community resistance to inter-ethnic contact and cooperation are recognized by most agencies working in peacebuilding. Agencies thus often do a significant amount of what has been termed “single identity” work *within* ethnic communities to prepare people for inter-ethnic contact and dialogue.<sup>75</sup> This can sometimes take a lot of time, up to two years in some of the programs in the communities in this study. Many agencies also have made great efforts to be responsive to practical constraints and concerns of participants once they have engaged in inter-ethnic interaction, and to assist them in overcoming obstacles to cooperation, not the least of which are concerns about security. Agencies have provided logistics and an umbrella for inter-ethnic action to ensure

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<sup>75</sup> Single identity work “involves engaging individuals singularly from within one community to discuss, address and potentially challenge the causes of conflict, with particular emphasis on skills and confidence building measures.” Cheyenne Church, Anna Visser & Laurie Johnson, “Single identity work: An approach to conflict resolution in Northern Ireland,” INCORE Working Paper (August 2002), p. 2.

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safety. The danger of censure or pressure from participants' own communities has also led them to be cautious and to keep programming low-key and quiet.

These kinds of preparatory work and ongoing organizational support for inter-ethnic interaction have been necessary to create space for inter-ethnic engagement, but also insufficient to deal with the intra-community constraints and pressure that most agencies who participated in the initial phases of this research recognized as the more important and effective kind of violence affecting progress toward peace. Frequently people are drawn from many different communities across Kosovo and receive little support or follow-up to support "re-entry" when they return to their own communities. Within the range of programming included in this study, there was little "single identity" work *following* inter-ethnic interactions. Most of the follow-up has focused on supporting or making possible inter-ethnic interaction – generally by providing logistics and an umbrella for interaction. The same systematicity with which agencies have managed to make travel and inter-ethnic contact possible has not been applied to dealing with structural and intra-community *social* obstacles to post-programme cooperation.

One consequence is locally-driven initiatives may be discouraged. Another is that participants often do not have a sufficient support network to withstand or deal with intra-community pressures and "rules" and there is little physical or political space for inter-ethnic dialogue and cooperation apart from that provided by the NGOs and international agencies themselves.

**6. Unclear vision of "success" makes development of robust strategies difficult.** The fragmentation and lack of sustainable follow-up to promising initial efforts may, in part, reflect a lack of agreed strategic vision for the inter-ethnic relations aspect of peacebuilding. On the one hand, the clear vision put forth by the United Nations and its international partners is that of a "multi-ethnic society"<sup>76</sup>, or, in the Contact Group's words, "multi-ethnicity that is sustainable."<sup>77</sup> Achieving this vision involves, as Eide enumerates, "a number of components – providing security, ensuring property rights, promoting return, and protecting the identity of minority communities."<sup>78</sup> The enumeration of types of activities, however, does not incorporate a strategy for improving relationships between K-Albanians and K-Serbs (as well as other minorities).

At the same time, the mandates of the international organizations responsible for managing the transition are vague. UNMIK's mandate is vague with respect to reconciliation; in the words of a Swedish evaluator of international assistance for

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<sup>76</sup> Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (incorporating K. Eide, *A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo*), UN Doc. S/635/2005, p.14.

<sup>77</sup> The Contact Group's Principles for a Settlement of Kosovo's Status.

<sup>78</sup> K. Eide, *A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo* at 9.

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reconciliation in Kosovo, “return of refugees and the establishment of human rights and the rule of law are the closest explicit components.”<sup>79</sup> The OSCE’s mandate mentions inter-ethnic respect and reconciliation<sup>80</sup> but gives no guidance on how to bring it about. Compared with the issue of democratisation, which is outlined in detail, reconciliation is apparently seen as a part of establishing human rights and a viable multi-ethnic society, not a distinct area of work. “On the whole,” the same Swedish evaluation notes, “there is an apparent lack of interest and understanding of reconciliation tools and mechanisms.”<sup>81</sup>

The implications of the vagueness of mandate and thinking about reconciliation (or coexistence) can be seen on the ground. Concretely, the strategies articulated by many agencies, including the United Nations, the OSCE and many NGOs, for transforming the inter-ethnic relations included “anything that brings people together,” “anything that gets them talking,” promoting “collaboration,” “good neighbor” behavior, or “Serbs and Albanians talking and laughing together.” While these may be potential approaches or results of activities, they constitute neither a vision nor a strategy.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Johnson, J. 2004. *International Assistance to Democratisation and Reconciliation in Kosovo*. Report No. 5, Democratisation and Reconciliation in Post-Intrastate Conflict Situations. An Evaluation of the International Contributions to Democratisation and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia 1995-2004. Uppsala, Sweden: Swedish Emergency Management Agency.

<sup>80</sup> “The OSCE Mission in Kosovo will in its work be guided by the importance of bringing about mutual respect and reconciliation among all ethnic groups in Kosovo and of establishing a viable multi-ethnic society where the rights of each citizen are fully and equally respected.” OSCE, PC.DEC 305 (1 July 1999), PC Journal No. 237, Agenda Item 2 (1999), available at [http://www1.osce.org/documents/pc/1999/07/2577\\_en.pdf](http://www1.osce.org/documents/pc/1999/07/2577_en.pdf).

<sup>81</sup> *Id.* at 28.

<sup>82</sup> This study’s findings on this issue are consistent with those of Donini, Minear, Smillie, van Baarda and Welch (2005). In their study of the perceptions of security of local communities, assistance agencies and peace support operations, they found in Kosovo that assistance agencies “had no articulated concept of either security or peace. Instead, they referred loosely to freedom of movement, the absence of intimidation and an environment that allowed them to work according to plan.” *Mapping the Security Environment: Understanding the perceptions of local communities, peace support operations and assistance agencies*. Medford, MA: Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University, p. 28. They went on to note that “none of the interviewees in the three sets of institutional actors presented us with an articulated concept of either ‘peace’ or of ‘security.’ In each instance, perceptions of both realities were driven by subjective factors.” *Id.* at 35.

### Policy and programme focus on peacebuilding through returns and multi-ethnicity has created inadvertent negative impacts

Across the different cases and programming, several common programming practices have inadvertently increased tensions or reinforced divisions between K-Albanians and K-Serbs.

**1. Focus on Returns has increased divisions.** Decisions to focus on returns and aid to returning IDPs or refugees inadvertently worsened divisions between K-Serbs and K-Albanians and amongst returnees and remainees. Agencies have been very aware of the potential divisive effects of focusing on returnees, and have developed a practice of providing balancing grants to mitigate potential resentments and tensions. This practice has been only partly effective. The focus on returns has especially reinforced perceptions of K-Albanians that the international community is attending to the needs of K-Serbs – their former oppressors – at the expense of the needs of the majority population.

NGO representatives reflect that the imbalance in assistance between Serb returnees and others caused tension in an otherwise “successful” Implementation Committee in which representatives of the NGOs, UNMIK, the municipality, the communities and UNHCR cooperated to design and oversee implementation of all aspects of the returns project.

It has also meant that relations between K-Serb remainees and K-Albanians have been given less attention. For example, the programmes on Zheger/Zegra included IDPs from Zheger/Zegra residing in the neighboring village of Donja Budriga, but not Budriga natives. Donja Budriga was considered to be a “fully stabilized site” in which “return is now over” and thus in no need of peacebuilding or dialogue activities. This exacerbated divisions between IDPs and remainees, and reinforced K-Serb perceptions that the commitment to multi-ethnicity both by K-Albanians and internationals is not real, but merely to demonstrate that Standards are being met.

**2. The emphasis on “multi-ethnicity” has had negative impacts.** One method for promoting multi-ethnic cooperation has been to provide rewards and incentives for cross-ethnic contact and activities; this, in theory, would develop bridges that will reduce cross-ethnic distrust and build willingness and capacity to work together. This practice has

Many Serbs in Donja Bitinja/Biti e Poshtme and Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë feel that especially after the March 2004 riots, they can live “side by side” but not together.

been successful, in the sense that many people have come together and worked together on needed

infrastructure and economic projects. At the same time, there is significant evidence that “multi-ethnicity” is not a vision fully shared by people in both K-Albanian and K-Serbian

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communities, especially after March 2004, even if co-existence and “co-ethnicity” might be. As Larry Minear and his co-author suggest in their study on perceptions of local communities, assistance agencies and peace operations, [t]he reestablishment of a multi-ethnic society runs at odds with the desires of large sections of the population, and efforts to establish it can, and do, lead to a rise in tensions.”<sup>83</sup>

As a result, the emphasis on multi-ethnicity has also been perceived in communities not as a “carrot” or reward for cooperation, but as “conditionality.” The way in which multi-ethnicity has been promoted in internationally-sponsored programmes has not inspired greater internalization of multi-ethnicity as a goal and principle. Rather, it has had the unintended negative impact of generating greater cynicism and reinforcing (even if not exacerbating) distrust.

### **Multi-ethnic “carrots” resented as conditionality**

The Albanian community in Shtupel/Stupelj sees most of the efforts by international agencies to encourage the communities to cooperate and talk with each other as coercive and unwanted conditioning. They have praise for one NGO’s project implemented in 2003 that brought electricity to parts of the village and helped improve the existing distribution network. This was one of the few projects, they commented, in which inter-ethnic cooperation was not a condition.

The need to have “multi-ethnicity” in order to obtain assistance or support is widely resented, and communities have developed ways to circumvent the spirit of multi-ethnicity. The evidence that emerged in this study is that those organizations, associations and interactions that do operate at more than the individual level – NGOs, community centers, agricultural cooperatives – are largely *pro forma*, either for the purpose of obtaining international assistance, or, more recently, to meet the Standards for Kosovo.

As soon as benefits are gotten, “multi-ethnicity” often disappears. In some cases, initiatives that were multi-ethnic on paper or in principle never became multi-ethnic, either because practical constraints (e.g., location) made multi-ethnicity difficult or because participants or beneficiaries agreed to divide the benefits. In others, participants found ways to minimize interaction, or the minority was marginalized in terms of responsibilities and communication. In still others, the initiative began as a multi-ethnic endeavor, but minorities (mainly Serbs) withdrew, not just because of political considerations as many believe, but also because of unresolved disagreements over the content of the program or because the management of the program made it difficult for them to participate. In some communities visited in this study, community members tried

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<sup>83</sup> Larry Minear et al., *Mapping the Security Environment*, p. 26.

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to reverse the conditionality by demanding benefits as a condition for accepting minority returns.

Some examples give a flavor of the ways in which communities have circumvented the substance while retaining the form multi-ethnicity:

- A Youth Centre in Gjilan/Gnjilane town started by an international NGO “has not managed to become multi-ethnic.”
- An NGO project “could be” multi-ethnic but is not yet.
- An internet centre has offered to Serbs to come for training and to use the facilities, but because of the location of the centre, Serbs are concerned about safety and do not come.
- A school clean-up was organized in which youth cleaned one Albanian and one Serb school and planted the gardens of the school. Because, as one person commented, “the situation is quite tricky on the ground,” they split the funds for this to do two separate projects, Serbs cleaning Serb schools and Albanians cleaning Albanians schools.
- A multi-ethnic milk station had two jobs – one for a Serb and one for an Albanian. The Serb post is still vacant.
- A documentary film on freedom of movement and multi-ethnic communities was being done in the OSCE-sponsored Youth Assemblies. Serb and Albanian youth conducted interviews in multi-ethnic environments and in one location where Serbs and Albanians live together. They made the film together for two days, and later the Albanians continued on their own. A Serb member of the filming team says he has not seen the film yet.
- A municipality employs a number of minority (both Serb and non-Serb), and the municipality and international community claim that they have been “fully integrated” with Albanian staff. Yet Serb employees were all located together in a separate office and were doing nothing when researchers visited; they say they were not assigned any substantive tasks or given specific responsibilities, but allowed to carry on private affairs (usually project development or fundraising for their own NGOs).
- Serbs in one village saw acceptance of Albanian returns to the village as key to the community’s ability to obtain donations for infrastructure. They note that they need to find donors ready to invest in the village and know that “environments in which

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returnees are accepted are always in a position to get an infrastructural donation or two for themselves.”

- A Community Center was developed by an international agency as a multi-ethnic institution with 50% Albanian and 50% Serb staff and played a positive role with NGOs. Participants commented that the multi-ethnic seminars outside the town were good, because “participants communicated much better.” The OSCE had planned that the Centre would evolve into a multi-ethnic NGO education project. However, the Center “collapsed,” in the words of one staff member, with the events of March 2004 and reopened in June 2004 serving only Albanians.
- A multi-ethnic radio station broadcasting news, music and educational programs in Albanian, Serbian, Roma and Ashkali had a multi-ethnic staff and was intended to “promote mutual respect and values of multi-cultural society” and “enable the efficient communication and cooperation between different ethnic groups.” Both Serbs and Albanians talked of a climate of ‘censorship’ within the station, because different news was read in Albanian and Serbian. Although one employee explained that this is because the station does not want to broadcast unconfirmed news, a Serb interviewee saw this as censorship of the Serb point of view. The Serb employee has since left, programming in Serbian has been cancelled for lack of money, while the station continues to be praised as a successful multi-ethnic institution.
- A Serbian women’s NGO tried to create a multi-ethnic project. The NGO was given coffee roasting equipment as a donation and wanted to place the coffee with the help of an Albanian women’s NGO, who refused the overture. The shop was looted during the riots of March 2004. Now the Albanian NGO is asking the Serbian women’s NGO to be partners, but they refuse because they believe the Albanians want them as figurehead implementation partners only.
- An agricultural cooperative has a board of Albanian and Serb members from the villages in the area. The Director is an Albanian and the manager is a Serb. Funding has been raised to purchase equipment whose use is currently split between the Albanian and Serb members, so that each has their own equipment and drivers. As one farmer stated, “being a member of the coop does not mean I have to work with Serbs, they are only on the board.”
- A multi-ethnic Bulletin supported by OSCE is written in Serb and Albanian. However, the NGO no longer has a Serb writer, and uses a Bosniak instead.

The associational forms of inter-ethnic engagement – such as business associations, professional associations, NGOs, etc. – that agencies are trying to promote could act as an effective civic constraint on politicians’ efforts to polarize communities along ethnic

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lines, and indeed could be “sturdier” than everyday, social contact and friendships in constraining or stopping violence.<sup>84</sup> However, this *pro forma* associational engagement cannot be considered “bridging social capital.” On the contrary, it has created a great deal of opportunism and cynicism about multi-ethnicity, rather than increased trust, interdependence and information sharing.

International agencies – from the United Nations and the OSCE to NGOs – have fueled this dynamic by tacitly accepting the kind of pro forma cooperation and multi-ethnicity described above and even at times rewarding it through continued financial support or through praise. Agencies also have not followed up on what people are actually doing in the projects and institutions they support. If a multi-ethnic community center is set up, what are people doing? Who attends meetings? What are the staff composition and decision making processes? What programs are being sponsored or held in the center, and for whom? If there are sports competitions, who participates? How are the teams structured? What kinds of interactions take place? These kinds of questions were rarely raised with programme participants or considered in assessing the success of multi-ethnic programming. On the contrary, in some cases, programmes, such as the multi-ethnic radio station in Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje and even entire communities, including Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje before 2004 and Klinë/Klina recently, were held up as models or, in the words of one interviewee, “poster boys” of multi-ethnicity despite the pro forma or opportunistic nature of the inter-ethnic cooperation.

There are, of course, good reasons in some instances for the failure of meaningful multi-ethnicity to develop in programmes, ranging from expectations around language use amongst multi-ethnic staff to disagreements about the content of programs. However, these difficult issues were rarely addressed systematically in programme implementation or follow-up, leaving many participants disillusioned about the possibilities of meaningful cooperation across ethnic lines.

**3. *Decisions about how to implement programmes inadvertently “do harm.”*** Some agency decisions about how to implement programs have had negative impacts of inter-ethnic tensions. Two aspects of program implementation are worth underlining, as negative impacts of these practices were mentioned repeatedly in the case studies.

*Staffing and Contracting.* Staffing and contracting decisions inevitably have fed perceptions of bias. For example, amongst returnees, we heard complaints of unfinished work or poor construction. While complaints were heard equally from K-Serbs and K-Albanians, the poor or unfinished work exacerbated Serbs’ feelings of distrust and ill-will towards Albanians and the international community because the contractors were almost exclusively Albanian. The allegations, of course, may or may not be true, but the perceptions were strong and uniform, and heightened resentment among K-Serbs.

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<sup>84</sup> Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict & Civil Society,” pp. 388, 393.

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### **Inadvertent negative impacts of staffing and contracting decisions**

KFOR hired 60 local staff from the Serb community, but no Albanians. It is not widely known that KFOR had approached the representative of the Albanian community in the area about splitting the jobs equally between Serbs and Albanians but was unable to find people willing to work side-by-side with Serbs at the time.

### **Inadvertent negative impacts of beneficiary decisions**

A local financing agency spun off from an international NGO program has a bonus programme for loan officers to encourage them to sign up minorities. The staff of the agency, which has no Serb representation, has given no loans to Serbs because the enclaves are so small they are worried the loans would not be repaid.

Serbs in one village complain that before the war there were only 30 Albanian houses, but 68 were (re)constructed after the war because, some claim, of connections of predominantly K-Albanian NGO staff with Albanian returnees. While Albanians note that the houses being rebuilt are significantly smaller than what they had before the war, this has been a source of resentment and tension.

*Failure to plan for conflict implications of post-program sustainability.* Failure to consider and plan for inevitable shortcomings and failures in implementation and after-effects of programmes that have a multi-ethnic component has repeatedly escalated tensions. For example, when the water system of a village was repaired, the reservoir was located in the Albanian part of a village. However, as the municipality was supposed to assume responsibility for maintenance, the agency did not plan for or finance the ongoing maintenance. As a result, every time the pump broke down, tensions between Albanians and Serbs escalated. Similarly, Albanians in the villages around Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec in Peje/Peja municipality perceive that KFOR helped the Serb enclave with their infrastructural needs but did not continue them into the Albanian villages. KFOR promised they would bring water into the six Albanian villages, but ended up taking the pipeline only to the petrol station at the edge of the first village after the enclave. The residents then had to finance the extension themselves. Infrastructure has become a bone of contention for the Albanians and has exacerbated perceptions that Serbs are getting all the benefits from the international community.

*Location of programs and political sensitivities.* Failure to take account of the political ramifications of participation in programmes has also exacerbated accusations of bias. A Community Center located in the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica south, for example, is inaccessible to Serbs living in the north, and although multi-ethnic in principle ends up majority Albanian. As one Serb in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica told an OSCE researcher:

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“It’s a political act to cross the bridge so why should Serbs be asked to do it unilaterally? They won’t. Not in big enough numbers to have any impact. They don’t feel safe and they don’t want to be marked as traitors by hardliners on their way back. And then they get accused by the internationals of not cooperating.”<sup>85</sup>

Serbs in Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje shared the same feeling in relation to the SRSG’s decision to allow Albanian children to attend the Sveti Sava school in a separate shift. Although the decision itself was not politically-based, but based on the fact that Albanian students needed more space and Sveti Sava had extra capacity, it also had a negative conflict impact. Serbs complained that they were being asked establish multi-ethnicity to their own detriment, i.e. to make the only Serb school in the municipality multi-ethnic while Albanians were not being asked to do the same. These negative impacts might have been avoided or mitigated had they been anticipated and taken into account in the initial design of the programming.

### **Programmes are not addressing key driving factors of conflict adequately**

The focus on returns, democracy-building and the economy has resulted in gaps in dealing with critical issues affecting inter-ethnic relations, and issues related to hostility and security in particular. People consistently mentioned missing persons and war crimes (K-Albanians), and security and justice related in particular to prosecution of perpetrators of IEV (K-Serbs) as key obstacles to peace. Property was also mentioned as a significant issue.

#### **K-Serbs believe key issues related to their security not being addressed**

Serbs believe that “attacks are not taken seriously in the police. They are just registered and no one tries to solve these cases; not one such case has been resolved.” What creates a sense of insecurity is “the fact that no one is held responsible for ethnically motivated crimes.”

The uncertainty of the resolution of the status of Kosovo has weighed on all interactions, even when not mentioned explicitly, and issues related to property usurpation and sales and freedom of movement were mentioned as continuing sources of tension and distrust. As one youth participant in a seminar was reported to have emphasized: “I want a better future, and the Serbs need to know that it was their fathers who killed my father, but I don’t blame the kids as it wasn’t them, but their fathers. But they must accept what their

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<sup>85</sup> OSCE 46.

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fathers have done to us.” In other words, the path to the future must pass through the past.

Some programs do address potential triggers of violence or flash points, such as claims of land usurpation. An NGO dialogue helped to resolve an escalating conflict over water supply in Gornja Bitinja/Biti e Epërmë, and in other communities helped to negotiate Serb access to lands they claimed Albanians from neighboring villages were usurping. Few programs, however, addressed key driving forces of conflict adequately and many not at all. The majority of programs pursued peacebuilding through promotion of practical cooperation on common interests, positive social interaction, general attitudes of tolerance, and explicitly avoided dealing with the issues mentioned by people in communities as obstacles to co-existence. In some cases, participants signed formal memoranda that they would not discuss the past or politics. In others, the agreement is less formal. Programs such as the OSCE’s Youth Assembly are described as working “brilliantly” when youth are brought together across ethnic lines, “but there are no efforts to make them talk about the conflict or the issues behind it.”<sup>86</sup> This is in part a result of participants’ own motivations for participating in these programs (and their resulting lack of interest in talking about these issues) and people’s own nervousness about dealing with these issues. “These are serious issues, there are not many interesting activities such as games,” so that youth are not so interested, says one Mitrovicë/Mitrovica-based NGO worker. People “never discuss politics because it always leads to quarrels,” many people who were beginning to socialize or work together add.

The failure to deal with key, yet politically sensitive, issues also reflects the capacities and skills of staff that are facilitating these programs, who often (especially among development-oriented NGOs) do not have sufficient training and experience to manage such difficult conversations, or who themselves have not been given an opportunity to deal with these issues themselves before being asked to facilitate inter-ethnic dialogue in the communities.

Of course, Kosovo-wide initiatives for capacity building and institutional development, especially in the justice and police sectors, as well as local governance, are also clearly designed to provide mechanisms to deal with these issues. Because of its community-based evidence gathering, this study did not explore these Kosovo-wide programs extensively, except insofar as to understand how they were perceived and experienced by community members and whether they were addressing issues communities considered to be important for violence, peace and security. At this level, however, it was clear that these programs also avoided dealing directly with issues related to the conflict. We also observed two important gaps that may limit the effectiveness of these programs.

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<sup>86</sup> Johnson, *International Assistance to Democratisation and Reconciliation in Kosovo*, p. 28.

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**1. Lack of agreement on what problems need to be addressed.** On sensitive issues such as freedom of movement, which is acknowledged as an area for improvement, there is little or no agreement on what the problem is, even whether there is a problem. K-Albanians uniformly cite that minorities are moving more freely, and this can be confirmed by direct observation. A typical example is Gjilan/Gnjilane, where Albanians and some KFOR officials say that there has been a low number of intimidations, and people claim no crime against Serbs. Serbs complain, they say, because Albanians would not speak Serb to them, and one of the reasons seems to be that a large number of youth do not speak Serbian, but older people who have had the chance to use it, still do. The complaints that KFOR had received from the Serb community of “dirty looks” and swearing from kids or drunken people should not be seen as interethnic, many Albanians (and internationals) assert. Yet what K-Albanians characterize as “minor” incidents -- the day-to-day verbal intimidation and harassment described above – are experienced by K-Serbs as significant sources of fear that limit their freedom of movement.

Similar gaps in perceptions exist on other issues: K-Albanians emphasized war crimes and roles of Serb community members in them, along with the continuing strength of Serbian “parallel institutions,” while Serbs emphasized K-Albanian unwillingness to

### **K-Albanians cite missing and killed as major obstacle to cooperation**

The topic of missing and killed are always the first topic to start the meeting, said a Serb leader in Klinë/Klina municipality, and “that is when the dirt surfaces and there is no way to move forward.” Because of this, “not a single issue was solved using joined forces.”

condemn violence against Serbs unequivocally and perceptions of discrimination in pursuit of justice among others as significant issues. Without a common understanding of the problem and a willingness to take the

other’s concerns seriously, these issues will continue to linger as obstacles to improved co-existence.

Dialogue and a common understanding of the problem to be addressed and ways to improve minorities’ sense of security could go a long way to dealing with issues such freedom of movement.

**2. Central level programming is not reaching communities effectively and is not taking care of key drivers of conflict at the community level.** The evidence gathered in the case studies in this research is consistent with the findings of the UNDP report on public perceptions of security and police performance. Two points of particular note are: 1) limited citizen-initiated contact with the police or other security providers” and 2) “little police-initiated contact with the public.”<sup>87</sup> Communication between

<sup>87</sup> UNDP. 2004. *Light Blue: Public perceptions of security and police performance in Kosovo*. Prishtinë/Priština : UNDP. Pp. 24-26.

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communities and the justice and police institutions is limited. Communities do not understand the procedures for dealing with claims – both complaints about criminal actions and complaints about war crimes. As a result, they cannot tell whether the police or justice system is being responsive. In two of the communities visited for this research, K-Albanians opposed to return of Serb IDPs submitted lists of alleged war criminals to KFOR. In both cases, KFOR and KPS reported that they investigated and found no or insufficient evidence to proceed any further; communication mechanisms, however, did not appear to work effectively, as community members said they had gotten no response and did not know what had happened with their claims. As a result, these issues continue to fester and increase hostility toward potential returnees, even if (as mentioned above) they do not result in violence.

Even if there is improved transparency and communication, there are many issues not appropriate for institutions (e.g., where there is not evidence of war crimes, harassment

Some issues related to the 1998-1999 war are not appropriate for justice or transitional justice institutions, yet continue to provoke enormous anger and resentment. In Zheger/Zegra, for example, people had specific complaints about some of the names on the list of potential returnees. “Some of the youth from the village, like Dragan and Milan, and some other youth, were taking part in the fighting in the area of Drenica, and every time they returned from the fighting they used to shoot their machine-guns in the air to scare the people of the village.” Another person on the indictment list “did not kill but who had taken all the cattle which belonged to the Albanians from the village and had taken it somewhere else.”

that is not prosecutable) but that affect perceptions of security and cooperation. Here, municipal or community-level conflict management mechanisms could play a role. However, the municipal-level committees and conflict management mechanisms at the community level are weak or very returns-focused, and other

mechanisms for dialogues implemented by NGOs deliberately avoid sensitive political or emotional issues.

### **Peacebuilding Programs are not engaging many key people and areas**

Programs have been biased toward working with people who are, comparatively speaking, easier to reach, either because they are more moderate, apolitical or willing to cooperate. Programs overwhelmingly focus on women, youth and returnees and the receiving communities. This is partly because women and youth are considered natural bridge-builders and more willing to engage with the other side. Youth are perceived to be more “open-minded,” “influenceable” and willing to look toward the future. Like youth, women are perceived as being more open and tolerant, and have been willing and able to cross the lines of conflict when no one else could or would. The comments of one NGO staff person in relation to programming for women in the Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec area are typical. Women there, it is claimed, had stronger pre-war relationships and so

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could draw on a stronger set of friendships to hold them together across ethnic lines than either men or youth. They also are “easier to work with” because they did not participate directly in the war. Participant selection processes reinforce the tendency to engage the easy to reach. These are, of course, important people to mobilize for peace and against violence (even if, in this case, the mobilization process has not yet been effective, as described above).

### **Indicative criteria for participant selection mentioned by agencies and participants**

People who say they want to live together in the future.

Participants who have already had some training or who have a “sense of compromise and tolerance.”

“First criteria” are knowledge of English, open-mindedness and school success. Participants are recruited through high schools, where old participants interview new ones.

Identify existing ethnic linkages and support them.

Desire to participate, interests, and readiness to change.

People with experience in NGO sector work.

Yet the “harder to reach,” especially key people and groups who might undermine any potential agreement such as KLA and war veterans, the Serbian Orthodox Church, less moderate Serbian parties in Kosovo, etc., have only recently begun to receive some attention. Outreach to the Serb community has been weak, as the frameworks for engaging with Serbs through returns and integration of Serbs into Kosovo structures have reinforced alienation of more “key” constituencies connected to Belgrade. The international community, one international official noted, “did not speak to the SNC until three to four months before [October 2005] yet it is the *de facto* leadership.” Of the twenty programs explored in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica in this study, we identified only one non-governmental program that worked with the SNC. Only a few more were working with the Serbian Orthodox Church. Although there appeared to be greater contact with the KLA and war veterans, either through cooperation with the TMK or through informal contacts with them on the sidelines of programs, they too were generally not part of programming. “Extremists” are “purposely” not participants in dialogues in Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec, though they are welcome to trainings; in Zheger/Zegra, an NGO

*“The international community did not speak to the SNC [Serbian National Council] until three to four months before [October 2005] yet it is the de facto leadership,” an international official noted.*

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facilitating dialogue in preparing the ground for returns made efforts to speak informally with families of war victims to inform them of what was being done, even if the NGO knew they would not participate. Failure to reach the “harder to reach” who may undermine progress toward co-existence threatens both the sustainability of projects that are being implemented and their ability to affect the wider environment.

With respect to women and youth, we found no evidence that women were either key for continuing the conflict or played key roles in transforming conflict, or preventing violence, at least in rural areas. This does not mean that they do not have the potential to play key roles as peacemakers or peacebuilders. The programming for women often did not support that potential. Most of the programming was directed to empowerment of women or bringing women together for joint activity, but like similar programs for other groups, did not lead to any action for peace or against violence. Some people we spoke to felt that women’s programmes such as hairdressing and sewing classes may be reinforcing the powerlessness of women and found it “insulting”, “patronizing”, and reinforcing “powerlessness” of women.

While youth clearly do play a key role as fighters, the youth that are likely to or do participate in violence are not being reached, due to the participant selection process and lack of rigorous analysis of who “youth” are in terms of perpetuating conflict. At the same time, their teachers and principals, who played a role in the March 2004, and are often “key” influential people in their communities, are often not included. In several instances, funding for ongoing or follow-up work with these constituencies was turned down.

Finally, there is a question about the geographical targets of programming. The areas that are more extreme in terms of the political situation and positions on status, such as the Drenica region, are those that were affected by the war and are largely mono-ethnic now. These areas, formerly also a center for KLA activity, now have higher levels of activity of the associations that emerged from the war (of veterans, of invalids, and of families of martyrs) also are believed to have played an important role as organizers and as travelers (“outsiders”) in the March 2004 unrest.<sup>88</sup> These areas receive relatively little aid compared to other areas, and nearly no peacebuilding assistance. Similarly, “Belgrade” is mentioned as key to the evolution of the situation and of inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo. Yet aside from high level talks and working groups, there has been little cross-border or coordinated programming with Serbia. If a main driving force of conflict is in Serbia, however, failure to address it will keep relations in Kosovo vulnerable to escalation and violence.

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<sup>88</sup> See, e.g., International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo*.

# IX. Conclusion and Recommendations

The violence that occurred March 17-18, 2004 was unique in many ways, a response to a particular set of circumstances at a particular time, and should not be overemphasized in assessing peacebuilding in Kosovo. As status negotiations proceed, many of the politico-strategic reasons for violence are likely to disappear, or evolve. Yet there are still many lessons to be learned from communities' experience in the March 2004 violence concerning the robustness of the peacebuilding that is being pursued in Kosovo.

The indicators that many people – local and international – relied on to measure progress were revealed in the March events to have been misleading, while efforts to build bridging social capital – institutions and relationships across conflict lines – remained shallow at best. Good leadership and the intra-community bonds and social networks were among the most significant resources communities drew upon to avoid or resist violence. These same social networks, however, have also been used to keep communities apart and to maintain tension and hostility. When and if the practical motive of avoiding harm is taken away, will they still be effective?

Questions were raised by communities in this study about the desirability or feasibility of “multi-ethnicity” as it has been promoted in Kosovo, even while the pursuit of democracy and European standards remains a strong goal. As the status negotiations proceed, the temptation is strong to assume that provisions in the agreement on decentralization, cultural heritage, minority rights, and property, along with democratization and economic development, will build the peace. To be sure, it will provide a more stable political framework within which Serb-Albanian – and more generally minority-majority – relations can develop. Yet this study suggests these will not be sufficient to build communities' ability to withstand the pressure of future shocks or crises that will inevitably arise in the implementation of any agreement. The lack of strategic focus on what is needed to build robust inter-ethnic *relationships* and bridging social capital strong enough to prevent the inevitable pull to the extremes will also need to be addressed. As will the quality and motivation of leadership – not just of the political leaders but of people with moral and social authority in communities as well – to exercise and mobilize restraint within their own ethnic communities.

In order to strengthen the contribution of peacebuilding to the development of these factors we recommend taking action in several areas.

1. ***Build on security of concentrations of K-Serbs.*** The evidence in this study is that larger presence of K-Serbs is associated with greater IEV, while at the same time larger concentrations of K-Serbs is associated with the opposite – in part because larger concentrations are harder to confront. Decentralization and returns policies should consider these realities in considering whether and how to delineate municipal structures or permit returns to places other than the original place of residence, while working

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simultaneously not only to connect these communities to the Kosovo government and economy, but also to build inter-ethnic social capital.

2. ***Develop a strategy for building bridging social capital.*** A strategy that relies on governance, minority rights, decentralization and economic development generally will not be sufficient to build real bridging social capital that can act as a restraint on violence. In addition to strengthening democracy and economic development in Kosovo, a strategy for transforming the *relationship* between K-Albanians and K-Serbs is needed, both within Kosovo and in the broader region. The findings indicated that it cannot be assumed that social interaction, joint work or economic interaction across ethnicities, nor good governance and minority rights, will automatically transform the hostility, distrust and insecurity that characterize the relationship. Elements of a strategy should include:

- f. *A vision of what the relationship between K-Serbs and K-Albanians will be in the future, one that is shared locally.* “Multi-ethnicity” is not a vision that is shared, and while “side-by-side” living is mentioned almost universally as the current reality and realistic goal, there is fear that accepting this could feed calls for cantonization, division and further conflict. Possible pieces of a more compelling and realistic vision might include “coexistence”<sup>89</sup> and “European development.” A vision should be discussed and developed openly.
- g. *Deal with political issues directly.* Avoidance of political issues in programming has made contact and cooperation easier, but shallower. We recommend that agencies working at all levels and sectors identify ways to incorporate ‘political’ issues, whether issues of the past to issues regarding status, into their work. It is action on these issues related to the conflict that will also change the dynamic. This will require investment in the development of capacity to manage these much more sensitive processes, specifically: investment of time and resources in dialogue and discussion among staff on these issues, training of staff in skills to deal with difficult issues, and in some cases, collaboration with or hiring of staff with skills in psychology and trauma healing.
- h. *Invest in follow-up and linkages.* Strategies are needed for moving beyond individual-personal impacts to affect the socio-political environment, and should

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<sup>89</sup> “Coexistence” has been defined by Eileen Babbitt as “a relationship between two or more communities living in close proximity to one another, that is more than merely living side by side, and includes some degree of communication, interaction, and cooperation.” Babbitt, Eileen et.al. 2002 *Imagine Coexistence: Assessing Refugee Integration Efforts in Divided Communities* (Medford, MA: Fletcher School), p. 8. See also Chayes, A. and Minow, M. (2003). *Imagine coexistence: Restoring humanity after violent ethnic conflict*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

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- be encouraged and funded among individual agencies implementing peacebuilding projects. Much more can be done to encourage greater synergy between different efforts so that they can build on rather than duplicate each other. At the programme level, event-based programming should be discouraged, while follow-up to programming and linkages among programmes to move beyond individual-personal impacts to generate socio-political impacts.
- i. *Expand programming to ensure communities have accurate information about the “other.”* The availability of accurate information about events and about the other’s intentions, as well as ways of checking rumors at times of crisis, was critical to communities’ capacity to avoid violence. Cross-ethnic information, crisis or “hotline” and other networks are one mechanism for promoting information exchange that did not play a role, but could be supported. As a key player in maintaining the conflict, the media should be a central focus for programming. Programming, however, needs to engage bigger players both in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.
  - j. *Monitoring and evaluation.* At the same time, donors and policymakers need to institute more thorough monitoring of multi-ethnic programming to discourage *pro forma* multi-ethnicity and reward those in which meaningful inter-ethnic dialogue and cooperation is occurring. Evidence that people consider mere participation in internationally-sponsored multi-ethnic programs fulfillment of their obligations for inter-ethnic engagement is strong, and should not be reinforced by donor and agency practice. Criteria for assessing the quality of inter-ethnic interaction need to be included, looking beyond participation in programs and program output to assess the process by which the programs were implemented, such as: how decisions were taken, the quality of cooperation, degree of self-initiated actions reflecting concern for the other’s interests.
3. *Rethink targeting of areas and beneficiaries/participants.* The findings suggest that several of the cornerstones of peacebuilding programming – returns, rewards for “multi-ethnicity,” youth and women’s programming – need rethinking and refinement.
- a. *Deemphasize refugee and IDP return.* Already there has been some de-emphasis of returns in peacebuilding programming as issues related to status have taken front stage. However, further consideration of the relationship of returns to peacebuilding may be warranted at this time. The findings suggest that the allocation of resources to returns has not only exacerbated Albanian resentments of Serbs, but also intra-community divisions as remainees receive fewer resources. Refugee and IDP returns are important, but to mitigate the negative conflict impacts of returns programming and to support local capacities for peace, *peacebuilding* programming should focus on inter-ethnic relations holistically, including working with remainees.

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- b. *Shift from emphasis on the “easy to reach” to promotion of leadership, local capacities for peace and connectors.* Reaching and mobilizing the moderate voices on both sides to have a voice in policy and public debate is important for building a peace constituency. Yet programs that target the “easy to reach” are not, collectively, mobilizing this voice. Programme participants are generally not taking initiatives for peace. A strategy should consider how to create that space – not only in working intra-ethnically, but in identifying how to shift from the current dependence on third party mediation of interaction to local self-initiated action for peace, especially in civil society. For work with moderate and “open-minded” people, the findings suggest that additional criteria for targeting of participants could improve program effectiveness in building “bridging social capital:”
- Identify and support “innovators” and “early adopters” who are will take or have taken public action for peace or in support of inter-ethnic cooperation.
  - Identify and support *existing* “connectors” – people, institutions or systems, actions and attitudes, and interests that already bring people together across conflict lines, rather than attempt to create new connectors. Areas such as economic development, employment, environment, health, or public services are common concerns of people in Kosovo, but do not necessarily already act as a connector across ethnic lines. By contrast, in some places, youth concerns with lack of recreation facilities has led them to reach out across ethnic lines and share space or play sports together on their own initiative. This could be supported. K-Albanian and K-Serb concern about the quality of education, especially in science and math, for example, could also be built on to bring people together to develop a common curriculum in those areas.
  - Identify and support local capacities for peace. Leadership by example might open some space for interaction. People and processes that currently mitigate conflict should be identified and supported. Greater rigor could be exercised in identifying people who exercise informal leadership and authority in communities, in addition to community leaders. Teachers and educational officials emerged from the study as one such group.
  - Work with youth and women is important, yet again more rigorous analysis of youth and women is warranted to identify and support those that are “key” for violence or non-violence.
  - Identify and link together participants in geographic and/or sectoral areas to avoid isolation.
- c. *Address the “hard to reach.”* The general, if not always purposeful, exclusion of “key” people leaves programs vulnerable and undermines the overall impact of peacebuilding work. Steps could be taken to find ways to include or engage several key actors more systematically: KLA veterans and war victims, Kosovo Serb political and community leaders across the spectrum of opinion, less moderate Albanian organizations such as Albin Kurti’s “Vetevendosje,” and the Serbian Orthodox Church. At the same time, greater rigor might be exercised in

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analyzing which youth are “key” for violence or non-violence, as the March 2004 events demonstrate that not all youth are “open-minded” and “tolerant,” and make efforts to reach out to youth that participate in violence.

- d. *De-“localize” programming.* Support programming that cross geographical boundaries – either between municipalities or communities, or between Kosovo and Serbia. Programs that focus on individual communities (either for returns, or because they have mixed populations) or Kosovo-wide policy miss important factors of conflict. Areas for programming that have been largely overlooked but should receive greater attention include:
- Mono-ethnic areas, that were most affected by the war and/or that are the cradle of the KLA, such as Gjakova/Đakovica or Decan/Decani, need greater attention. People comment that hard-line opinion prevails there that “outsider” perpetrators of violence throughout Kosovo came from those areas.
  - Interaction between people from these mono-ethnic areas with people (K-Serbs and K-Albanians) from more mixed areas. This occurs in Kosovo-wide programs such as youth camps but could be increased and focused more systematically with the necessary follow-up to support re-entry back into the mono-ethnic areas.
  - Cross-border and/or coordinated work with Serbia outside the IDP realm, especially with areas that are critical to the Serb-Albanian relationship in Kosovo. After status talks conclude, this will likely become more important, as the line of confrontation will likely shift to the Kosovo-Serbia border in relation to the northern municipalities.
- e. *Support “single identity” work.* Single identity work – work within one community on issues and dynamics in conflict – should be considered and supported not just as a preparatory step to cross-ethnic interaction, but also as a follow-up process to address the “rules of the inter-ethnic game” and deal with intra-community resistance to inter-ethnic cooperation. Intra-community political dialogue in communities where political divisions are bitter should be considered as a part of a strategy to strengthen capacity of communities to manage inter-ethnic conflict. In urban areas in particular, in addition to promoting dialogue across ethnic lines, dialogue and engagement across the “oldtime resident”-“newcomer” divide needs promotion to develop networks across *internal* lines of division that can be drawn upon to mobilize communities to avoid violence.

4.. *Address driving factors of conflict more directly.* In the immediate term, this would include helping prepare the population for the eventual outcome and implementation of the status talks. Nonetheless, even after status is decided, many of the driving factors identified will remain. Some directions that might be pursued include:

- a. *Transitional justice:* Develop more transparent and fair procedures for dealing with claims of war crimes, and encourage NGO parallel processes. Issues related

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- to lustration will also need to be considered carefully in this context, as concerns (of Albanians and Serbs) related to individuals' involvement with the war continue to exacerbate tensions from the community level in places like Zheger/Zegra to the Kosovo-wide level.
- b. Security and impunity: Action might be taken in several arenas. First, in light of starkly different perceptions about the problem of freedom of movement, greater dialogue at all levels between Serbs and Albanians about the nature of the problem and what to do about it would be useful. In this context, a broadening or reframing of the issue from “freedom of movement” to address minorities’ “sense of security” might be helpful, as the terminology of “freedom of movement” – associated closely with the Standards for Kosovo – may have the unintended consequence of polarizing discussion on what the current reality is and future actions ought to be. Second, issues of impunity and *perceptions* of impunity need to be addressed. This issue is, of course, is a long-term problem related to the weakness of the justice system that affects Albanians as well. The need to strengthen the justice system has been underlined by many,<sup>90</sup> and efforts to strengthen the justice system are already underway. However, they should be supplemented in the short- to medium-term by efforts – both official (government and international agency) and civil society – to deal with the factors that motivate witnesses not to come forward and to deal with the link between impunity and K-Serb fears and insecurity specifically. In the shorter run, therefore, promotion of greater contact between police and communities and greater transparency about the status of investigations might be considered, as well as strengthening and expansion of community policing.
  - c. Develop more community-based mechanisms for addressing key issues, from the missing, war, crimes, feelings of victimization or current insecurity to claims of property usurpation, especially those that do not rise to a level warranting institutional attention and the psychological, relational and emotional aspects of these issues. This should not necessarily entail new mechanisms, but could be incorporated into existing dialogue and other processes as a way of deepening and building on those efforts.
- 4. *Incorporate conflict sensitivity into all programming and policy making.*** Decisions about staffing and contracting, about location of programs and centers, and post-program sustainability planning especially should analyse and take into account potential impacts on K-Serb—K-Albanian tensions. In addition, to the

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<sup>90</sup> Kai Eide noted that “minority communities – and especially the Kosovo Serbs – suffer from more than a perceived insecurity. It is indeed a mixture of perception and reality. To combat this situation, it will be important to combat crime more vigorously.” K. Eide, *Comprehensive Report on the Situation in Kosovo*, p. 9.

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extent that economic development is both highly important to all communities in Kosovo, but has contributed to violent conflict through its connection to disappointed political aspirations and horizontal inequalities amongst ethnic groups, economic policy and development aid – from privatization to job creation policies to practical implementation of income-generation projects on the ground should identify concretely potential “winners” and “losers” and the impact on K-Albanian—K-Serb (and other minorities) divisions.

5. ***Consider incentives and motivations for avoidance of violence.*** “Bonding social capital” has been a great resource for mobilization of communities against violence. It has been under strain, especially in urban areas, as populations shift and social networks break down or change. In those areas, efforts to strengthen both “bridging” social capital across ethnic lines, as well as promote engagement and trust across intra-community lines of division, are important. In more rural areas, the “bonding social capital” that was mobilized to prevent violence in March 2004 is still in place, but can as easily be mobilized for violence in the absence of appropriate motivations. With the “Standards for Kosovo” operating as a weaker and weaker source of motivation, another set of incentives – associated perhaps with European integration – will need to replace them, with clear consequences for not meeting standards of behavior.

# Appendices

# Appendix 1: About CDA-Colaborative Learning Projects

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects is a non-profit organization, based in Cambridge, Massachusetts (USA). We are committed to improving the effectiveness of international actors who provide humanitarian assistance, engage in peace practice, and are involved in supporting sustainable development.

CDA operates on the premise that experience is a good teacher if we can take the time to learn its lessons. To that end, we organize collaborative learning projects to gather and analyze the experiences of international efforts and, from this, to identify patterns across contexts and project types. Our experience shows that this kind of learning enables us to avoid repeating mistakes of the past and to continually improve the impacts of our work.

Our learning projects have involved colleagues in humanitarian assistance agencies, development agencies, peace practice groups, and corporate enterprises.

Many individuals and agencies know of CDA through its Executive Director, Mary B. Anderson and her 1999 book: *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War*. The peace and conflict impact assessment tool known as “*Do No Harm*” analysis helps humanitarian and development assistance workers to identify the impacts of their assistance on conflict and to develop options for minimizing harm and enhancing their positive support for peace.

CDA maintains a small group of core staff who have extensive experience in zones of conflict. They have worked in over ninety countries with several hundred international and local organizations, including European and North American governments, United Nations agencies, the World Bank, members of the Red Cross movement, universities and training centers, and many non-governmental organizations. In addition, CDA calls on a broad group of experts when specific regional expertise or language competence is needed.

The organization’s work is funded primarily by governments and international financial institutions which support CDA CLP because it combines rigorous analysis with pragmatic field-level work and delivers practical tools and techniques to field staff and international policy-makers alike.

The guiding principle of all work, whether with NGOs, governments or corporations, is that international actors who work with local groups should always do so in ways that promote, rather than undermine, local efforts to achieve economic and political development, peace and stability. The focus of each of CDA’s projects is on systematic learning from experience to improve the impacts of international assistance.

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CDA's approach:

1. Is field-based and experience-driven (rather than theory or model-based).
2. Develops a context in which organizations learn from and with each other more than they can learn from their own experience alone.
3. Produces tools and approaches that are broadly applicable and transferable across contexts.

CDA's current programs include:

- Do No Harm (DNH): to identify the ways in which international humanitarian and/or development assistance given in conflict settings may be provided so that, rather than exacerbating and worsening the conflict
- Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (RPP): working with a broad range of agencies and contexts to analyze experience at the program level to improve the effectiveness of international peacebuilding efforts. RPP conducted 26 case studies, and consulted with over 200 agencies and over 1000 people to analyze peacebuilding experience. The findings of three years of analysis and consultation are in *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*, which sets out what is being done, what has been successful and why, and what needs to be done. CDA has been working in Kosovo for two years with a group of NGOs to reflect on the impact of their programming and priority areas and strategies for enhancing its impact. The initial analysis of NGO partners is that their individual efforts could, and should, have a more significant impact.
- Steps Toward Conflict Prevention (STEPS): a systematic and structured look at successful prevention experiences to understand better what constitutes an effective strategy and to identify ways that international development and humanitarian assistance can support, or promote, prevention strategies.
- Corporate Engagement Project (CEP): to provide managers with clear ideas about how their work with communities relates to the broader sociopolitical environment and to develop practical management tools for supporting stable and productive relations in the societies where corporations work.

# Appendix 2: About the Research Team

## Diana Chigas

Diana Chigas is Co-Director of the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) project at CDA-Collaborative Learning Projects. Ms. Chigas has been working primarily in the Balkans with non-governmental agencies, inter-governmental agencies and donors to reflect on the impact of their programming and priority areas and strategies for enhancing its impact. She also teaches negotiation and conflict resolution at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. Prior to joining CDA, Diana served as Vice President, Regional Director for Europe and the former Soviet Union and Director of Research and Evaluation at Conflict Management Group, where she advised international organizations, non-governmental organizations and governments in peacebuilding, negotiation and conflict resolution. At CMG, Ms. Chigas directed programs on Preventive Diplomacy in the OSCE, working with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and on-site missions on methods and strategies. She co-led the program on Conflict Management in Cyprus, which brought together citizens and elites from both sides for dialogue and joint problem-solving over nearly ten years, with the aim of catalyzing a human infrastructure for peace. Ms. Chigas has facilitated “track two” discussions and provided training and advice to the negotiating teams of the government in El Salvador and the FMLN, and with negotiators in the South African constitutional negotiations and in the Georgia/South Ossetia peace process.

## Cheyenne Church

Cheyenne Church is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Human Security of the Fletcher School, Tufts University in the United States. She is also an independent consultant in monitoring and evaluation and is acting as CDA’s liaison for the work of the Reflecting on Peace Practice Project in Liberia. Prior to joining the Fletcher School, Ms. Church was the Director of Institutional Learning and Research at the U.S.-based NGO, Search for Common Ground (2003 – 2005) and the Director of the Policy and Evaluation Unit at INCORE (United Nations University’s Centre for International Conflict Resolution) (2000-2002). Ms. Church is author of several important works on evaluation in peacebuilding and conflict resolution, including: *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs* (Washington, DC: USIP 2006, with Mark Rogers); *Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions Part II: Emerging Practice and Theory* (Derry/Londonderry: INCORE, 2003, with J. Shouldice) and *Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play* Derry/Londonderry: INCORE, 2002, with J. Shouldice).

## Jos De La Haye

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Jos De La Haye is President of the Field Diplomacy Initiative (FDI), a Belgian NGO that brings together researchers, policy makers and NGO workers to provide support to initiatives to respond to conflict in a constructive way. Since 2003, Dr. De La Haye has also been Ph.D Programme Coordinator Social Sciences at the Catholic University Leuven. Dr. De La Haye's research and field work has focused on conflict related issues, i.e. impact assessment, early warning, conflict analysis. He has worked as a researcher at the University of Leuven, and as PCIA project coordinator for FDI and International Alert, where he managed and edited the Resource Pack on Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Peacebuilding and authored its chapter on monitoring and evaluation. He has also consulted to international organizations and NGOs, including UNDP, OSCE, Care International, Catholic Relief Services, International Foundation for Election Systems, on conflict-related issues. His field experience has been concentrated in the Balkans (Bosnia and Kosovo), Africa (Kenya and Uganda), Asia (Sri Lanka) and the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan). Dr. De La Haye was involved in designing the methodology for the study and in conducting preliminary community studies, consultative workshops with local and international NGOs and agencies, and led the preparation of one of the case studies.

### Monica Llamazares

Dr. Llamazares is currently working on capacity building of multi-ethnic grassroots community safety forums for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. Previously, she worked as a peacebuilding and conflict resolution consultant and trainer, with extensive experience in Kosovo. Dr. Llamazares holds a PhD on post-war peacebuilding and an MA in Conflict Resolution from the Dept. of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford (UK). Her research and professional interests include the return and integration of IDPs/refugees in post-war peacebuilding missions, gender and peacebuilding, and the interface between community policing approaches and grassroots conflict resolution interventions in post-war settings. Dr. Llamazares designed and conducted the Phase I desk study research, as well as preliminary community studies.

### Olivera Markovic

Ms. Markovic is the head of the Mitrović/Mitrovica field office of the Amsterdam-based Academic Training Association. She is finishing her master's degree in sociology at the University of Nis in Serbia, and received her B.A. in sociology at the University of Pristina. She has been a teaching assistant at the Faculty of Philosophy in Mitrovica, at the "School of Democracy and Identity" (summer school in Bujanovac, Serbia of the *Italian Consortium for Solidarity (ICS)* and the NGO Good Action Society) and a researcher for the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory in Belgrade. Since 1998, she has also been a researcher for the NGO *Drustvo dobre akcije* (Good Action Society) Niš, Serbia. Along with Mr. Venhari, Ms. Markovic was the lead case study writer for the project, preparing six of the seven case studies.

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### Vasiliki Neofotistos

Vasiliki Neofotistos is an Assistant Professor in Anthropology at SUNY-Buffalo. Prior to joining the faculty at SUNY, she was Visiting Assistant Professor at Catholic University in Washington, DC and a Lecturer in Social Anthropology at Harvard University. She holds a BA in Communication and Mass Media from Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece (1995), a Master of Studies in Social Anthropology from Oxford University, UK (1997) and a PhD in Social Anthropology from Harvard University. She has worked as a full-time media monitor for the project "Media Freedoms and Hate Speech" --part of an International Helsinki Federation project-- for Greek Helsinki Monitor and Minority Rights Group, Greece (09/95 - 05/96). She spent twenty months in the capital city of Skopje, Republic of Macedonia conducting her dissertation fieldwork research on the social processes of ethnic identity building and the construction of difference between the two major ethnic groups in the country, Macedonians and Albanian, and speaks fluent Macedonian and Albanian. Dr. Neofotistos was involved in the preparation of the Gorazdevac/Gorazhdec case study.

### Artan Venhari

Artan Venhari is a Task Manager at the European Agency for Reconstruction. Prior to joining EAR, he was a researcher at IKS, a Kosovan non-profit research institute that was CDA's K-Albanian partner for this research. IKS emerged in 2004 out of the 'capacity-building' project of the Germany-based European Stability Initiative. Mr. Venhari and the IKS team brought experience in civil society, dialogue and conflict resolution. Mr. Venhari completed his post-graduate studies at SOAS, the School of Oriental and African Studies in London on a UK Chevening scholarship. Upon his return, he worked on inter-ethnic dialogue for the Kosovan Nansen Dialogue and pursued training in project cycle management in the Netherlands. Along with Ms. Markovic, Mr. Venhari was the lead case study writer.

# Appendix 3: Guide for Case Studies

## KOSOVO CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY BRIEFING – FINAL

### **Briefing Purpose:**

1. to provide a common set of guidelines for all case studies to ensure ‘enough’ comparability of information for analysis
2. to provide boundaries for our inquiry to ensure adequate depth is achieved within each study

### **Research Project Key Question:**

What have been the significant factors in enabling communities to not participate in violence?

- § To what extent, if any, has peacebuilding been a factor?
- § How did the non-participation into violence happen?

### **CASE STUDIES**

*What is a Case Study?*

A case study investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. It relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion. It results in a report that contains a rich narrative of the phenomenon detailing how it came about.<sup>91</sup> They are as such necessarily brief, reflective snapshots of complex and dynamic situations.

In this project, the case studies will represent a variety of situations that will be compared to identify common or differing factors that have enabled communities to not participate in violence.

The 8 case studies will explore concrete situations, likely very localised as in a village, small town or cluster of villages. Multiple data collection methods will be used, relying primarily on one-to-one interviews and small group discussions. Data and analysis from Phase 1 will also inform each case study. Each case study **MUST** be grounded in the community experience or the facts as told by the community. The analysis of this is critical and comes at a later stage, and should **not** be woven into the ‘story’ of the case study itself. A separate section should be reserved for the authors analysis as they see it at the time of writing.

*Why do Case Studies?*

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<sup>91</sup> Robert Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, 2003

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

Case studies are a way to learn from past experience as they explore how something has happened. Cumulatively, they are an excellent means to consolidate information in a way that allows multiple people to engage in the analysis and which are more generalizable across varying circumstances.

*What Case Studies are not:*

- § not evaluations
- § not a conflict analysis
- § not comprehensive to everything that is going on at the time in the situation
- § not meant for the authors to provide their view
- § not regional or national in nature

*Who will write the case studies?*

After the original pilot study, the 'on-the-ground' research team will research and write each case in collaboration with one international team member working virtually. The role of the virtual member will be to ensure continuity between cases, application of methodology guidelines, provision of an external perspective and answering questions as necessary.

*How long will each case take to write?*

Cases will average 10 days total from start to a complete case study document. It is not expected that each case study will use 10 consecutive days. Rather it appears that there may be some benefit in spreading the workdays over a longer period of time to allow for follow-up visits. It is of critical importance that information collected is documented and labelled accurately so that it is attributed to the correct case.

*How do I write a case study?*

- § These case studies are intended to tell a story about why some communities decided to not participate in violence and why some did. What the community or people within it did and why and what happened as a result of their efforts and why or why not.
- § The story for case studies about resistance will focus on the resistance or non-participation. While stories where violence broke out will focus on the participants of peacebuilding work **and** the factors that were identified in the resistance cases for comparative purposes.
- § Case studies should have a story line. What to include and what to leave out is decided essentially by how important it is to understanding the story.
- § A case study should tell all sides, from all levels. Significant effort to speak to a variety of people and differing perspectives is very important. Gender, age, local/international and socio-economic standing should all be considered in interviewee selection and noted during the interview process.
- § Where possible take notes in meetings, if it does not interfere with the conversation. Be as precise as possible with the language to ensure noting the exact words used.

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- § Assure each person that their comments are not for the press and won't be quoted.
- § Add all information into the case study framework as outlined below. Be sure to indicate what community the information came from.
- § The case study will be written chronologically.

### *Action Steps*

Based on the experience that Vasiliki and I had working on the first case study, what follows is the recommended process for the next 7 cases. Of course it is all recommended not required and there will certainly be times that flexibility and creativity will come up with a better process.

A. It is recommended that both researchers work on the same case at one time and travel to the area together.

### B. Data Collection:

1. establish 2-3 fixed interviews before arriving in the community. These will create other opportunities.
2. if at all possible enter the communities through non-ngo contacts (ex. local community officer, elected representative, personal contact, journalist etc.). After these interviews are conducted, then speak to the ngos and then through them speak to participants in peacebuilding. Use the information in the first community interviews to inform the ngo interviews.
3. each day debrief on what was found in each community to identify differences, similarities and what needs to be followed up with in the next interviews.

### C. Process

1. Identify list of potential contacts
2. Set of day one interviews
3. Conduct 2-3 dys of interviews
4. Midpoint - At the midpoint of collecting information (example after 2 days of interviewing in both communities) use the case methodology categories and compile the information you have both collected. for instance under Community Overview list everything you know about the community - same for the other categories. This can be done in bullet point format, no need for essay style. Use this reflection process to both share information with each other and to identify where there are gaps that need to be filled and can be explored in the next set of interviews. Be sure to include your tentative thoughts and conclusions in the analysis section too. Send this document to the virtual/external researcher who

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

- will review it and respond with questions, clarifications or other lines of inquiry to follow up with in the next set of interviews.
5. The external will need a day to turn around this document to the local team. Use this day to set up the next set of interviews and steps 1 & 2 for the next case that you are going to conduct. If at all possible give the external warning as to when this day will be so they can block out time to turn around their questions quickly.
  6. conduct next days of interviews
  7. Add information to the case methodology outline so that it contains EVERYTHING that you have found from interviews, reading/documents, phase 1 research etc.
  8. send to virtual/external researcher who will write the first draft of the case study based on the raw data collected.
  9. draft case study is returned to local team to review, clarify, edit and suggest
  10. external finalises case study

At any time throughout this process also feel free to conduct the external researcher with questions, ideas etc.

### D. TIMING

Use the following as a ballpark to manage time for the cases. Some may go longer or shorter which is fine, this should simply provide guidance

1 dy - set up

2 dys interviews

1 dy midpoint write up

1 dy plan the next round of interviews and step 1&2 for the next case

2 -3 dys interviews

1 dy write up all notes

1 day review draft of case

### *Whom do I talk to?*

A wide range of sectors should be covered to get a complete picture of the story. Representatives from both communities should be included within each sector. Where possible talk to more than one person/group for each sector (e.g. 2 Albanian and 2 Serbian that represents media). Where possible try to meet with the most local (in terms of the case study) person, closest to the case site, rather than the municipal level. The following is a list of the possible sectors, examples of who that could represent and the minimum different groupings we should try to cover. If the minimum is blank then simply try to speak to some people from the sector.

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

Sector	Examples	Minimum
Business	market vender, Executive, business association representative	Corporate and small business in the case site
Media	radio or print journalists, editors	
Social Service	teacher, nurse, social-worker, librarian, doctor	From case site
Political (elected)		Municipal President, elected representatives from community - municipal Village Head Albanian villages – opposition
Religious Leaders		From case site
Civil Service/Officials (non-elected)		Housing Authority (HBD) Mediation Committee Community Committee Returns Working Group Local Returns Officer Local Human Rights Officer CCK Ombudsperson
Civil Society (non-pcbldg)	domestic violence, human rights, HIV/AIDS, War Veterans Group International ngo	local ngos working in case site (may be found via networks)
Peacebuilding projects		Staff Participants from case site
International Community	UNMIK, OSCE, donor representatives	Local Community Officer UNMIK Representative OSCE Head of Field Office
Security	Officers – try to get past the official spokesman if possible	KPS sub-station, KFOR, KPC?, CivPol
Community members	Housewife, youth, newspaper delivery guy, store clerk, waiter	Youth and women from case site

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

### *Introducing Yourself to Interviewees*

- § It is very important to remain consistent in the introduction for each interview or group discussion. This sets the tone of the conversation and creates a common starting point. Mention the following:
  - Introduce yourself
  - that you work for Collaborative for Development Action an American research ngo.
  - CDA was invited by a number of ngos working in Kosovo to conduct research. DO NOT offer the names of the ngos unless directly asked.
  - The purpose of the project is to help people in other conflict settings in the world learn how they could stop violence or promote peace in their communities.
  - As research it has no bearing on funding or access to donor monies
  - Assure each person that their comments are not for the press and that they will not be directly quoted.

### **Case Study Framework:**

- § The following framework covers the complete case study. Some of the data may be located in existing reports, or as a result of Phase 1 of the project. Case writers will not need to discuss all of this information with each individual they interview.
- § As with the entire project the term ‘violence’ is defined very broadly and includes intimidation.
- § This framework is not intended as an outline in terms of an expected order to structure the study. Rather they should be sure that all of this information exists within the final case report.
- § The points listed below are not questions to be asked directly, rather points of information we wish to collect. How that information is identified often will be in an indirect manner.
- § Don’t force your questions into these categories – collect people’s own words and use them to help frame the issue.

### **I. Community Overview (who, where, what is the community?)**

Community is defined as the total site that is being explored in the case study. It may include multiple villages, one village, or a neighbourhood of a larger urban centre. Be sure to define this in your case study report and as early in the case process as possible.

- § Who is the community?
  - Size of the community in numbers
  - Ethnic & religious make-up
  - Approximate gender distribution
  - Age distribution
  - Returnees/remainees? How long the person has been living in the community?
- § How do people live in the community?

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- What is the economic situation: look for information that will be comparable between cases ex. Unemployment rates, new businesses being started, businesses being closed, means of sustaining existence such as vegetable patch etc. We are also interested in the impact of all of these on inter-ethnic relations – so it would be good to collect this information by ethnicity, and get a sense of who is doing what, who is impacted by various parts of the economic situation how, etc.
- Crime rates – what crime? How often/prevalent? Etc. Here we are looking to see if IEV might be related to crime.
- Physical make-up of the community – e.g. high density population or low-density, divided by a river etc.
- Communication networks
  - Ø Messages – how are messages disseminated within each community?
  - Ø Media Outlets available – language of programming, perceived bias of information, objectivity, do they fuel the conflict?
- § What are dividers and connectors within/between the communities and how have they changed over time? Be as specific as possible – how the various things (like economy as a connector, war experience as a divider, etc.) are actually used or experienced by people
  - Also note dividers/connectors within each community. What are intragroup dynamics – close, tight-knit group, do they trust each other, are there smaller groups within one group?

## II. Background to Conflict in the community

Here we want to understand what the nature of conflict has been in the community over the last 2.5 years (2002-present), how things have changed. We also want to understand the historical background – what historically has fed conflict. This latter may be covered already in dividers and connectors.

- § Briefly, history with respect to conflict/tensions and IEV: pre-1989, history during the 1990s, war experience and immediately post-war.
- § What is the frequency and nature/typology of violence?
  - Are the reported figures accurate? More/less than actual. What are the motivations? What is the effect of IEV – fear, solidarity within your community, defiance? What is the current status of violence and intimidation?
  - Is IEV linked to organised crime? If so how?
  - Intragroup violence – quantity, frequency and causes. Is there a connection between intragroup and interethnic violence? In other words, are you likely to be intimidated by your community if you participate in cross-community activities?

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- § What factors influence violence in the community? Why does it happen here?
  - Missing persons: number, profile/importance of this issue in the community
  - Status of the War Veterans, War Invalids/Martyrs and Families Associations – do they exist, what do they do, public sentiment around them?
  - Is there a relationship between ‘proper behaviour’ (I’ve done nothing wrong, I’ve behaved properly) and IEV?
  - Who are the ‘outsiders’ who are violent? What could the community do to protect themselves from them?
  - Proximity, size and make-up of KFOR, CivPol, KPS and Kosovo Protection Corps – role and communities opinion of each?
  - What happens here when violent or high profile events that are negative to your community occur elsewhere in Kosovo? What about when those events happen within the municipality?
  - How did inter-community relations change immediately after the March 2004 riots? Why did this happen? Was this positive or negative? Has it continued?

### III. Experience of Resisting or Not participating in violence

- § Examples when people in the community peacefully resisted those who were threatening violence. A sense of frequency of these examples
  - What was the situation (riot, demonstration, children throwing stones)
  - Who were they? (gender, age, education, job, position in community etc.)
  - What did they do? What happened/what was the result?
  - Was this in-character for them or were you surprised by there behaviour? Why?
  - Why do you think this person(s) did this – what made them behave this way?
  - What was the reaction from the community of this action?
- § Examples of times when you thought things could explode in violence or that someone would be intimidated, but nothing happened.
  - What happened that made you think things would explode/person would be intimidated?
  - What happened instead of violence?
  - What was the community reaction to no violence occurring?
  - Why did nothing happen?
- § Relations between Serbs/Albanians in the community
  - how have they changed over the last 2 years?
  - What did you first see that told you things were changing? What do you see now that you wouldn’t have seen 2 years ago?

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

- What do you think caused the change?
- Has your community tried anything to help improve relations?

### IV. Peacebuilding Activities in the community & their connection to violence

Here we have not define peacebuilding and will be developing the boundaries of “peacebuilding” based on the case studies. We want to know a) what people in communities think peace means and what has contributed to it and how; and b) what the agencies think they are doing and what their “theory of peacebuilding” is – i.e. how they think their activities contribute to peace. So we’d like to be able to understand from peacebuilding: what agencies do (kinds of activities), whom they work with, how they think their activities contribute to peace, and whether they actually do contribute to peace and reduction of violence specifically (here the community’s voice obviously is important).

§ Number of international ngos and indigenous ngos operating in the community

§ What is their primary work (agriculture, roads, schools) and which are considered peacebuilding activities (by the community and by the agencies)

§ History of the peacebuilding efforts in the last 2.5 years. (Note they do not need to still be running now. Note also that community members may know the answers to some of these questions, but may not to others here. Still it would be interesting to know what they do think.):

- Who started it – person and/or agency?
- What do they do (activities)?
- How long has it run?
- Why did they choose to do this activity and not something else?
- How will this activity bring peace?
  - Ø If integration is the answer then explore why is integration important? What will it mean if it is achieved?
- Who is involved in it [participants]? Why did they get involved? (identify not only gender, education, social status but also the war experience)
- Who has chosen not to be involved in these activities? Why? Who has actively resisted these activities from happening? Why?
- What difference has this project made – positive and negative? What initiatives have helped build bridges between the communities?
- What evidence is there of these changes? Be sure to connect with those involved in the initiative and those who were not as a means to cross check the connection between the initiative and the change.

§ Has the work of the international community done any harm or damage to this community?

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

- § Are the different ngo projects linked in any way? If so how are they linked and why is that link important or not important? (linkages exploration)
- § If there are lots of peacebuilding activities and you could only pick one which has been the most significant for your community? (significance)
- § How have the peacebuilding activities affected the amount of violence in the community?

### V. What might help?

This is not the focus of inquiry, but it would be good to understand what people think might have helped, or might help, to bring peace and reduce violence. This will help us understand their theory of change, and their concerns.

- § What should have happened differently after the 98/99 war to bring stability and peace to the community? Who should have done it? Why didn't these things happen?
- § What needs to happen now to stop the violence?
- § What needs to happen now to bring the two communities together?
- § What might happen in the next year – if Kosovo becomes independent/if negotiations get stuck? What would be needed to prevent violence?

### VI. Analysis/Judgement of Case Writers

- § This section should be kept distinct from the rest of the case study. It is important that it is very clear what is fact according to the community and what is the judgement of the case writers.
- § Why did or didn't violence happen in this community?
- § Did the initiatives for change (ngo or other) help prevent violence? Why and how did this happen? What factors were key to this?
- § Is this change sustainable?
- § Is the process replicable elsewhere or totally unique to those circumstances? Why or why not?

#### *How will the analysis be done?*

The analysis will be conducted through a participatory process. It will start with the case study authors coming together to review the cases to make tentative first conclusions. Then a series (1-3) of consultation workshops will be held to involve others in the analysis. From this the final conclusions will be developed.

#### *Writing the case study*

- § Use the third person
- § Source your information – if it is from a document, or an interview. If from an interview be sure not to state the actual name.

# Appendix 4: Municipal Comparative Table, IEV 2002 – 2004

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### Stage 1 – IEV Mapping: Municipal Comparative Grid

The Table below offer the rough yearly totals of IEV reported to UNMIK CivPol, and will only be complete after the data for the periods March’02-Sept’02 and Oct’04-March’05 are inputted as well as a few identified missing SitReps that are currently being pursued with UNMIK CivPol. To understand the typology of IEV refer to the Yearly Tables of IEV also segregated by Municipality.

On the left column, lists of significant features of each Municipality that may have an impact on IEV are offered. On the 2004 column the incidence of riot violence, with the use of four broad terms (property, assault, murder, demonstration) to describe the character of the disturbances. In all cases where there were disturbances, clashes/stand-offs with security forces (KPS, CivPol, KFOR) took place also. The symbol + indicates more severity or incidence, and the symbol – less severity or incidence throughout the Table. The **bold** towns denote regional capitals and marks the start of Municipalities belonging to a distinct region.

*Municipality*                      *Sept- Dec’02*    *Jan’-Dec’03*            *Jan-Dec’04*            *Jan-Mar ‘05*

<b>Prishtinë / Priština</b> + young + unemployed + illegally occupied property resistance to urban returns	4	16	31 March’04: 1 murder, + assault, + property	1
Fushë Kosovë/Kos. Polje + Mixed population, + returns Post-March bad recovery: appropriation of property, forced sales, no returns	3	11	17 March’04: 1 murder, + assault, + property	6
Obiliq / Obilic - integration Neighbours involved + Urban returns	9	21	12 Marc’04: + property, + assault	4

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

Lipjan / Lipljan + Mixed population Serbs 'fight back' + Urban returns	8	11	20 March'04: 1 murder, + assault, + property	0
Glogovc / Glogovac Albanian mono-ethnic	0	0	0	0
Shtime / Štimlje Ashkali/Roma remained well integrated, Serbs left	2	1	4 March'04: property	0
Podujevë / Podujevo No Serbs, Ashkali/Roma remained, - returns	1	1	1 March'04: property	0
<b>Gjilan / Gnjilane</b> - war damage, + mixed population, + returns including urban, + HPD evictions & targeting of property	17	17	24 March'04: 1 murder, + assault, + property	5
Kamenicë /Kamenica - war damage or KLA activity, + returns & + freedom of movement	7	7	5 March'04: property, assault	0
Novobërdë /Novo Brdo Very rural, subsistence farming, pre-war Serb majority now Alb. Marginal majority, IEV corresponds with political/party tension	2	1	1 March'04: 1 property targeted	0
Ferizaj / Uroševac + Returns to rural/no to urban areas, US army base employs 5,000, Roma + targeted as collaborators	0	8	7 March'04: property	0
Viti / Vitina Border town/influx Macedonia war, + Serbs	17	17	16 March'04: property	1

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

good returns to mixed & urban areas				
<b>Kaçanik/Kaçanik</b> Almost mono-ethnic	0	1	0 March'04: demonstration	0
<b>Štrpce / Shtërpçë</b> Balanced Serb/Alb population, isolated geographically	2	4	2 March'04: 1 murder	2
<b>Prizren</b> - war damage, + mixed, + wealthy, + war veteran activity	3	14	10 March'04: 1 murder, + property, + assault	3
<b>Dragash/Dragaš</b> Gorani minority muslims, isolated Municipality, - young, IEV linked to intra-group violence	2	2	3	0
<b>Suharekë / Suva Reka</b> + war damage, no Serbs, resistance to returns linked to war crimes	0	4	0 March'04: demonstration	0
<b>Rahovec/Orahovac</b> Serb return to urban area, + mixed, March'04 rioters locals	2	4	2 March'04: property	1
<b>Malishevë / Mališevo</b> + rural, + poor, no Serbs	0	1	1	0
<b>Pejë / Peć</b> + war damage, Serbs 'enclavised' little contact, + organised criminality, + political tension, few returns to urban area	6	11	39 March'04: + property, + assault	9
<b>Deçan / Dečani</b> - returns, -minorities, +	0	0	2 March'04: property	0

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

war damage, KLA stronghold, Serb patriarchate fear of Serb 'corridor'				
<b>Gjakovë/Đakovica</b> No Serbs, strong 'Gjakove' identity, + urban return RAE & Bosniak, Catholics 30%,	2	5	15 March'04: property	1
<b>Klinë /Klina</b> 15-20 % catholic, no Serbs in town	2	5	3 March'04: property	1
<b>Istog / Istok</b> 1 large organised Serb return (Osojane) not specifically targeted, + KFOR engagement, - urban returns	5	3	11 March'04: property	1
<b>Mitrovicë/Mitrovica</b> Flash point! Threat of partition, divided Municipality	28	61	49 March'04: 2 murders, + assault, + property, + violent demonstrations	10
<b>Skenderaj / Srbica</b> KLA stronghold, always – Serbs, + war damage	0	4	10 March'04: property, assault	1
<b>Vushtrri / Vuçitër</b> + returns (Serbs rural, Ashkali urban), + targeting of Serb farmers of 2 large organised returns	10	22	19 March'04: + property, + assault,	1
<b>Zubin Potok</b> Serb Municipality, 800 Alb village, Albs participate in Municipal structures	0	3	1	0
<b>Zvečan / Zveçan</b> Serb Municipality, 3 Alb villages isolated, KPS	3	4	1	0

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

Serb targeted by Serbs				
Leposavić/Leposaviq Serb Municipality, 132 Alb return, Alb involvement in Municipal structures	1	1	0	0

Below are a series of issues/factors that appear to be relevant in the incidence/absence of IEV and there follow tentative questions to begin exploring causal as opposed to correlative relationships between issues/factors and IEV. These have been drawn from the summary of the mapping document (pp.41-43), as well as from the tentative conclusions drawn from the first Community Survey. When the results from the second Community Survey and Workshops are inputted, partial and preliminary answers may begin to emerge from the mapping exercise. But these are to be put to the 'test' in further field consultations and explored in depth at the Case Study Stage of the project:

### ***War Experience:***

- ü Is physical/infrastructural damage, especially if it remains un-repaired, a factor?
- ü Is the unhealed trauma a factor? How does this trauma inter-play with remaining/returning minorities?
- ü How is the 'memory' of the war impacting on 'culture of violence', involvement of children, acceptance of IEV?
- ü Is the experience of high numbers of casualties a determining factor?
- ü Is the 'missing' issue as important/more/less important than the war-dead?
- ü Is the identity of the victims (fighters, civilians, elderly, women & children, prominent political/cultural figures) determining?
- ü More??

### ***Returns:***

- ü Are spontaneous/individual returns or large/organised returns more/less likely to be targeted?
- ü Are returns in urban areas less tolerated and therefore more likely to be targeted?
- ü Have earlier/later returns been more/less targeted?
- ü Is the nature of the inter-ethnic dialogue component of return projects significant in the incidence/absence of targeting of the participating IDPs?
- ü More?

### ***Socio-economic and geographic factors:***

If unemployment is a significant factor...

## What Difference Has Peacebuilding Made?

- ü Why do Municipalities experience diverse levels of IEV when all share dire socio-economic situations?
- ü Is the type of economy relevant (services, farming, internal economic migration)?
- ü What is the role of the informal/illegal economy in incidence/absence of IEV?
- ü And of organised crime?
- ü Is the location/topography of the site relevant?
- ü More?

### *Municipal political landscape:*

- ü To what extent is the party in charge determining in incidence/absence of IEV? Are some parties more prone to integration than others?
- ü Is inter-party tension relevant to IEV? How?
- ü Is minority participation/integration in majority-controlled Municipalities linked to less IEV? Why?
- ü More?

### *Identity:*

- ü What features of identity other than the obvious ethnicity appear more relevant in the experience of IEV: Faith, Nationality, gender, political affiliation, family name, others?

### *Others?*

Monica Llamazares, May 3<sup>rd</sup> 2005.